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Summary
There is little published evidence on the reactions of UK financial futures prices and 
associated trading activity to new information. This thesis addresses this deficiency in 
the literature by focusing on two forms of information exposure in UK futures markets. 
These occur in the form of either a repo rate announcement or from information inferred 
from observing the historical pattern of transactions. This study examines the impact of 
the unexpected component of repo rate announcements on futures markets. We find that 
the size of the price reaction and the amount of associated trading activity following an 
announcement was generally explained by the degree of surprise. This study also 
examines the information content of trade arrival times, or trade durations in market 
microstructure. In particular we generalise Hasbrouck’s VAR model, to determine the 
role played by trade durations in the price formation process and the autocorrelations of 
trades. We find that a buy transaction arriving after a long time interval has a lower 
price impact than a buy transaction arriving right after a previous trade. In addition, we 
model these trade durations using an autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) model. 
Although we find both the exponential and the Weibull distributions only partially 
account for the intertemporal correlations present in our duration data, we reject the 
exponential in favour of the Weibull. We also introduce a new asymmetric log-ACD 
model, where the next expected duration depends on the trade sign process.
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Chapter One
Introduction
Central to the literature concerned with market microstructure is the belief that in a 
market with asymmetrically informed agents trades convey information, and by 
examining the characteristics of trades one can infer something about the degree of 
information in the market. This new information can either arrive in the form of a 
macroeconomic announcement or by simply observing the historic pattern of trades.
While the literature dedicated to the impact of new information upon financial markets 
is now extensive, most of these studies consider US data, so it still remains that 
relatively little empirical work exists on the very high frequency adjustment dynamics 
exhibited by UK futures markets in response to new information. Since US equity 
markets open for trading after the release time for economic data, previous US studies 
have been unable to examine the immediate price adjustment in equity futures markets. 
It follows that a major innovation of UK studies is that since UK markets open before 
the release time of economic data, this facilitates an examination o f the immediate 
impact of news announcements upon both futures prices and trading activity. Also the
transactions data considered in this study include all transaction prices, whereas in 
previous US studies of a similar field they only consider price change transactions. The 
problem with studies using price change transactions is that, this exhibits spurious 
negative correlation as prices bounce between the bid and ask, and hence offers limited 
insights into the dynamics of price adjustment to new information.
A second important distinction between UK and US studies rests on the different trading 
systems used in both markets. In particular, major US markets are specialist markets 
where a designated market maker provides liquidity by posting bid and ask quotes. 
However the UK futures markets are now order driven, where there is no market maker 
but only traders who can enter either limit orders or market orders. A limit order is an 
order to buy/sell a given quantity at a maximum/minimum price within a given time 
horizon. A market order is an order to buy/sell a given quantity at the best available 
price. In an order driven market transactions occur when orders are matched, and the 
spread amounts to the difference between the smallest limit sell price and the largest 
limit buy price. Indeed the traders who enter limit orders provide liquidity to those who 
enter market orders, in a similar manner to market makers providing liquidity in a quote 
driven market. It follows that since relatively little empirical work exists on the 
dynamics of price formation in an order driven market, this thesis addresses this 
deficiency and provides further insights into both price and trade dynamics in an order 
driven market, and illuminates the similarities and differences of price formation and 
trade intensity between order driven and specialist markets.
In chapters two and three we examine the impact of repo rate announcements upon price 
and trading activity of both the Short Sterling and the FTSE 100 futures contracts traded 
on LIFFE (London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange). Although 
there exists an extensive literature dedicated to the impact of new information upon 
financial markets, much of this literature compares the response of prices following an 
announcement with some non-announcement benchmark. However, if  markets are 
efficient financial prices should only react to the unexpected component of any 
announcement. While some studies have utilised survey data in an attempt to capture the 
unexpected component of an announcement, the measure prevalent in most of these 
studies is the difference between the forecast value and the actual announced value.
However utilising survey data supplied by Reuters, about market participants forecasts 
of a forthcoming repo rate announcement, we indicate that this difference fails to 
distinguish between what is entirely expected and entirely unexpected information. This 
study uses additional measures of market surprise, following a repo announcement, that 
better captures both the nature and the degree of the surprise element.
In chapter two our results indicate that any unexpected change in repo rate leads to a 
change in price for both contracts. Further the response is found to be asymmetric for 
both contacts with the larger negative price reaction following an unexpected increase in 
repo rate compared with an unexpected decrease. In addition, trading volume was 
generally associated with a surprise in repo rate for the FTSE 100 but not for the Short 
Sterling. In chapter three our results indicate that following a not-expected repo rate 
announcement both contracts initially exhibit large price changes, elevated volatility and 
an increased number of larger trades. Although there does appear to be some evidence 
o f an initial over-reaction for the Short Sterling, the FTSE 100 exhibited a faster 
adjustment period. While there appeared to be some evidence of an adjustment 
following an expected announcement we explain this as a consequence of an element of 
surprise that remained in this measure of the surprise element. This lead to the 
development of alternative measures that focus on simply the unexpected components 
associated with each repo announcement. More specifically we examine the proportion 
of market participants that forecast an announcement either 25 or 50 basis points either 
side of the actual announcement and the impact these surprises have upon trade volume 
and its components, namely trade frequency and trade size. Our results indicate that with 
most surprised market participants being 25 basis points around the decision, they 
explain most abnormal trading activity following an announcement.
In chapter four we generalise the VAR model suggested by Hasbrouck (1991) for the 
dynamics of both trades and quote revisions of the FTSE 100 futures contract. In 
particular we include time-of-day effects and the time lapse between two consecutive 
transactions (trade durations). Trade durations have only recently been considered to 
play a prominent informational role in market microstructure. We aim to extend this 
recently developed literature that considers a role for time and more importantly to 
determine the role o f time in the price formation process of an order driven market. We
uncover both similar and different features of the price formation process of an order 
driven market compared with a specialist market. Our results indicate that both trade 
durations and daily periodicities are informative variables in price and trade dynamics of 
the FTSE 100 futures contract. In consensus with Dufour and Engle (2000) we find that 
a buy transaction arriving after a long time period has a lower price impact than a buy 
transaction arriving immediately following a previous trade. In contrast to their findings 
we show that when quotes are revised in an upward fashion more buyers enter the 
market and similarly when quotes are revised in a downward fashion more sellers enter 
the market. Finally in contrast with Dufour and Engle (2000), we find trade durations 
appear to be robust in the presence of both volume and spread, and therefore we can be 
confident of our inferences about the role played by trade durations in the dynamics of 
price formation in an order driven market.
Chapter five uses an autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) framework similar to 
the one first proposed by Engle and Russell (1998) to address a number o f issues 
regarding the trade intensity process. This ACD framework accounts for the irregular 
spacing characteristic of transactions data. In the original model, the conditional 
distribution is assumed to be Weibull, which collapses to the exponential in a particular 
case. Using FTSE 100 futures contract transactions durations’ data we proceed in a 
similar manner to Engle and Russell (1998) and provide a comparative analysis of both 
the exponential and the Weibull versions of the ACD model. Our results indicate that 
both the exponential and the Weibull only partially account for the intertemporal 
correlations between durations. Similar to Engle and Russell (1998) we prefer the 
Weibull to the exponential. Secondly we extend the asymmetric Log-ACD model first 
proposed by Bauwens and Giot (2002) to allow the duration process to depend upon the 
state of the trade sign process. That is, to examine if when a buyer initiates a trade 
whether the parameters differ from those if  a seller initiates a trade. We also include 
volume and spread into our version of the asymmetric Log-ACD model and find that 
both higher volume and spread lead to a shorter time arrival for the next trade.
The findings of this thesis are summarised in chapter six, where conclusions are then 
drawn on the work as a whole.
Chapter Two
Impact of Repo Rate Announcements upon Futures Markets
This chapter examines the impact of repo rate announcements upon both the Short 
Sterling interest rate futures and the FTSE 100 stock index futures contracts, which are 
traded on the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE). 
We focus on many aspects of market activity, including price changes, price volatility 
and trading volume. A major innovation in this study is the use o f survey data on market 
participants’ expectations, including information on the proportion o f the market that 
correctly forecasted the repo rate decision. We utilise this survey data as a proxy for 
both the size and the direction of the surprise element. In anticipation o f our results, we 
found that any unexpected change in repo rate leads to a change in price for both the 
Short Sterling and the FTSE 100 futures contracts. In addition, the response in these two 
markets was found to be asymmetric, with unexpected increases exhibiting the larger 
price reaction. In general trading volume was not found to be associated with any 
surprise in repo rate for the Short Sterling however for the FTSE 100 volume was found 
to be significantly elevated following a surprise announcement. Moreover for the FTSE 
1 0 0  the response in volume was found to be asymmetric with unexpected increases 
exhibiting the larger volume reaction. Finally, both markets exhibited a negative
relationship between the degree of market consensus o f the repo rate decision and price 
volatility.
2.1 Introduction
The method by which news is impounded into financial markets has always been of 
great concern and has generally received widespread attention. However only recently, 
with the availability of high frequency data sets, have researchers from both the 
academic and financial world been able to examine the high frequency dynamics by 
which financial market adjusts to new information.
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (E.M.H), as developed by Fama (1970), is one of the 
main theories in the financial literature. Fama (1970) stated that financial markets are 
assumed to be informational efficient, and financial market participants form 
expectations before an announcement on the foundation of all available information. 
That information should be incorporated in the prices o f financial assets prior to any 
announcement. Thus only the unexpected component o f any announcement generates a 
market adjustment. The availability of survey data on market participants’ expectations 
permits the decomposition of announcements into both expected and not expected 
components \
In this chapter, we employ survey data on market participants’ expectations of the 
forthcoming repo rate decision, as a proxy for the surprise element of each 
announcement. We proceed with a methodology similar to that o f Sun and Sutcliffe 
(2003) and divide the unexpected announcements into unexpected increases and 
unexpected decreases. This provides information on both the size and direction of the 
surprise element. As an additional measure o f the surprise element, we utilise 
information on the proportion of the market that correctly forecast the repo rate
1 For each announcement the mean forecast of the repo rate was subtracted from the 
actual decision rate, (see Jain (1988) and Becker et al. (1996)).
decision. We interpret this as, the greater the consensus the smaller the surprise, and 
similarly the smaller the consensus the greater the surprise.
There exists a burgeoning empirical literature that is devoted to the adjustment of 
financial markets to new information. The literature focuses on many aspects of the 
adjustment process, and raises many interesting questions. One such question we 
explore in this chapter is ‘whether investors react in a rational manner to major 
unanticipated announcements’. We address this question by examining certain aspects 
of market activity such as price changes, price volatility and trading volume around the 
announcement time.
2.2 Previous Empirical Literature
This chapter focuses on the role played by price, trading volume and price volatility of 
both the FTSE 100 and the Short Sterling futures contracts in response to a repo rate 
announcement. Since the empirical literature dedicated to the response of these three 
market variables to new information is considerable, this section is divided into three 
main discussions. Firstly the reaction of financial prices to new information, secondly 
the role played by trading volume in the reaction to new information, and finally the role 
of volatility in response to new information.
2.2.1 The Reaction of Financial Prices to New Information
An extensive empirical literature examines the effect o f ‘news’ on price adjustments in 
financial markets. The reaction of financial prices to news should be determined by the 
magnitude to which the news changes market opinion about the future payoff of the 
relevant security. Many studies have examined and postulated the impact of unexpected 
changes in economic variables on stock prices. Sun and Sutcliffe (2003) examined the 
impact o f the scheduled MPC and other macroeconomic announcement surprises on the 
spot, futures and options market for UK short-term interest rates. They found both the 
spot and futures market to react strongly to surprises in the repo rate. In addition they
found the response of these two markets to repo rate surprises to be asymmetric, with a 
larger negative reaction for positive surprises. They raised two possibilities for this 
apparent under-response; the first being that the expected change in repo rate is now 
expected at either of the next two MPC meetings, or because expectations became more 
accurate in the seven days between being collected and the MPC meeting. In particular 
they found the reactions of the spot and futures market to be fully consistent with semi­
strong market efficiency.
Others studies have examined how macroeconomic news affects either U.S. bond or 
equity price movements (Roley and Troll (1983); Jain (1988); Hardouvelis (1988); 
Smirlock (1986); Urich and Wachtel (1984)). However these studies generally utilise 
market closing prices, thus they are not concerned with market efficiency or the speed of 
adjustment, but rather whether any effect exists upon the direction and size of asset price 
changes. However Jain (1988) is an exception since he considered hourly returns o f the 
S&P 500 index, and concluded that the results were consistent with market efficiency. 
Two important announcement surprises have a significant negative effect on stock 
prices, the money-supply announcement and the CPI announcement (Fama and Schwert 
(1977); Schwert (1981); and Jain (1988)). Becker et al. (1996) provided an analysis of 
the bond futures market and although they found the markets response to be inefficient, 
they concluded that there were no logical explanations for why the market failed to 
promptly exploit all available information. However they raised the possibility of biased 
expectations leading to spurious response patterns. Cornell (1983) and Sheehan (1985) 
examined the impact of weekly money stock announcements and concluded that only 
unexpected announcements influenced financial variables. It has been firmly established 
that unanticipated increases in money supply lead to immediate increases in interest 
rates, (Grossman (1981); Roley (1982); Urich and Wachtel (1981)). Schirm et al. (1989) 
used both investors’ expectations and a time series model to measure expected Treasury 
debt announcements. They used models similar to those documented in Cornell (1983) 
and Sheehan (1985), and concluded that unexpected Treasury debt announcements 
prompted no interest rate response. In particular only cash management announcements 
had any significant effect on interest rates.
2.2.2 The Reaction of Trading Volume to New Information
Beaver (1968) was the first to suggest using volume as a measure of investors’ reactions 
to the release of information. He argued that volume, in conjunction with price changes, 
reflects two things: a lack of consensus about how a newly disclosed piece of (public) 
information should be interpreted and the extent to which that information changes 
individual investors’ expectations. Intrinsically, trading volume reflects the sum of 
differences in traders’ reactions, while the change in price reflects only the marginal 
reaction.
A number of analytical papers have examined the role of information on the volume of 
trade using different models, (Admati (1985); Bamber and Cheon (1995); Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1981); Hellwig (1980); Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990); Jain (1988); 
Kandel and Pearson (1995), Karpoff (1986) and Kim and Verrecchia (1991a)). The 
underlying notion prevalent in all these models is that most trades in financial markets 
occur due to differential beliefs.
The notion that differential interpretations are an important stimulus for speculative 
trading is longstanding. Louis Bacheliers’ (1900) seminal thesis on price fluctuations, 
published more than a century ago hypothesised that:
'past, present and even discounted future events are reflected in market price, 
but often show no apparent relation to price changes . .  .
Contradictory opinions concerning these changes diverge so much that at the 
same instant buyers believe in a price increase and sellers in a price decrease ’.
Differential belief revision around public announcements can arise from either 
differential interpretation of news or a difference in the precision o f investors’ pre­
disclosure information. Differential interpretations o f news can cause investors’ to 
revise their beliefs differentially. However, even when the news is commonly 
interpreted, differences in the precision o f pre-disclosure information can cause
investors to revise their beliefs differentially because investors will weight commonly 
interpreted news differently when revising their beliefs.
Kyle (1985) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) suggest that informed traders are more 
active when liquidity trading is high enough to help camouflage their trades. This 
camouflage reduces the effect of informed trades on prices, thereby increasing the 
profitability of informed trades. When trading volume is higher than normal, there is 
more likely to be enough liquidity trading to prompt informed traders to act on their 
differential interpretations.
Thus if  the unexpected component in economic announcements induces divergent 
beliefs, then there should be increased trading activity in the market following a surprise 
announcement, as market participants rebalance their portfolios based on the new 
information. Kandel and Pearson (1995) argued that in the absence o f any price change, 
there is little reason for information based trading other than differential interpretations. 
However if market participants agree on the effects of new information, they may not 
engage in additional trading; that is, the observed abnormal volume will be 
insignificantly different from zero, even if a change in price occurs. This framework 
allows us to interpret the extent of consensus among traders by examining trading 
volume in the market. In contrast Verrecchia (1981) believed that the link between 
information and volume is ambiguous.
Jain et al (1988) found trading volume not to be associated with surprises in the 
announcements of money supply, the CPI, PPI, unemployment rate, and industrial 
production. They concluded, that these results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
market participants interpret the surprises in announcements in an analogous manner 
and thus do not participate in any additional trading. Woodruff and Senchack (1988) 
found volume and trade frequency to be abnormally high after the release of the 
earnings surprise, and although volume remained elevated for some time, trade 
frequency peaked quickly in the first half-hour and rapidly declined thereafter. In 
general trade volume, trade frequency and trade size were all seen to be directly 
associated with the absolute degree of surprise. Kim and Verrechia (1991a) concluded 
that post-announcement volume is a function of the absolute price change
accompanying the announcement and the extent to which the precision of information 
changes across traders who are heterogeneously informed. Foster and Viswanathan 
(1993) construct a model that relates unexpected news to higher trading volume and 
volatility as a result of trading between informed and liquidity traders.
Finally, numerous studies have shown that trading volume associated with an equity 
price increase is greater than that associated with a price decrease. Epps (1975) and 
Copeland (1976) explain this by the disparity of opinions held by optimistic and 
pessimistic investors.
2.2.3 The Reaction of Price Volatility to New Information
There has been increasing concern over the presence of volatility in securities markets. 
This has stimulated much research into the process by which, new information is 
impounded into stock prices. Under the uncertain information hypothesis, Brown, et al. 
(1988) suggest that stock return variability will increase following the announcement of 
any major unanticipated event as the market responds to the incomplete information 
concerning the event. As mentioned earlier Foster and Viswanathan (1993) and Sun and 
Sutcliffe (2003) found volatility to be related to unexpected news. Li and Engle (1995) 
found the unexpected component of scheduled macro-economic announcements to 
affect returns and return volatility of US Treasury bond futures. Patell and Wolfson 
(1984) and Jennings and Starks (1985) observe that following earnings and dividend 
announcements volatility remained higher than normal for several hours and even into 
the next day. Ederington and Lee (1995) found volatility to remain greater than normal, 
even though the major adjustment to the initial release has occurred. They concluded 
that these continued price fluctuations were the result of either portfolio readjustment by 
market participants who disagreed with the markets evaluation of the releases 
implication, or alternatively the release of further information. Crain and Lee (1995) 
also found volatility to remain higher than normal for several hours, even though most 
of the price adjustment occurred within the first hour of the announcement.
2.3 Data and Methodology
2.3.1 Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)
On the 6 th May 19972, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordan Brown announced that 
the Government was giving the Bank of England operational responsibility for setting 
interest rates. The Bank of England Act (1998), which gave the Bank that responsibility, 
came into force on the 1st June 1998. The mechanism chosen to determine interest rates 
was to set up the MPC. The Bank's monetary policy objective is to deliver price stability 
(as defined by the Government's inflation target) and, without prejudice to that 
objective, support the Government's economic policy, including its objectives for 
growth and employment.
The repo rate3, which is the interest rate implicit in the prices at which the Bank of 
England is prepared to buy assets from a bank and then sell them back to the same bank 
approximately two weeks later. This rate sets the minimum cost of short-term bank 
funds and, to the extent that any change in the repo rate is not absorbed by a change in 
the mark-up charged by banks to their customers, directly affects short-term interest 
rates. Decisions are made by a vote of the Committee on a one-person one-vote basis, 
with the Governor having the casting vote if  there is no majority. Since the MPC meet 
monthly, their decisions determine the repo rate for the following month. The minutes of
2 Prior to this date, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, made interest rate decisions, after a 
monthly meeting with the Bank of England. An important distinction between these two 
regimes is that during the earlier regime, only interest rate changes were announced and 
these were unscheduled. However since the MPC has been established, all decisions are 
announced at 12:00GMT on the Thursday following the first Monday of the month. In 
addition since the MPC has been established, publicly available macro-economic data 
has helped the market form an expectation of the forthcoming repo rate, hence survey 
data of market participants’ expectations has become available.
3 A repo or “sale and repurchase agreement” can apply to Sterling treasury bills, UK 
government foreign currency debt, eligible bank and local authority bills, specific 
Sterling bonds issued by supranational organisations and by governments in the 
European Economic Area, (Monetary Policy Committee, 1999).
the meeting, including a record of any vote, are normally published on the second 
Wednesday after the meeting. Additionally a change in repo rate may also affect long­
term interest rates via its effect on expectations of future short-term rates.
2.3.2 LIFFEData
The tick-by-tick futures contract data used in this chapter are provided by LIFFE for the 
FTSE100 and Short Sterling futures contracts traded on this exchange between 7 May 
1997 and 30 April 2001. These are two of the most heavily traded contracts on LIFFE. 
The tick-by-tick data contains details of all trades in the contracts, and gives the time to 
the nearest second, the price and the number of contracts traded.
The data used are generally for the most heavily traded contract. For the Short Sterling 
contract the nearest-to-maturity contract is used at all times. For the FTSE100 contracts, 
we use the nearest-to-maturity contract until the trading volume on the next contract 
becomes greater. This generally occurs at maturity.
Since the futures price is linked by an arbitrage condition to the spot value of the index, 
the move to a new contract has virtually no implications for this study. Therefore we 
pay no attention to contract changeovers in what follows. The close link between futures 
prices and the price of the underlying asset means that the results will be a good 
indicator of the reaction of the underlying asset to repo rate surprises.
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2.3.3 Environmental Changes
During our sample period, there were two major environmental changes. These were 
namely, the change in tick size for the FTSE100 and the migration to the electronic 
trading system from the traditional open outcry. The change in tick size for the 
FTSE100 occurred in 1998 with the July contract being the first contract to be traded
tViusing the new tick size. The switch to electronic trading occurred on the 10 May 1999 
for the FTSE100 and the 6 th September for the Short Sterling. Figures 2.1 and 2.4 
present the daily trade volume around these environmental changes for both the Short 
Sterling and the FTSE 100 respectively. Figures 2.2 and 2.5 present the daily trade 
frequency around these environmental changes for both the Short Sterling and the FTSE 
100 respectively. Finally, Figures 2.3 and 2.6 present the daily trade size around these 
environmental changes for both the Short Sterling and the FTSE 100 respectively. We 
account for the impact of these environmental changes upon market activity, by the 
addition of two dummy variables representing the change in tick size o f the FTSE 100 
and the switch to electronic trading for both contracts in our model estimations.
2.3.3.1 Tick-Change
Our results clearly indicate that there is a jump in both mean daily trade volume and 
mean daily trade size after the tick change for the FTSE 100. However this change 
appeared to have no effect upon mean daily trade frequency of the FTSE 100.
2.3.3.2 Electronic Trading System
In recent years we have witnessed many international derivatives exchanges converting 
from the traditional open outcry to an electronic trading system, these include LIFFE 
during 1998 to 2000, France’s MATIF in June 1998 and the Sydney Futures Exchange 
in 1999.
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Although electronic trading systems are viewed by the exchanges as a means of 
competing more effectively and boosting trading volume, recently there has been a 
growing debate on the merits of the electronic system over the traditional open outcry.
Many studies have examined market activity around the transition time, in an attempt to 
draw some useful conclusions about the impact of the switch to the electronic trading on 
market activity. Tse and Zabotina (2001) found narrower bid-ask spreads and reduced 
price clustering in the FTSE 100 stock index futures contract following the transition to 
electronic trading at LIFFE. However in contrast, Ap Gwilym and Evamena (2003) 
examined the UK long-term government bond futures at LIFFE before and after the 
transition. They concluded that although price clustering is not greatly affected by the 
migration to electronic trading, there is a greatly increased concentration of large trades 
at more popular prices. They also found that mean daily trading volume increased after 
the transition, though this was not statistically significant. However mean daily trade 
size dramatically reduced, and the mean daily number of transactions and quotations 
increased. Finally they reported much elevated volatility since automation. We examine 
market activity around these environmental changes in an attempt to draw some useful 
conclusions ourselves. In particular we examine daily trade volume, daily trade 
frequency and daily trade size of both the Short Sterling and the FTSE 100 and conclude 
that while mean daily trade volume increases after the switch to electronic trading for 
the Short Sterling, there is no clear evidence of an impact o f the switch to electronic 
trading on mean daily trading volume for the FTSE 100. The reason for there being no 
observable impact upon volume for the FTSE 100, is because the switch to electronic 
trading led to both an increase in mean daily trade frequency and a decrease in mean 
daily trade size for the FTSE 100. It follows from the relationship of trade volume = 
trade frequency * trade size, that these two effects will offset each other leading to no 
change in trading volume. For the Short Sterling contract mean daily trade frequency 
increased and mean daily trade size increased slightly after the switch to electronic 
trading.
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2.3.4 Repo Rate Survey Data
Reuters provided the repo rate announcement data, shown in Table 2.1 Reuters conduct 
a monthly e-mail survey, of the repo rate expectations of about 40 to 50 financial 
institutions, on the Tuesday and Wednesday of the week preceding the scheduled MPC 
meeting. Reuters aim for a reply of at least 25 financial institutions. Reuters publish 
these forecasts at 12:30GMT on the Thursday before the announcement. Table 2.1 
shows each monthly repo rate announcement between June 1997 and April 2001. For 
each month the data provides information on the decision, including whether this 
decision was a rise, a fall or a no change, the market forecast and the vote of the MPC 
members. July 1998 marked the arrival of extra information; this represented the 
proportion of the market that correctly forecast the repo rate decision.
Announcement
Date
MPC Decision MPC Vote Market Consensus
Rate Change Forecast Proportion
Jun 1997 6.50 0.25 6 - 0 0.25
Jul 1997 6.75 0.25 6 - 0 0.25
Aug 1997 7.00 0.25 5 - 0 0.25
Sep 1997 7.00 0.00 7 - 0 0.00
Oct 1997 7.00 0.00 7 - 0 0.00
Nov 1997 7.25 0.25 7 - 0 0.00
Dec 1997 7.25 0.00 8 - 0 0.00
Jan 1998 7.25 0.00 5 - 3 0.00
Feb 1998 7.25 0.00 4 - 4 0.00
Mar 1998 7.25 0.00 4 - 4 0.00
Apr 1998 7.25 0.00 5 - 3 0.00
May 1998 7.25 0.00 6 - 2 0.00
Jun 1998 7.50 0.25 8 - 1 0.00
Jul 1998 7.50 0.00 9 - 0 0.00 60
Aug 1998 7.50 0.00 7 - 2 0.00 55
Sep 1998 7.50 0.00 7 - 2 0.00 80
Oct 1998 7.25 -0.25 7 - 2 0.00 60
Nov 1998 6.75 -0.50 8 - 1 -0.25 75
Dec 1998 6.25 -0.50 8 - 1 -0.25 80
Jan 1999 6.00 -0.25 7 - 2 0.00 60
Feb 1999 5.50 -0.50 8 - 1 -0.25 60
Mar 1999 5.50 0.00 8 - 1 0.00 60
Apr 1999 5.25 -0.25 8 - 1 -0.25 70
May 1999 5.25 0.00 5 - 4 0.00 70
Jun 1999 5.00 -0.25 8 - 1 0.00 60
Jul 1999 5.00 0.00 9 - 0 0.00 80
Aug 1999 5.00 0.00 9 - 0 0.00 80
Sep 1999 5.25 0.25 7 - 2 0.00 80
Oct 1999 5.25 0.00 9 - 0 0.00 60
Nov 1999 5.50 0.25 8 - 1 0.25 70
Dec 1999 5.50 0.00 6 - 3 0.00 80
Jan 2000 5.75 0.25 8 - 1 0.25 70
Feb 2000 6.00 0.25 8 - 1 0.25 80
Mar 2000 6.00 0.00 9 - 0 0.00 80
Apr 2000 6.00 0.00 6 - 3 0.00 60
May 2000 6.00 0.00 9 - 0 0.25 60
Jun 2000 6.00 0.00 6 - 3 0.00 70
Jul 2000 6.00 0.00 9 - 0 0.00 80
Aug 2000 6.00 0.00 5 - 4 0.00 60
Sep 2000 6.00 0.00 5 - 4 0.00 55
Oct 2000 6.00 0.00 9 - 0 0.00 70
Nov 2000 6.00 0.00 9 - 0 0.00 80
Dec 2000 6.00 0.00 7 - 2 0.00 85
Jan 2001 6.00 0.00 5 - 4 0.00 70
Feb 2001 5.75 -0.25 9 - 0 -0.25 70
Mar 2001 5.75 0.00 7 - 2 0.00 70
Apr 2001 5.50 -0.25 6 - 3 -0.25 60
Table 2.1: Results of Reuters Monthly Repo Rate Survey Data
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Bias and Efficiency Tests
Due to several days elapsing between the date of the survey and the date of the repo rate 
decision, it is possible that intervening events may lead to a systematic revision in 
forecasts, which destroys the information value of the news estimated as the difference 
between the decision and the forecast. In addition, market participants may in fact alter 
their forecast opinions to be in line with the market majority.
To investigate this matter, we follow a similar methodology to Balduzzi et al. (1998) 
and Anderson et al. (2002)4.
We regress the actual announcement, At on the mean forecast o f the survey Ft , and the
change in the futures price between the time of the survey and the time of the repo rate 
announcement, A y :
A, = a  0, + a  u  Fu + a 2 I Ay, + e,., , (2.1)
This regression facilitates the testing of several hypotheses. Firstly, if there is 
information content in the survey data, the coefficient estimates a jj should be positive 
and significant. Secondly if the survey information is unbiased, the coefficient estimates 
ao,i should be insignificant and the slope term a jj should be insignificantly different 
from unity. Finally, if  expectations are revised between the survey and the 
announcement, there should be a reaction in the futures price at the time of the revision, 
and we should see a relationship between the change in the futures price and the 
announcement.
4 Balduzzi et al. (2001) find most of the MMS forecasts contain information and are 
unbiased. They also find that for most indicators the hypothesis that cfc,,- = 0 cannot be 
rejected. Hence the MMS forecasts do not appear significantly stale.
Short Sterlin CT3 FTSE100
Coefficient T-statistic Probability Coefficient T-statistic Probability
Oo.i -0.038 -0.296 0.769 -0.001 -0.008 0.994
<*l,i 1.004 48.568 0.000 0.998 45.558 0.000
Oi2,i -0.007 -2.177 0.035 -0.001 -0.092 0.927
Table 2.2: Bias Test
Coefficient estimates, /-statistics and associated probabilities for Equation (2.1),
A, = a  + a  u  Flit + a  u  Ay, + e,_,
The dependent variable, A t is the actual repo rate announcement. The explanatory variables are the mean 
forecast o f the survey, F\ and the change in the futures price between the time o f the survey and the repo rate 
announcement, Ay. Number o f observations = 47.
The results in Table 2.2 indicate that the repo rate forecasts contain information and are 
unbiased. In addition, for the FTSE 100 we cannot reject the hypothesis that a 2J = 0, but
we can for the Short Sterling. This indicates that while the forecasts do not appear to be 
significantly stale for the FTSE 100, there does appear to be some evidence for the Short 
Sterling of a market revision between the time of the survey and the announcement. In 
the analyses of this chapter we account for any market revision by including an 
explanatory variable that measures market activity during the week preceding the 
announcement, i.e. between the forecast release and the actual announcement. For this 
purpose we calculate the change in price, between the time o f the survey release and the 
announcement5.
5 Although we used other measures of market activity, including average daily price 
changes, average daily volatility and average daily trading volume, in the week 
preceding the announcement, these provided no additional information to that provided 
by the change in price between the time of the survey and the time of the announcement, 
and hence had no implication on the coefficients or /-statistics o f other explanatory 
variables. We therefore do not report the results using other measure o f market activity.
As a further investigation of the validity of the forecasts, we perform an efficiency test 
of the forecasts. To comply with the principle of rational expectations and thus be useful 
in an analysis of market efficiency, the forecasts need to be both unbiased and efficient. 
While we have shown our forecasts to be unbiased, we shall perform an efficiency test 
similar to Pearce and Roley (1985) and Becker et al. (1996) 6.
In the efficiency test, the surprise value Si (actual release value minus the forecast value) 
for each series is regressed on lagged release values of the series, and the joint 
hypothesis o f zero lag coefficients is tested.
Si = a 0 + a l lagl + a  2 lag2 + a  3 lag3 + et , (2 .2 )
The underlying idea is that if  the announced data, is generated by an autoregressive 
process, the markets expectation should be generated by the same process. As a result, 
the current surprise should be independent of the lagged announced values.
6 Pearce and Roley (1985) and Becker et al. (1996), previously performed bias and 
efficiency tests for the MMS forecasts. Pearce and Roley (1985) find that the MMS 
survey estimates are unbiased (with the exception of industrial production) and efficient 
over the time period of their study and conclude that the survey data is more accurate 
than autoregressive models by virtue of lower mean squared errors. Becker et al. (1996) 
find four out of the nine forecasts considered in their study to be both unbiased and 
efficient, these include CPI, merchandise trade, nonfarm payrolls and housing starts.
Coefficient T-statistic Probability
do 0.113 0.847 0.402
dj 0.141 1.342 0.187
d2 0.015 0.083 0.934
d3 -0.176 -1.713 0.094
Table 2.3: Efficiency Test
Coefficient estimates, /-statistics and associated probabilities for Equation (2.2),
Si = a  0 + a  j lag 1 + a  2 lagl + a  3 lag3 + et
The dependent variable Sj is the surprise value. The explanatory variables are the three lags o f the actual 
release values. Number o f observations= 44.
The results in Table 2.3 indicate that we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
a ] = a 2 = a 3 = 0. Thus we can conclude that the current surprise is independent of the 
lagged announcements, hence we declare the forecasts to be efficient.
2.4.2 The Effect of Repo Rate Announcements upon Futures Prices
2.4.2.1 Hypothesis
For the Short Sterling, we predict that any unexpected change in repo rate is predicted to 
lead to a similar effect on the rate of return implicit in the price of the Short Sterling
n
futures, i.e. /?, = p 2 = -1  (Hypothesis 1) .
For the FTSE 100, we predict a negative relationship exists between any unexpected
o
changes in repo rate and the price of the FTSE 100 futures contract (Hypothesis 2) . In 
addition we predict that the relationship between the FTSE 100 futures price and any 
unexpected change in repo rate to be asymmetric, with unexpected increases in the repo 
rate exhibiting the larger price reaction (Hypothesis 3)9.
7 By convention interest rate futures are quoted as 100(1-Rf), where Rf is the annual 
futures spot return implicit in the current price o f the Short Sterling future. Therefore an 
increase in Rf of 1% corresponds to a decrease in F of 1%, and so the repo rate is 
expected to have a negative effect on the futures’ price.
8 Repo rate decreases are recognised as beneficial to UK companies and hence the 
economy. This is because the cost o f borrowing becomes cheaper. Hence if the repo rate 
decision was an unexpected decrease, then the FTSE 100 is expected to rise. Similarly an 
unexpected increase in repo rate should lead to a fall in the FTSE 100.
9 It is generally considered that markets react far greater response to negative news than 
positive news, (Anderson et al. (2002), Sun and Sutcliffe (2003)). Woodruff and 
Senchack (1988) found the most unfavourable earnings surprise corresponded with the 
largest price adjustment. Following the “up-stick” rule, which states that it is more 
difficult to short a stock on unfavourable news than to buy on favourable news, they 
found the most favourable earnings stocks had the quickest adjustment.
2.42.2 The Model
The impact o f unexpected changes in the repo rate upon the futures price is examined by 
estimating the following linear regression equation:
AFt = a  0 + J3 JJAMPC; + p  2UAMPC; + p  + p  4D2 + p  5 APt + en (2.3)
where AF,=change in futures price from the last trade before the announcement to the 
end of the first five, fifteen and sixty minutes of trading after the announcement10. The 
economic variables include unexpected increases in the repo rate UAMPCt+ and 
unexpected decreases in the repo rate UAMPCi n . The two dummy variables Dj and D2 
are defined where D] = 1 if  announcement occurs after the FTSE 100 changed tick size 
and zero otherwise. D2 = 1 if  announcement occurs after the introduction of electronic 
trading and zero otherwise. The economic variable APt is defined as the change in 
futures price from the time the survey is released to the last trade before the 
announcement.
10 We examine the change in price over different time intervals to establish, both the 
magnitude and direction of the price adjustment, for both the short and long run, in 
response to the release of new information into the market.
11 An unexpected increase in the repo rate is defined as the announced repo rate 
exceeding the expected repo rate. Similarly an unexpected decrease in the repo rate is 
defined as the announced repo rate being lower than the expected repo rate.
2A.2.3 The Results
S liort Sterling FTSE100
Coefficient T-statistic Probability Coefficient T-statistic Probability
5 min
do 0.006 0.549 0.586 3.511 1.697*** 0.098
A -0.659 -5.963* 0.000 -136.060 -8.881* 0.000
A -0.379 -4.535* 0.000 -55.633 -1.368 0.179
A - - - -6.908 -1.235 0.224
A 0.005 0.361 0.720 1.094 0.188 0.852
A -0.004 -3.004* 0.005 0.014 0.764 0.449
15 min
do 0.006 0.502 0.619 5.578 1.218 0.231
A -0.677 -5.713* 0.000 -166.440 -5.099* 0.000
A -0.390 -4.349* 0.000 -1.846 -0.073 0.942
A - - - -9.554 -1.555 0.128
A 0.003 0.202 0.841 3.717 0.752 0.457
A -0.005 -3.186 0.003 0.025 1.559 0.127
60 min
do 0.009 0.829 0.412 2.033 0.242 0.810
A -0.808 -6.769* 0.000 -161.156 -2.695* 0.010
A -0.360 -3.989* 0.000 71.483 1.539 0.132
A - - - -14.910 -1.324 0.193
A 0.001 0.071 0.943 3.917 0.432 0.668
A -0.004 -2.472** 0.018 0.051 1.735*** 0.091
Table 2.4: Effects of Unexpected Changes in Repo Rate upon Futures Price
Coefficient estimates, ^-statistics and associated probabilities for Equation (2.3),
A F t =  a  q + f3 JJA M PC*  + 2U A M P C t +  j i  +  [3 P  5
The dependent variable is the change in futures price (AFt) from the last trade before the repo rate 
announcement to the end o f the first five, fifteen and sixty minutes o f trading after the announcement. UAMPCt+ 
represents the unexpected increases in repo rate, UAMPCi represents the unexpected decreases in repo rate, D } 
is a dummy variable representing the change in tick-size for the FTSE 100. D 2 is a dummy variable representing 
the switch to the electronic trading system. APh represents the change in future price between the survey release 
and the announcement, * = Significant at 1% level. ** = Significant at the 5% level. *** = Significant at the 
10% level. Number of observations=47.
Short Sterling: White Heteroskedasticity Test Statistics: 5 minutes, 4.689 (probability = 0.455), 15 minutes, 
4.003 (probability = 0.549), 60 minutes, 2.214 (probability = 0.819).
LM Test for Serial Correlation Test Statistics: 5 minutes, 0.061 (probability = 0.970), 15 minutes, 0.126
(probability = 0.939), 60 minutes, 0.540 (probability = 0.763).
Jacque-Bera Test for Normality Test Statistics: 5 minutes, 4.827 (probability = 0.090), 15 minutes, 9.239 
(probability = 0.010), 60 minutes, 1.396 (probability = 0.498).
Adjusted R2 values: 5 minutes = 0.563, 15 minutes = 0.544, 60 minutes = 0.585.
FTSE100: White Heteroskedasticity Test Statistics: 5 minutes, - (probability = -), 15 minutes, 7.433 (probability 
= 0.283), 60 minutes, 5.454 (probability = 0.487).
LM Test for Serial Correlation Test Statistics: 5 minutes, 4.423 (probability = 0.120), 15 minutes, 3.963
(probability = 0.138), 60 minutes, 2.937 (probability = 0.230).
Jacque-Bera Test for Normality Test Statistics: 5 minutes, 5.637 (probability=0.060), 15 minutes, 0.570
(probability = 0.752), 60 minutes, 7.446 (probability = 0.024).
Adjusted R2 values: 5 minutes = 0.342, 15 minutes = 0.364, 60 minutes = 0.172.
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The results in Table 2.4 indicate that unexpected increases in the repo rate have a larger 
negative effect on the price of both the Short Sterling and the FTSE 100 futures contracts 
than do unexpected decreases. For the Short Sterling this difference is not significant 
over the first five and fifteen minutes of trading, but is significantly different (at the 5%
1 *7 1 ^level) over the first sixty minutes of trading ’ . For the FTSE 100 this difference is not 
significant over the first five and sixty minutes of trading, but is significantly different 
(at the 1% level) over the first fifteen minutes of trading. For the Short Sterling the 
values of both pi and are significantly different to minus one14. However, as post­
announcement time increases, 0/ tends to minus one. This suggests that after 60 
minutes, the market is approaching the new price equilibrium. In addition ao is close to 
zero indicating that when the decision is expected, the market does not exhibit any price 
adjustment. For the FTSE 100 the results indicate that unexpected decreases did not 
appear to have a significant effect upon futures price. Finally the change in futures price 
between the time of the survey release and the announcement is found to have a 
significantly negative effect upon the price of the Short Sterling only. This is consistent 
with the earlier results shown in Section (2.4.1) of a market revision between the time of 
the survey release and the announcement for the Short Sterling only.
In conclusion hypothesis 1 is rejected for both unexpected increases and decreases. We 
partially accept hypothesis 2  as our results were only found to be significant for 
unexpected increases. We accept hypothesis 3 that for the relationship between changes
12 Sun and Sutcliffe (2003) found the coefficient for positive MPC surprises to be 
significantly different from the coefficient for negative surprises on both LIBOR and 
Short Sterling futures.
1 3 To establish whether or not the two independent variables are significantly different, 
we examine their confidence intervals. If they do overlap then they are not significantly 
different. However if these do not overlap, then they are significantly different. These 
confidence intervals are constructed as: 
coefficient * (standard error) * za ,
where za corresponds to the test statistic o f the significance level of 1 0 0 *a%.
14 Sun and Sutcliffe (2003) found apart from positive surprises upon Short Sterling 
futures, the effect of MPC surprises on LIBOR and Short Sterling futures is less than 
one.
in the FTSE 100 index and unexpected changes in repo rate, was stronger for unexpected 
increases than decreases.
For the Short Sterling estimation, the White heteroskedasticity test, the LM test, and the 
Jacque-Bera test of the residuals indicate that there is no heteroskedasticity or serial 
correlation, however there does appear to be evidence of non-normality (p=0 .0 1 ) present 
for 15 minutes only. Hence we can be confident o f our inferences for both the 5 minutes 
and 60 minutes. For the FTSE 100, the White Heteroskedasticity test, the LM test and 
the Jacque-Bera test of the residuals indicate that there is no serial correlation, however 
heteroskedasticity is present for 5 minutes only, and non-normality is present (p=0.024) 
for 60 minutes only. Therefore for the five minutes regression we report White 
Heteroskedastic Consistent Standard Errors. Hence we can be confident of our 
inferences for both the five and fifteen minutes. However, econometric sources such as 
Kmenta (1971), suggested that non-normal disturbances are common in small data sets 
and so this limitation is an unavoidable constraint of the research design.
2.4.3 The Effect of Repo Rate Announcements upon Futures Trading 
Volume.
2.4.3.1 Hypotheses
Any unexpected change in repo rate, whether this be an unexpected increase or an 
unexpected decrease is predicted to lead to an increase in trading volume of both the 
Short Sterling and the FTSE 100 futures contracts {Hypothesis 4).
Trading volume of the FTSE 100 is predicted to be higher following unexpected 
decreases in repo rate compared with unexpected increases in repo rate {Hypothesis 
5)15,16.
15 An unexpected decrease in repo rate leads to a price increase in the FTSE 100 futures 
contract.
16 Numerous studies have shown that trading volume associated with an equity price 
increase is greater than that associated with a price decrease (Epps (1975); Copeland 
(1976)).
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2A3.2 The Model
The impact o f unexpected changes in the repo rate upon trading volume of the futures 
contracts is examined by estimating the following linear regression equation:
lnVt = a 0 + fiiUAMPC; + P 2UAMPC; + P 2D X + j34D 2 + e,., (2.4)
where lnVt = natural logged trading volume o f the futures contracts between the time of 
the announcement and the first five minutes of trading after the announcement17. The 
two economic variables are unexpected increases in the repo rate (UAMPCt+) and 
unexpected decreases in the repo rate (UAMPCf). The two dummy variables, Dj and D2 
are defined where Dj=\ if  the announcement occurred after the tick change for the 
FTSE 100, and zero elsewhere and D2=\ if the announcement occurred after the switch 
to electronic trading and zero elsewhere.
17 We found the trading volume series to be non-normal for both the Short Sterling and 
the FTSE 100 hence we performed these regressions using the natural logs of the volume 
data series. Regulez and Zarraga (2002) found evidence that volume was non-normal. 
Others have used the natural logs of volume, these include Ajinkya and Jain (1989), 
Campbell et al. (1993) and Bamber et al. (1999).
2.4.3.3 The Results
Short Sterling FTSE 100
Coefficient T-Statistic Probability Coefficient T-Statistic Probability
<*o 5.749 24.247* 0.000 4.504 11.018* 0.000
ft -0.265 -0.103 0.919 3.537 2.679* 0.011
5 min f t -4.027 -2.211** 0.032 -2.384 -3.701* 0.001
f t - - - 1.250 3.005* 0.005
f t 2.327 7.129* 0.000 -0.044 -0.245 0.808
Table 2.5: Effects of Unexpected Changes in Repo Rate upon Futures Trading Volume
Coefficient estimates, t-statistics and associated probabilities of Equation (2.4),
In Vt — cXq + f3 jf/AA/PC  ^ + 2  U& MPCt + f3  ^ 4 Z) 2  + c,-,
The dependent variable, InV, is the natural logged trading volume o f the futures contract between the time of 
the announcement and the first five minutes o f trading after the announcement. UAMPC,+ represents the 
unexpected increases in repo rate, UAMPC,' represents the unexpected decreases in repo rate, D t is a dummy 
variable representing the change in tick-size for the FTSE 100. D2 is a dummy variable representing the switch 
to the electronic trading system. * = Significant at the 1% level. ** = Significant at the 5% level. Number of 
observations = 47.
Short Sterling: White heteroskedasticity test statistic: 4.717 (probability = 0.194).
LM test for serial correlation test statistic: 0.721 (probability = 0.697).
Jarque-Bera test for normality test statistic: 1.024 (probability = 0.599).
Adjusted R2 value = 0.513
FTSE100: LM test for serial correlation test statistic: 1.916 (probability = 0.384).
Jarque-Bera test for normality test statistic: 1.925 (probability = 0.382).
Adjusted R2 value = 0.342
The results in Table 2.5 indicate that for the Short Sterling, unexpected decreases in the 
repo rate lead to an increase in trading volume, however unexpected increases play no 
part in explaining the dependent variable. For the FTSE 100, we found the residuals to 
show evidence of heteroskedasticity, thus we report White heteroskedastic consistent 
standard errors. The results for the FTSE 100 contract show both unexpected increases 
and unexpected decreases play an important part in explaining the elevated abnormal 
post-announcement volume. In addition, we found this reaction to be greater for 
unexpected increases than unexpected decreases in repo rate.
Hence for the Short Sterling the results partially support hypothesis 4, as we find 
elevated volume following an unexpected decrease in repo rate, however we find there
to be no relation between unexpected increases in repo rate and post-announcement 
volume. However, for the FTSE 100, the results lead us to accept hypothesis 4 and reject 
hypothesis 5.
2.4.4 The Effect of Repo Rate Consensus upon Futures Trading Volume
2.4.4.1 Hypothesis
If the unexpected component in the repo rate announcement induces divergent beliefs,
1 ftthere should be an increase in trading activity following an announcement . The 
relationship between the proportion of the market correctly forecasting the repo rate 
decision and trading volume is predicted to be negative for both the Short Sterling and 
the FTSE 100 financial futures contracts {Hypothesis 6).
2.4.4.2 The Model
The relationship between the proportion of the market correctly forecasting the repo rate 
decision and the trading volume of the futures contracts is examined by estimating the 
following linear regression equation.
InV( = a Q + J3{Pbt + P2D2 + et , (2.5)
where lnVt = natural logged values of trading volume o f the futures contract between 
the time of the announcement and the first five minutes of trading after the 
announcement. The economic variable Pbt = the proportion o f the market that correctly 
forecast the repo rate decision. The dummy variable D 2 is defined as D2 = 1, if  the 
announcement day occurred after the switch to the electronic trading system.
18 See Section 2.2.2.
2.4A3 The Results
SIiort Sterling FTSE100
Coefficient T-statistic Probability Coefficient T-statistic Probability
5 min
oto 7.054 16.181* 0.000 6.637 22.445* 0.000
ft -0.010 -1.364 0.182 -0.012 -2.218** 0.034
f t 1.738 5.038* 0.000 -0.066 -0.259 0.797
Table 2.6: Effect of Repo Rate Consensus upon Futures Trading Volume.
Coefficient estimates and /-statistics o f Equation (2.5), 
lnVt = a 0 + P xPb% + P2D2 + et ,
The dependent variable, Ink, is the natural logged trading volume o f the futures contracts between the time 
of the announcement and the first five minutes o f trading after the announcement. Pb, represents the 
proportion o f the market that correctly forecast the repo rate decision, D2 is a dummy variable representing 
the switch to the electronic trading system. * = significant at the 1% level. ** = significant at the 5% level. 
Number o f observations = 34.
Short Sterling: White heteroskedasticity test statistic: 4.437 (probability = 0.218).
LM test for serial correlation test statistic: 0.388, (probability = 0.824).
Jacque-Bera test for normality test statistic: 0.811, (probability = 0.667).
Adjusted R2 value = 0.418.
FTSE 100: White heteroskedasticity test statistic: 2.548 (probability = 0.467).
LM test for serial correlation: 3.899 (probability = 0.142).
Jacque-Bera test for normality test statistic: 0.382 (probability = 0.826).
Adjusted R2 value = 0.132.
The results in Table 2.6 indicate that for the Short Sterling, the proportion of the market 
correctly forecasting the repo rate decision plays no part in explaining post­
announcement volume. However for the FTSE 100 we found the relationship between 
the proportion of the market correctly forecasting the repo rate decision and trading 
volume to be negative (significant at the 5% level). Hence as the proportion of the 
market correctly forecasting the repo rate decision decreases, volume increases. We 
conclude therefore that we accept hypothesis 6  for the FTSE 100, but not for the Short 
Sterling.
2.4.5 The Effect of Repo Rate Consensus upon Financial Futures Price 
Volatility
2.4.5.1 Hypothesis
Following the uncertain information hypothesis, (Brown et al. (1988)), we predict the 
relationship between the proportion of the market correctly forecasting the repo rate 
decision and price volatility to be negative, (.Hypothesis 7).
2.4.5.2 The Model
The relationship between the proportion of the market correctly forecasting the repo rate 
decision and price volatility is examined by estimating the following linear regression 
equation.
ARt = ccq + P\Pbt + P 2 ^ 2  P i^ pt (2*6)
where ARt = abs(\n(PtJ P t_n) \ 19
Pt+n = the price of the last trade over interval t + n , where / = time of announcement, 
and n = 5, 15 and 60 minutes. Pbt = the proportion o f the market forecasting the repo 
rate decision. The dummy variable D2 is defined where D2 =1 if announcement occurs 
after the switch to electronic trading and zero otherwise. The economic variable AP t =
the change in futures price from the time the survey is released to the last trade before 
the announcement.
19 All log returns are multiplied by 103.
2.4.5.3 The Results
Short Sterling FTSE100
Coefficient T-statistic Probability Coefficient T-statistic Probability
5 min
do 15.433 7.585* 0.000 51.218 4.091* 0.000
0, -0.155 -4.663* 0.000 -0.343 -1.734*** 0.094
02 -1.537 0.993 0.329 -19.854 -2.271** 0.031
03 -0.130 -0.973 0.339 0.021 0.809 0.425
15 min
do 15.960 7.029* 0.000 38.822 3.866* 0.001
0, -0.153 -4.118* 0.000 -0.171 -0.989 0.331
02 -1.930 -1.117 0.273 -12.035 -1.389 0.175
03 -0.161 -1.082 0.288 -0.012 -0.444 0.660
60 min
do 15.663 7.168* 0.000 72.053 3.885* 0.001
0, -0.143 -4.002* 0.000 -0.293 -0.915 0.368
02 -2.081 -1.251 0.221 -25.635 -1.602 0.120
03 -0.090 -0.632 0.532 -0.059 -1.151 0.259
Table 2.7: Effect of Repo Rate Consensus upon Futures Price Volatility
Coefficient estimates, t-statistics and associated probabilities o f Equation (2.6),
ARt = a 0 + P xPbt + p  2D 2 + P 3APt + en
The dependent variable, AR, represents volatility. Pbt represents the proportion o f the market that correctly 
forecast the repo rate decision, D2 is a dummy variable representing the switch to the electronic trading 
system. AP, represents the change in futures price between the time o f the survey release and the 
announcement, * = significant at 1% level. ** = significant at the 5% level. *** = significant at the 10% 
level. Number o f observation = 34.
Short Sterling: White Heteroskedasticity Test Statistics: 5 minutes, 7.874 (probability = 0.163), 15 minutes, 
7.697 (probability = 0.174), 60 minutes, 8.721 (probability = 0.121).
LM Test for Serial Correlation Test Statistics: 5 minutes, 0.994 (probability = 0.608), 15 minutes, 0.765 
(probability = 0.682), 60 minutes, 1.980 (probability = 0.372).
Jacque-Bera Test for Normality Test Statistics: 5 minutes, 3.552 (probability = 0.169), 15 minutes, 6.553 
(probability = 0.038), 60 minutes, 10.786 (probability = 0.005).
Adjusted R2 Values: 5 minutes, 0.450, 15 minutes, 0.399, 60 minutes, 0.392.
FTSE100: White Heteroskedasticity Test Statistics: 5 minutes, - (probability = -), 15 minutes, 6.773 
(probability = 0.238), 60 minutes, 5.037 (probability = 0.411).
LM Test for Serial Correlation Test Statistics: 5 minutes, 2.744 (probability = 0.254), 15 minutes, 0.694 
(probability = 0.707), 60 minutes, 2.436 (probability = 0.296).
Jacque-Bera Test for Normality Test Statistics: 5 minutes, 0.716 (probability = 0.699), 15 minutes, 30.371 
(probability = 0.000), 60 minutes, 61.944 (probability = 0.000).
Adjusted R2 Values: 5 minutes, 0.452, 15 minutes, 0.077, 60 minutes, 0.135.
The results in Table 2.7 indicate that a negative relationship exists between the 
proportion o f the market correctly forecasting the repo rate decision and the volatility of 
both the Short Sterling and the FTSE100 futures contracts. Although volatility remains 
persistently elevated for the Short Sterling following an unexpected announcement, for 
the FTSE 100 volatility remains elevated for only 5 minutes. Therefore, we accept 
hypothesis 7, for both contracts.
For the Short Sterling, the White test, the LM Test, the Jacque-Bera test of the residuals 
indicate that there is no heteroskedasticity or serial correlation present however there 
does appear to be evidence of non-normality for both the fifteen and sixty minutes 
residuals, (p = 0.038, 0.005), respectively. For the FTSE100, the White test, the LM 
test, the Jacque-Bera test of the residuals indicates that there is no serial correlation, 
however heteroskedasticity is present at the 5 minutes only, hence we report White 
heteroskedastic consistent standard errors. The Jacque-Bera test indicates strong 
evidence o f non-normality for both the fifteen and sixty minutes residuals. However, as 
we discussed earlier, Kmenta (1971), suggested that non-normal disturbances are 
common in small data sets and that this limitation is an unavoidable constraint o f the 
research design.
2.5 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we examined the impact of repo rate surprises upon market activity of 
both the Short Sterling and the FTSE 100 futures contracts. We utilised survey data 
supplied by Reuters on market participants’ expectations of the forthcoming repo rate 
announcement, as a proxy for both the direction and the magnitude of the surprise 
element in the market following an announcement. In a similar manner to Sun and 
Sutcliffe (2003) we used the difference between the forecast value and the actual 
announced value to determine whether an unexpected announcement was an unexpected 
increase or an unexpected decrease in repo rate. In addition we used the proportion of
the market that correctly forecast the actual announcement as a further indication of the 
size of the surprise element in the market following an announcement.
Due to the possibility of a market revision between the time o f the survey release and 
the announcement, we performed bias and efficiency tests of the forecasts, and found 
that while the announcements were efficient, there does appear to be some evidence o f a 
market revision for the Short Sterling only. In our models, we accounted for any market 
revision by an additional explanatory variable that measures the change in futures price 
between the time of the survey release and the time of the announcement. As expected 
this variable was significant in our model of price change for the Short Sterling only.
We also provided evidence of a change in market activity following a tick-change for 
the FTSE 100 and the transition to the electronic trading system from the traditional 
open-outcry for both the Short Sterling and the FTSE 100. In our models we accounted 
for these changes by additional dummy variables and found the change in tick-size to be 
significant in relation to both volatility and trading volume o f the FTSE 100 and the 
switch to electronic trading to be significant in relation to trading volume of the Short 
Sterling.
Our results indicate that both markets react strongly to repo rate surprise 
announcements. Consistent with Sun and Sutcliffe (2003), we found the response in 
both markets to be asymmetric with unexpected increases causing the larger negative 
reaction in price. Consistent with the uncertain information hypothesis, (Brown et al. 
(1988)), we found that volatility became elevated immediately following a surprise 
announcement. Although this returned to normal levels after only 5 minutes for the 
FTSE 100, for the Short Sterling volatility remained elevated for at least 60 minutes 
following a surprise announcement.
In general trading volume was found to be positively associated with the surprise 
element for the FTSE 100, but not generally for the Short Sterling. This indicates that 
for the FTSE 100 following a surprise announcement market participants differ in their 
evaluation of the announcement and therefore rebalance their portfolios based on the 
new information. In addition, we found the response of the FTSE 100 contract to be
asymmetric, with unexpected increases in the repo rate leading to a larger volume 
reaction, compared with unexpected decreases. However for the Short Sterling, our 
results indicate that although price appeared to react to repo rate surprises, trading 
volume was generally not found to be associated with our surprise measure. We suggest 
in a similar manner to Kandel and Pearson (1995) that if market participants agree on 
the effects of the announcement, then they may not engage in any additional trading, 
even if a change in price occurs.
Chapter Three
Repo Rate Surprise and the Transaction Process
In the previous chapter, we utilised survey data on market participants’ expectations of 
the forthcoming repo rate to provide an analysis of the impact of repo rate surprises, 
upon both the FTSE 100 stock index and the Short Sterling interest rate futures contracts. 
We focused on three aspects of market activity including price changes, trading volume 
and price volatility, and concluded that the response in these two markets was found to 
be asymmetric, with unexpected increases exhibiting the larger negative price reaction. 
In addition, we found trading was associated with a surprise in repo rate for the 
FTSE 100 futures contract but not generally for the Short Sterling futures contract. This 
chapter provides additional insights into the impact o f repo rate surprises upon both the 
Short Sterling futures contract and the FTSE 100 futures contract. We focus on many 
aspects of market activity, including price, trade frequency and trade size. We provide 
an analysis o f the adjustment behaviour, of both futures prices and futures trading 
volume over both transaction time and 15-second time intervals. Additionally we 
provide a direct measure of the degree of repo rate surprise, to provide a unique analysis 
of the impact of repo rate surprises upon trading.
3.1 Introduction
Although there exists a burgeoning empirical literature dedicated to the adjustment of 
financial markets to new information, relatively little empirical work exists on the 
dynamics of trade frequency and trade size in response to new information. This chapter 
addresses this deficiency by examining the effects of repo rate surprises upon both trade 
frequency and trade size of both the Short Sterling and the FTSE 100 futures contracts. 
In addition, by examining both trade frequency and trade size, we are offering a deeper 
insight in the response of trade volume to new information1.
In the previous chapter we established that financial markets should only respond to the 
unexpected component of any announcement. The analysis supported this by showing 
that unexpected changes in repo rate lead to a change in price for both the Short Sterling 
and the FTSE 100 futures contracts. In addition, we found trading volume of the 
FTSE 100 futures contract was consistently associated with our measures of repo rate 
surprise. However for the Short Sterling, trading volume was only associated with an 
unexpected decrease in repo rate. In the previous chapter we were not concerned with 
market efficiency or the speed and duration of the adjustment process, but rather with 
whether any effect exists upon both the direction and the magnitude of both the futures 
price changes and the futures trading volume. This chapter provides additional insights 
into both the price adjustment process and the trading associated with the release of repo 
rate announcements. In particular we decompose our announcements into expected and 
not-expected components and focus on the speed of price adjustment and the number of 
transactions to achieve a new equilibrium price.
Most models that assess the impact of new information upon financial market activity, 
determine the surprise element as the difference between the forecast value and the 
announced value. In the previous chapter we used this measure in a similar manner to 
Sun and Sutcliffe (2003) and separated our unexpected announcements into unexpected 
increases and unexpected decreases in repo rate. For our second measure of the surprise
1 This follows from equation V=F*S, where V=trade volume, F=trade frequency and 
S=trade size,
element, we utilised the degree of market consensus relating to the repo rate decision. In 
this chapter more detailed survey data on market participants’ expectations of the 
forthcoming repo rate announcement is used. More specifically, each surveyed market 
participant provides a probability of whether there is likely to be no change in the 
interest rate, or a rise or a fall decision of 25 or 50 basis points. We interpret the means 
o f these probabilities as representative of the proportion of market participants expecting 
that decision. This provides more detailed information on the views of market 
participants and hence on the impact of unexpected information upon financial market 
activity. We proceed by examining the impact of the degree of surprise upon trade 
volume, trade frequency and trade size. By measuring the trading activity in response to 
the degree of surprise of market participants we provide a further understanding of the 
reactions of market participants in response to unexpected information. Further, by 
examining both trade frequency and trade size, we also provide a deeper understanding 
o f the role played by volume in response to new information.
3.2 Previous Empirical Literature
In recent years we have witnessed an increased availability of high frequency 
transactions data sets that has generated research on the very high frequency dynamics 
by which financial markets adjust to new information. The literature devoted to the 
adjustment process examines important questions such as ‘How long does it take for the 
information to be fully incorporated in market prices, in the sense that price volatility 
returns to normal levels?’ and ‘How quickly and efficiently does the market incorporate 
the new information?’ If prices adjust slowly, then based on the markets initial response, 
traders with quick access to the market may be able to earn excess trading profits. This 
opportunity for trading profits may end long before volatility has returned to normal 
levels. Trading profits are only possible if  the direction of the futures price changes is 
predictable, whereas volatility may remain high if subsequent price adjustments are 
large but unpredictable.
Much of the literature in this area examines the effect o f earnings and dividend 
announcements upon equity prices. Patell and Wolfson (1984) and Jennings and Starks 
(1985) find that although the return variance remains higher for several hours, the 
opportunity to earn excess returns ceases after ten to fifteen minutes. In contrast 
Woodruff and Senchack (1988) and Brown et al. (1992) find that the average time 
between an unexpected earnings announcement and the first post-announcement trade is 
fourteen minutes. However they do not test for significance and find that roughly half of 
the adjustment occurs within the first thirty minutes. Brown et al. (1992) discover that 
following extremely bad or good earnings news, prices tend to trend in the same 
direction for approximately four hours. Barclay and Litzenberger (1988) find that profit 
opportunities last around fifteen to thirty minutes following new issue announcements. 
Jain (1988) found the response of the S&P 500 index to unexpected changes in money 
supply and CPI to be completed within one hour. Ederington and Lee (1993) find that 
volatility in US interest rate and foreign exchange futures markets remains significantly 
higher than normal for between forty to sixty minutes after scheduled macroeconomic 
announcements, although the opportunity for trading profits ends within one minute. 
Ederington and Lee (1995) show that US interest rate and foreign exchange futures 
markets begin adjusting within the first ten seconds o f an announcement and that most 
of the adjustment to a new equilibrium is complete within forty to fifty seconds. They 
also found weaker evidence of an overreaction in the first forty seconds with a 
correction in the second or third minute after an announcement. Leng (1996) shows that 
the impact of ‘major’ announcements upon price variability in US foreign exchange 
futures markets lasts for at least an hour, while the impact o f ‘minor’ announcements is 
short-lived. Ederington and Lee (1994) examine dollar/yen futures, and find that 
volatility is higher during the forty-minute period following 8:30EST announcements. 
They also found price adjustment begins within ten seconds and is complete within fifty 
seconds, with some evidence of an initial overreaction. Crain and Lee (1995) compare 
the reaction of spot and futures prices in interest rate and currency markets to scheduled 
macroeconomic announcements. They found while most price adjustments occur within 
the first hour following the announcement, volatility remains above normal for several 
hours in both markets, although longer in the spot market. However as they use hourly 
intervals in the analysis, they cannot be precise about the duration of the price 
adjustment. Becker et al. (1996) used MMS expectations data to provide an analysis of
the efficiency of bond futures markets, they found the markets response to be inefficient. 
They concluded that there were no logical explanations for why the market failed to 
promptly exploit all available information. However they raised the possibility of biased 
expectations leading to spurious response patterns.
Theoretical models of the price adjustment process, such as Brown and Jennings (1989) 
and Grundy and McNichols (1989), suggest that uninformed traders can obtain 
information from observing the sequence of prices during the price adjustment period. 
The theoretical models of Blume et al. (1994), Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), and 
Easley and O ’Hara (1992) suggest that other aspects of market activity such as volume 
and the time between trades may offer important insights into the adjustment process.
Although much evidence exists on the role played by trading volume in response to new 
information (see section 2 .2 .2 ), relatively scant evidence exists on the role played by its 
components. Ap Gwilym et al. (1998) found that both the interest rate and the equity 
index futures markets reacted immediately to macroeconomic announcements. Although 
there was an initial overreaction for both markets, the FTSE 100 futures price adjusted to 
the new information within seven transactions. The Short Sterling exhibited a slightly 
longer adjustment period of around ten transactions. In addition they found smaller trade 
sizes prior to an announcement release, and suggested that investors are reluctant to 
trade prior to an announcement. However immediately following an announcement, 
they found average sized trades for the FTSE 100 futures contract while the price 
adjusted to the new information, with larger trades being delayed until the price had 
fully adjusted. In contrast the Short Sterling contract exhibited large trades for a 
considerable time. They concluded that diverging opinions explained the impact of an 
announcement upon the Short Sterling market.
3.3 Data and Methodology
This chapter presents two main analyses. In our first analysis we follow a similar 
methodology to Ap Gwilym et al. (1998) to examine the adjustment behaviour of both 
futures prices and futures trading volume in response to repo rate announcements. 
However this chapter provides an analysis that differs from Ap Gwilym et al. (1998) in 
that conditional expectations are used to provide a more accurate analysis of any 
adjustment process. In particular we use survey data on market participants’ 
expectations of the forthcoming repo rate to decompose our announcements into 
expected and not-expected components. To determine the market reaction to repo rate 
announcements we compare measures of market activity around the announcement time 
with a ‘normal’ or non-announcement period. In addition we provide a comparative 
analysis between the reactions following a not-expected announcement with those 
following an expected announcement. The announcement windows considered here are 
both transaction time and clock time periods. Focusing on both transaction time and 
clock time intervals is particularly useful for comparative studies of different markets 
where trade frequencies are different. We focus on a transaction-by-transaction period 
that considers the first 30 transactions following an announcement and a clock-time 
period that extends from two minutes before the announcement to ten minutes after, 
which we term the announcement window running from T-120 seconds to T+600 
seconds. This permits the capture of any activity prior to the repo announcement, and is 
long enough to examine the adjustment process. The non-announcement benchmark is 
derived from the same 30 transactions/twelve-minute windows for any Thursday where 
there was no repo rate information release.
We examine many aspects of the adjustment behaviour o f both futures prices and 
futures volume both transaction-by-transaction and over 15-second time intervals. First 
we gain insight into the nature of the adjustment process by comparing price volatility, 
average absolute price changes, average number of transactions and average trade sizes
2 •across announcement days with non-announcement days . Second, we investigate the 
duration of the adjustment process by comparing average percentage continuations 
across announcement days with non-announcement days. Finally, we investigate the 
speed of the adjustment process by examining the correction to the new equilibrium 
price over each time interval. We find that while both price and volume react more 
strongly following a not-expected announcement compared with following an expected 
one, there does appear to be some evidence of a reaction following an expected 
announcement. We interpret these findings as a consequence of the method used to 
construct the surprise element. More specifically we interpret an expected 
announcement as one where more than 50 percent of surveyed market participants 
expected it. This is the standard approach adopted in studies utilising survey data (e.g. 
Roley and Troll (1983), Urich and Wachtel (1984), Smirlock (1986), Jain (1988), 
Hardouvelis (1988) and Becker et al. (1996)) and provides a good proxy of whether the 
anticipated component is greater or smaller than the unanticipated component. However 
it means that there is still a significant proportion of the market that did not expect the 
expected decision. Similarly in every not-expected announcement there is an element of 
anticipated news. Therefore any market adjustment following an expected 
announcement is the consequence of elevated trading by a minority whose prior 
expectations were not confirmed in the announcement.
In our second analysis we address this issue and examine the impact of the degree of 
repo rate surprise upon trading. We proceed by separating our surprise element for each 
announcement into four different measures of surprise; the proportion of the market that 
forecast a decision 50 basis points below the decision, 25 basis points below the 
decision, 25 basis points above the decision and 50 basis points above the decision. In 
particular we examine the impact of these four measures of repo rate surprise upon trade 
volume, trade frequency and trade size during the first five minutes after the 
announcement. By observing the impact of repo rate surprises upon trade frequency and
2 Following the impact of the transition to electronic trading from the floor upon market 
activity, (see Section 2.3.3.2). We divide our analysis of both trade frequency and trade 
size into the period before electronic trading was introduced and the period after 
electronic trading was introduced.
trade size, we provide a deeper understanding o f the reaction o f volume to new 
information.
3.3.1 LIFFEData
Again we use tick-by-tick data provided by LIFFE for both the Short Sterling interest 
rate futures contract and the FTSE 100 stock index futures contract traded on this 
exchange between July 1998 and September 2003. Again, the data used are generally for 
the most heavily traded contract. For the Short Sterling contract the nearest-to-maturity 
contract is used at all times. For the FTSE 100 contracts, we use the nearest-to-maturity 
contract until the trading volume on the next contract becomes greater. This generally 
occurs at maturity.
3.3.2 Repo Rate Survey Data
Reuters provided the repo rate announcement data shown in Table 3.1. As described in 
chapter two, Reuters conduct a monthly e-mail survey, of the repo rate expectations of 
about 40 to 50 financial institutions, on the Tuesday and Wednesday of the week 
preceding the scheduled MPC meeting. Reuters aim for a reply o f at least 25 financial 
institutions. Reuters publish these forecasts at 12:30GMT on the Thursday before the 
announcement.
However since July 1998, the market participants surveyed by Reuters have provided a 
more detailed forecast of the forthcoming announcement, incorporating a probability 
assessment of all feasible repo rate decisions. These decisions range from a fall to a rise 
o f 50 basis points, in incremented steps o f 25 basis points. Table 3.1 shows each 
monthly repo rate announcement between July 1998 and September 2003. For each 
month the data provides information on the average proportion o f market participants 
that forecast a decision of no change, to a rise or a fall o f 25 or 50 basis points, along 
with the repo decision and the market forecast. We highlight in bold the proportion of 
surveyed market participants that correctly forecast the repo rate decision. We consider
an announcement that was forecasted by at least 50 percent o f the surveyed market 
participants as an expected announcement, and similarly those announcements that were 
forecasted by less than 50 percent o f surveyed market participants as not-expected 
announcements.
3.3.3 Electronic Trading System
In chapter two (section 2.3.3.2), we indicated that the switch to the electronic trading 
system from the traditional open outcry caused a change in market activity. In particular 
trade frequency increased after the switch to the electronic trading system, for both 
contracts. However for trade size, both contracts reported different patterns following 
the switch to the electronic trading system. For the FTSE 100 trade size decreased quite 
substantially. In contrast the Short Sterling contract showed a slight increase in trade 
size. In the analyses of this chapter we account for the effects on market activity of both 
contracts following the switch to the electronic trading system. In our first analysis we 
separate our data sample in to two periods, namely the pre-electronic trading system 
period (pre-ET) and the post-electronic trading system period (post-ET). In our 
regression analysis we include a dummy variable, Dh where Dt assumes a value of one if 
the announcement occurs after the switch to the electronic trading system and zero 
elsewhere.
Repo Rate Forecasts MPC Decision Market Forecastuaie
-50 -25 0 25 50 Change Change
Jul 1998 0 0.97 59.44 39.29 0 0.00 0.00
Aug1998 0 0.97 59.44 39.29 0 0.00 0.00
Sep1998 0 13.24 80.48 6.29 0 0.00 0.00
Oct 1998 0 41.33 58.41 0.26 0 -0.25 0.00
Nov 1998 2.14 73.57 24.29 0 0 -0.50 -0.25
Dec 1998 11.15 59.81 29.04 0 0 -0.50 -0.25
Jan 1999 2.39 38.87 58.74 0 0 -0.25 0.00
Feb 1999 5.93 54.67 39.41 0 0 -0.50 -0.25
Marl999 0 48.85 51.15 0 0 0.00 0.00
Apr 1999 1.48 63.19 35.33 0 0 -0.25 -0.25
May 1999 0 38.78 61.22 0 0 0.00 0.00
Jun 1999 0 37.67 62.33 0 0 -0.25 0.00
Jul 1999 0 27.05 72.95 0 0 0.00 0.00
Aug1999 o 12.62 81.54 6.19 0 0.00 0.00
Sep 1999 0 4.31 76.54 18.96 0 0.25 0.00
Oct 1999 0 0.97 62.68 36.36 0 0.00 0.00
Nov 1999 0 0.71 34.42 59.84 4.03 0.25 0.25
Dec 1999 0 0.17 71.86 27.97 o 0.00 0.00
Jan 2000 0 0 30.76 66.21 3.03 0.25 0.25
Feb 2000 0 0.03 27.50 69.53 2.94 0.25 0.25
Mar2000 0 0.28 71.11 28.61 0 0.00 0.00
Apr 2000 0 0 58.11 41.89 0 0.00 0.00
May2000 0 0 40.32 59.68 0 0.00 0.25
Jun 2000 0 0 67.72 31.72 0 0.00 0.00
Jul 2000 0 0.33 75.60 24.07 0 0.00 0.00
Aug2000 0 0.63 59.37 40.00 0 0.00 0.00
Sep 2000 0 0.32 55.13 44.71 0 0.00 0.00
Oct 2000 0 0.15 69.37 30.45 0 0.00 0.00
Nov2000 0 1.25 78.38 20.37 0 0.00 0.00
Dec2000 0 6.67 83.97 9.36 0 0.00 0.00
Jan 2001 0 24.94 74.31 0.75 0 0.00 0.00
Feb 2001 2.93 62.03 34.93 0.07 0 -0.25 -0.25
Mar2001 0 35 64.83 0.17 0 0.00 0.00
Apr 2001 0 52.17 47.83 0 0 -0.25 -0.25
May2001 0 70.19 29.62 0.39 0 -0.25 -0.25
Jun 2001 0 29.24 70.61 0.15 0 0.00 0.00
Jul 2001 0 14.17 79.17 6.67 0 0.00 0.00
Aug2001 0 14.77 80.77 4.46 0 -0.25 0.00
Sep 2001 0 19.82 78.75 1.43 0 0.00 0.00
Oct 2001 1.80 53 44.96 0.24 0 -0.25 -0.25
Nov2001 3.97 62.21 33.79 0.03 0 -0.50 -0.25
Dec2001 0 31.70 68.15 0.19 0 0.00 0.00
Jan 2002 1.04 21.71 75.18 2.14 0.04 0.00 0.00
Feb 2002 0 5.24 72.76 21.48 0.52 0.00 0.00
Mar2002 0.02 11.80 79.64 8.52 0.02 0.00 0.00
Apr 2002 0.60 3.40 80.80 14.80 0.40 0.00 0.00
May2002 0 1.48 82.19 15.63 0.70 0.00 0.00
Jun 2002 0 0.29 67.32 31.32 1.07 0.00 0.00
Jul 2002 0 0 77.92 21.6 0.24 0.00 0.00
Aug2002 0.35 8.58 83.39 7.48 0.19 0.00 0.00
Sep 2002 1 0.97 10.39 84.71 3.81 1.03 I 0.00 [ 0.00
Table 3.1: Results of Reuters Monthly Repo Rate Survey Data.
Bold format indicates the proportion o f the market that correctly forecast the repo rate decision.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 The Price and Volume Adjustment Process
3.4.1.1 The Nature of the Adjustment Process
First we gain insight into the nature of the adjustment process by examining price 
volatility, the mean value of absolute price changes, the mean number of transactions 
and mean trade sizes. We compare the behaviour of both the not-expected 
announcement days and the expected announcement days with the pattern of our non­
announcement days. In addition, following the E.M.H. that prices in financial markets 
should only react to the unexpected component of any announcement indicates that 
there should be no price reaction following an expected announcement. There exists an 
extensive empirical literature indicating that volatility increases with the release o f new 
information (See Section 2.2.3). We calculate the standard deviations o f returns across 
15-second intervals for the announcement window. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the 
volatility o f the Short Sterling futures contract and the FTSE 100 futures contract around 
the announcement time respectively. These clearly indicate a sharp increase in volatility 
following a repo rate announcement. Although generally the unexpected announcements 
show a much higher volatility in comparison with the expected announcement days, 
there still appears to be abnormally high volatility following an expected announcement. 
This indicates that while the majority of market participants forecast the announcement 
decision a minority of those were still surprised by the announcement. This leads to 
higher than normal trading following an expected announcement. In addition there 
appears to be evidence of a market readjustment for the Short Sterling. This appears to 
occur within the second minute after the announcement. Prior to the announcement 
volatility generally appears to higher across announcement days in comparison with 
non-announcement days. This indicates market uncertainty, and a lack of consensus 
about the announcement.
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Next, we examine the mean absolute price changes around a repo rate announcement, 
this provides an alternative measure of volatility. Table 3.2 presents the mean absolute 
price change per transaction following a repo rate announcement. Our results indicate 
that both contracts react immediately to the announcement. The mean absolute price 
change by transaction, following a not-expected announcement, remain significantly 
greater than both the non-announcement period and the respective expected 
announcement transaction period for the remainder of the 30 transactions. However, 
there is evidence for both contracts o f a price reaction following an expected 
announcement. While the mean absolute price change by transaction following an 
expected announcement remains larger than the non-announcement period for at least 30 
transactions, these are only significant for around the first 14 transactions for the Short 
Sterling compared with around 7 transactions for the FTSE 100.
Table 3.3 presents the mean absolute price changes around a repo rate announcement 
measured over clock-time. Our results indicate that prior to the announcement the mean 
absolute price changes remain larger than the non-announcement period for both 
contracts. This is particularly true for the FTSE 100, where the mean absolute price 
changes prior to a not-expected announcement are significantly greater than both the 
respective expected announcement period and the non-announcement period. Following 
an announcement, both contracts begin reacting to the news within fifteen seconds. The 
mean absolute price changes are initially large. During the first 30 seconds both 
contracts exhibit a mean absolute price change following a not-expected announcement 
o f twice as large as the respective expected announcement period. The mean absolute 
price changes then decline rapidly after 60 seconds for the Short Sterling with a market 
readjustment occurring after around 120 seconds, and around 75 seconds for the 
FTSE 100 following a not-expected announcement. The mean absolute price changes for 
not-expected announcements then remain significantly greater than both the respective 
expected announcement period and the non-announcement period for at least 1 0  minutes 
for both contracts. Following an expected announcement, although the mean absolute 
price change declines rapidly after around 75 seconds for the Short Sterling and 60 
seconds for the FTSE 100, there are some later significant intervals. Finally, it is 
interesting to note that following an expected/not-expected announcement our results 
are indicative of a shorter/longer price adjustment period than that found in Ap Gwilym
et al. (1998). This suggests that as the majority of the price adjustment is the 
consequence of any unexpected components of an announcement, then the price 
adjustment following an announcement will appear to be shorter in the Ap Gwylim 
study due to the expected component of that announcement.
FTSE 100Short Sterling
0.650.22Non-Announcement
NENETransaction Number
1.650.731
1.05 1.55'
1.960.66
1.020.61
1.410.51
0.41 1.09
1.45 7.15'0.56
0.70 0.940.54
0.63 1.10'
0.46 1.00 ' 1.13
1.220.37
2.950.54 0.70 1.40
0.24 1.26
0.46 1.17
0.32 1.40
1.46' 1.890.29
0.27 0.87 1.40
0.700.34
0.27 0.50
0.30 1.010.27
2.05 a’“0.40 0.830.29
0.34 0.50 0.91
1.060.27
0.34 0.85 1.10
0.46' 0.50 0.89
2.05a,a0.22 1.02
0.15 0.40 1.21 1.50
0.20 1.04
0.27 1.12
1.800.24 0.30 0.87
Table 3.2: Mean Absolute Price Change Across Transactions Following a Repo Rate 
Announcement.
a/b = the difference between the announcement and the non-announcement is significant at the l%/5% level, 
a/b = the difference between the not-expected announcement and the expected announcement is significant 
at the l%/5% level.
E/NE represents expected/not-expected announcements.
Short Sterling FTSE 100
Non-Announcement 0.05 0.74
Time Interval E NE E NE
T - 105 0.22b 0.31a 0.84 2.70b,b
T - 90 0.12 0.25 1.05 2.80a,a
T - 75 0.15 0.09 0.71 2.10
T - 60 0.39 b 0.14 0.82 0.90
T - 45 0.15 0.23 1.10 2.55b
T - 30 0.20 0.26 1.06 1.75
T - 15 0.39b 0.16 1.02 1.25
T 0.12 0.20 1.55b 2.10b
T + 15 1.49a 2.79 ^ 1.98a 3.20a,a
T + 30 0.90a 2.36a,a 3.8 l a 8.55a,a
T + 45 1.00a 1.75 a’a 3.20a 13.35“*a
T + 60 0.59a 1.54aa 2.22a 6.20a’a
T + 75 1.05a 0.60a 1.62b 8.98a,a
T + 90 0.59a 0.72a 1.54a 4.15a,b
T + 105 0.5 l a 0.23 1.73a 4.55a,a
T +  120 0.32a 2.34 a’a 2.27a 3.65a,b
T +  135 0.27a 1.74 a’a 1.25b 3.19a,a
T +  150 0.20b 0.95 a'a 1.89a 1.92a
T +  165 0.49a 1.56 a’a 2.07a 2.108
T +  180 0.10 0.42 a’a 1.28 4.10a,a
T +  195 0.12 0.63 a’a 1.78a 3.90a,a
T + 210 0.15b 0.52 a-b 1.42a 2 .45a>#
T + 225 0.15b 0.35a>b 1.28a 2.95a>a
T + 240 0.15b 0.61a,b 1.46a 4.25a,a
T + 255 0.10 0.48 a’a 0.95 3.10a,a
T + 270 0.07 0.47 a’a 0.87 1.80a,b
T + 285 0.10 0.41 a’a 1.23 1.60
T + 300 0.29a 0.23 1.448 3.60a,a
T + 315 0.15b 0.35a 1.20 2.55 a’a
T + 330 0.10 0.41 a*a 1.20 2.75a,a
T + 345 0.12b 0.12 1.12 1.85
T + 360 0.07 0.32 1.01 2.208,8
T + 375 0.10 0.34 a’a 1.20b 3.20a,a
t  + 390 0.00 0.42 a’a 0.95 2.60a>a
T + 405 0.1 T 0.51 a’a 1.05 2 .10a*a
T + 420 0.15b 0.10 1.31a 1.51
T + 435 0.15b 0.50a>b 1.04 1.09
T + 450 0.12b 0.50 a’b 1.07b 2.10a,a
T + 465 0.07 0.35 a’a 0.94 1.55
T + 480 0.05 0.32a>a 0.90 2 .7081 a
T + 495 0.15b 0.31 ^ 1.17 2.80a,a
T + 510 0.05 0.14 1.17b 2.308>a
T + 525 0.07 0.25 1.24b 3.00a,a
T + 540 0.07 0.35a,a 0.99 1.908>a
T + 555 0.10 0.12 1.08b 2.108’8
T + 570 0.05 0.84a>a 0.62 1.90a’a
T + 585 0.05 0.64 a’a 1.10 0.65
T + 600 0.05 0.31a’a 0.66 2.25s’a
Table 3.3: Mean Absolute Price Changes Around Repo Rate Announcement.
a/b = the difference between the announcement and the non-announcement is significant at the l%/5% level, 
a/b = the difference between the not-expected announcement and the expected announcement is significant at 
the l%/5% level.
E/NE represents expected/not-expected announcements.
Table 3.4 presents the mean number o f transactions (trade frequency) around the 
announcement time. Our results indicate that the mean number of transactions prior to 
the announcement release are insignificantly different from the non-announcement 
period for the FTSE 100, but are generally significantly greater for the Short Sterling. 
Following the announcement both contracts begin reacting to the news within 15 
seconds. The mean number of transactions are initially large. During the first 30 seconds 
both contracts exhibit a mean number of transactions following a not-expected 
announcement o f around twice as large as the respective expected announcement period. 
This relationship persists for the remainder of the twelve-minute window. The mean 
number of transactions for both contracts following a not-expected announcement 
remains significantly greater than both the non-announcement period and the respective 
expected announcement period for much of the remainder o f the twelve-minute window. 
However there is evidence for both contracts of an increased mean number of trades 
following an expected announcement, these remain significantly greater than the non­
announcement period for much of the remainder of the twelve-minute window.
Next we consider the mean trade size around the announcement time as shown in Table 
3.5. Our results indicate that for both contracts, intervals prior to the release time have 
smaller trade sizes, with the smallest trades occurring prior to the release of a not- 
expected announcement. This suggests that market participants are unwilling to trade 
prior to an announcement and are even more reluctant to trade prior to a not-expected 
announcement. Following an announcement, both contracts reveal significantly larger 
trade sizes within the first 15 seconds. For the Short Sterling following a not-expected 
announcement the average trade size remains higher than both the non-announcement 
period and the respective expected announcement for much o f the remainder of the 
twelve-minute window. However there is evidence of increased mean trade sizes 
following an expected announcement, these remain significant for much of the remainder 
o f the twelve-minute window. For the FTSE 100 following a not-expected 
announcement the average trade size remains significantly greater than the non­
announcement period for much of the remainder o f the twelve-minute window, although 
only significantly greater than the respective expected announcement period for the first 
75 seconds, although there are significant later intermittent intervals. Following an 
expected announcement trade size remains greater than the non-announcement period for 
much of the 1 0  minutes, although these are rarely significant.
Short Sterling FTSE100
Pre-ET Post-ET Pre-ET Post-ET
Non-Announcement 0.10 0.30 0.86 2.85
Time Interval E NE E NE E NE E NE
T - 105 0.75a 0.50a 1.09b 0.75s 0.67 1.80 2.03 1.00b
T - 90 0.25 0.50a,b 0.79b 0.75s 1.33 1.80 1.83 3.40
T - 75 0.25 0.33 0.45 0.50 1.17 1.00 3.09b 3.60
T - 60 0.38b 0.50a 0.58 0.75a,a 0.50 0.80 2.06 1.20
T - 45 0.75a 0.67a 0.79b 0.75s 0.33 1.40 2.09 3.00
T - 30 0.38b 0.33 1.06 0.25 0.83 1.20 2.49 1.20
T - 15 0.88a 0.33" 0.58 0.50 1.00 0.60 2.29 3.60
T 0.38b 1.00a>a 0.48 0.25 1.00 1.00 2.60 2.00
T +  15 0.50a 0.67a,b 3.30a 5.75s,a 1.50 1.70s 4.57s 6.60s
T + 30 0.50a 0.68a,b 4.20a 8.75s>a 1.83b 1.89s 7.80s 27.40s’8
T + 45 0.50a 0.73a,b 3.97a 5.25s,a 2.50b 2.80b 7.80s 36.40s8
T + 60 0.50a 0.55a 4.06a 5.75s,a 2.33b 2.60b,b 6.91s 24.40s8
T + 75 0.56a 0.67a 3.61a 9.00a,a 2.17b 2.80s,a 6.09s 17.80s8
T + 90 0.58a 0.67a 3.18a 3.25s 1.17 2.40s*a 6.23s 16.00bb
T +  105 0.63a 0.67a 3.18a 4.25a,b 0.67 2.40a,a 2.03 14.60bb
T +  120 0.67a 0.92a,b 2.58s 3.75s,a 2.50b 3.20s,a 5.63s 12.80bb
T +  135 0.38b 1.00s’8 3.06s 4.25s18 1.33 3.20s’8 3.94b 11.00bb
T +  150 0.63a 0.83a 1.21s 4.00s,a 2.33b 2.86s 6.40s 6.40
T +  165 0.63a 1.33a,a 1.67s 3.50s,a 1.67 2.60s,a 4.34b 12.40ab
T +  180 0.38b 0.50a 1.27s 2.25a,b 2.17b 2.20b 4.54b 7.80
T +  195 0.05 0.67a,a 1.09b 2.50a,a 3.00b 3.00b 4.26s 8.60
T + 210 0.75a 1.00a 1.03 3.25a,a 1.37 1.40 4.06s 5.80b
T + 225 0.63a 0.92s 0.58 2.75s’8 1.50 3.00s,b 4.14s 9.60
T + 240 0.13 0.83a,a 1.21b 2.25a,b 1.00 2.60s,b 5.63s 5.80s
T + 255 0.63a 0.73a 0.58 1.00b 1.50 2.20 4.14s 11.00b
T + 270 0.38b 0.50a 0.45 3.50a,a 1.83b 1.80 3.34 11.40s8
T + 285 0.75a 0.79a 0.85 2.50a,a 2.67b 2.60 4.66s 14.40s8
T + 300 0.75a 0.83a 1.18b 1.87s 2.50b 2.55 6.11s 8.40
T + 315 0.50a 0.58a 0.91b 1.25s 1.33 1.60b 5.43s 6.80b
T + 330 0.38b 0.50a 1.42s 2.00s 1.00 1.60 3.83s 7.40
T + 345 0.38b 0.50a 1.00s 1.25s 2.17b 2.60 3.71b 6.00
T + 360 0.25 0.67a’b 0.73 4.50a,a 1.33 2.60b 3.83s 7.00s,b
T + 375 0.50a 0.50a 0.91b 1.50s 1.50 2.00s 2.97 8.20s,b
T + 390 0.13 0.67a,a 0.61 2.00s,a 1.67 2.60 3.74s 10.00s8
T + 405 0.50a 0.67a 0.70 1.00b 2.00b 2.00 3.91s 9.00s8
T + 420 0.50a 0.56b 0.76 1.06 2.17b 2.40 4.03b 8.00b
T + 435 0.50a 0.50a 0.79 1.75M 1.00 1.40 3.86b 2.20
T + 450 0.50a 0.52a 0.88 2.00s,a 1.50 1.52 2.91b 4.60
T + 465 0.38b 0.50a 0.94 b 2.50s’8 1.00 1.40b 3.40s 5.20
T + 480 0.25 0.50a,a 0.64 2.75s>a 1.33 2.00 2.97 5.80
T + 495 0.13 0.50a,a 0.73 2.25M 1.33 2.20 3.03 6.40b
T + 510 0.25 0.48 0.36 0.75 1.67b 2.19 3.57b 5.60
T + 525 0.13 0.83a,a 0.48 1.25a,b 2.17b 2.39s 4.11s 5.00
T + 540 0.13 0.16 0.88 1.00 b 1.67b 2.06 3.09b 4.20
T + 555 0.25 0.36 0.91b 1.25 s 1.50 2.20b 3.20 7.00s,b
T + 570 0.13 0.67a,a 0.45 5.25s>a 1.67 2.00 3.26b 7.40s,b
T + 585 0.13 0.33b,b 0.36 1.75s>a 1.33 2.80b 3.1 l b 7.80s,b
T + 600 0.13 0.83a,a 0.55 3.25M 1.17 2.60b 2.34 3.00
Table 3.4: Trade Frequency Around Repo Rate Announcement
a/b = the difference between the announcement and the non-announcement is significant at the l%/5% level, 
a/b = the difference between the not-expected announcement and the expected announcement is significant 
at the l%/5% level.
E/NE represents expected/not-expected announcements.
Pre-ET/Post-ET represents the pre/post electronic trading periods
Short Sterling FTSE100
Pre-ET Post-ET Pre-ET | Post-ET |
Non-Announcement 65.51 78.42 12.44 | 3.71 |
Time Interval E NE E NE E NE E NE
T - 105 61.32 69.51 71.65b 75.45 9.46b 10.23 3.50 3.42
T - 90 68.45 59.23b 72.23 71.23 10.23 9.65 2.99b 2.50“
T - 75 59.36b 61.62 69.52“ 73.59 8.33“ 7.45“ 3.58 3.69
T - 60 62.63 53.59a,b 76.54 75.23 9.10b 6.89“ 3.23 3.21
T - 45 63.65 65.15 68.92“ 62.21“ 11.23 8.45b 2.86b 2.49“
T - 30 54.36a 56.43b 72.58 74.31 10.52 8.96 2.45“ 2.23“
T - 15 59.84 60.49 73.65 69.63b 8.67“ 7.10“ 3.61 2.86b,b
T 63.52 62.13 76.62 63.48“’b 9.63 8.56“’b 3.51 2.41“’*
T + 15 75.3 l a 83.62a 82.31 95.63“’b 13.45b 14.56“’b 4.02 4.82“’b
T + 30 82.3 l a 88.95a 88.96“ 96.58“ 14.56“ 15.63“ 4.33b 4.99“’b
T + 45 68.62 78.62a,“ 80.13 89.30“’“ 13.15 16.15“’* 3.95 5.27“’“
T + 60 63.23 69.41 89.56“ 91.28“ 11.23 15.98“’“ 4.56“ 4.75“
T + 75 71.45b 82.49a 92.32“ 95.43“ 12.56 14.32“’* 3.81 4.52“’“
T + 90 84.35a 88.69a 95.13“ 96.45“ 14.53“ 12.56 4.59“ 5.05“
T + 105 69.21 75.65a,b 82.45 98.37“’b 12.56 12.83 3.79 4.28b,b
T + 1 2 0 63.34 79.58a,a 86.15b 91.25“ 13.29b 13.03 4.10 4.65“’b
T + 1 3 5 68.23 81.45“’* 79.47 90.08“’“ 11.52 13.52“’“ 4.63“ 4.73“
T + 1 5 0 86.52a 92.45a 82.15 86.45 13.58“ 12.84 4.25b 5.02“,b
T + 1 6 5 73.45b 81.25a’b 80.48 88.69b 14.52“ 13.60“ 4 .60“ 4.80“
T + 1 8 0 71.25 78.84a,b 92.56“ 92.26“ 10.25 12.01 3.92 4.38b
T+ 1 9 5 69.69 79.58“’“ 88.56“ 88.62“ 12.89 12.63 3.76 4.21
T + 210 75.45b 73.65b 85.95b 84.60 13.80“ 14.25“ 4.28b 4.76“
T + 225 71.65 82.14a,b 78.52 82.52 12.08 13.67“’“ 3.85 4.59“’b
T + 240 77.59b 83.59a 81.32 86.45b 13.69b 13.08 4.65“ 4.95“
T + 255 75.36 78.45a 92.56“ 89.14“ 11.25 12.92 3.82 4.28
T + 270 82.36a 80.233 75.63 90.32“’* 13.59b 13.80“ 4.25b 4.50“
T + 285 85.36a 83.59a 89.92“ 96.53“ 14.02“ 14.62“ 4.09 4.49“’b
T + 300 92.32a 89.93a 98.32“ 87.13 13.85“ 14.03“ 4.12 4.73“'“
T + 315 79.89a 82.45“ 79.65 85.09b’b 13.20 13.50b 4.50“ 5.11“’b
T + 330 65.32 78.53“’“ 83.46 88.54“ 12.58 13.08 3.99 4.54a,b
T + 345 75.32b 86.39a,b 86.15b 89.04“ 13.60b 13.49b 4.29b 4.68“’b
T + 360 69.37 70.45 81.23 80.23 13.50 13.83“ 4.59“ 4.88“
T + 375 72.45 82.13“’“ 89.75“ 91.25“ 12.89 12.96 3.75 4.29
T + 390 78.14b 88.83a,b 85.62 85.69 12.71 12.84 3.62 4.31
T + 405 76.32b 90.35“’“ 87.46b 93.68“ 12.65 13.57“’“ 3.88 4.45b
T + 420 81.49a 78.35“ 92.10“ 96.08“ 13.09 13.54b 4.15 4.60“
T + 435 83.65a 85.13“ 84.15 83.05 11.98 12.63 3.78 4.32
T + 450 78.50b 83.26“ 85.45 88.78“ 12.36 12.38 3.75 4.09
T + 465 85.23a 86.15“ 81.98 91.59a,b 12.68 12.93 3.86 4.27
T + 480 72.24 85.00a,b 84.65 90.35a,b 13.59b 13.48b 4.27b 4.39b
T + 495 76.95b 80.31“ 89.18b 94.25“ 12.45 13.60“-“ 3.76 4.18
T + 5 1 0 88.82a 95.50“ 86.3 l b 98.32“ 13.59 13.92“ 4.11 4.48“
T + 525 84.32a 84.99“ 84.13 90.29a,b 13.80“ 13.49 4.25 4.55“
T + 540 68.52 78.23a,b 92.03“ 95.56“ 13.59 12.83 4.95“ 4.89“
T + 555 78.19a 89.12a’b 80.45 85.40b 12.80 13.62b 3.94 4.39b
T + 570 76.63 80.45“-“ 79.52 80.56 13.69“ 14.02“ 4.12 4.85“
T + 585 78.52a 82.31“ 86.58b 92.30“ 13.58 13.95“ 4.05 4.36
T + 600 | 70.51 76.23“’b 80.23 89.59“’b | 12.93 13.29 4.19 4.78“
Table 3.5: Trade Size Around Repo Rate Announcement
a/b = the difference between the announcement and the non-announcement is significant at the l%/5% level, 
a/b = the difference between the not-expected announcement and the expected announcement is significant at 
the l%/5% level.
E/NE represents expected/not-expected announcements 
Pre-ET/Post-ET represents the pre/post electronic trading periods.
3.4.1.2 The Duration of the Adjustment Process
To examine the duration of the adjustment process we calculate the average percentage 
o f continuations across both transactions and 15-second time intervals. A continuation is 
defined as a price change in the same direction as the previous price change, while a 
price change in the opposite direction to the previous price change is termed a reversal.
For example in the series of prices shown in Figure 3.3, the first observed price change 
is from Pi to P2 , which is a price decrease. The second observed price change is from P2 
to P3, which is a price increase. Since the second price change is in the opposite 
direction to the first price change, the second price change is classified as a reversal. The 
third price change from P3 to P4 , is a price increase, and is classified as a continuation 
since this is in the same direction as the second price change. Similarly P5 to P6 is a 
continuation, since its price change is in the same direction as the previous price change.
The arrival of information in the market generally causes an imbalance in the supply and 
demand for a security at the existing price level. An adjustment then occurs, and a 
higher level of continuations should be observed as the price adjusts to a new 
equilibrium.
We compare the pattern of continuations after both not-expected and expected 
announcements with the pattern for non-announcement days. The duration of the
Figure 3.3: An Example o f a Series o f Price Changes.
adjustment process is indicated by the time taken for continuations to return to ‘normal’ 
levels. First percentage continuations are calculated for each 15-second interval of the 
announcement window for both expected and not-expected announcement days. We test 
these continuations for statistically significant differences from the ‘normal’ levels of 
continuations, which are defined as the average percentage of continuations during the 
twelve-minute window across the non-announcement days, and for statistically 
significant differences between the level o f continuations following not expected and 
expected announcements. Then we repeat the analysis across the first thirty transactions 
after the announcement.
Table 3.6 presents the mean percentage of continuations around a repo rate 
announcement over clock-time and Table 3.7 presents the mean percentage of 
continuations following a repo rate announcement over transaction time. Our results 
indicate that price continuations are rare in the period prior to the announcement. For the 
Short Sterling continuations become significantly elevated within 15 seconds of the 
announcement time. We found the highest percentage of continuations followed a not- 
expected announcement and that these remained significant for 60 seconds, with 
additional significant intervals appearing in the third minute following an 
announcement. Although we found an elevated level o f continuations following an 
expected announcement, these remained significant for only 45 seconds. In terms of 
transaction time it takes only 8  transactions before continuations return to normal levels 
following an expected announcement in comparison to at least 30 transactions following 
an unexpected announcement. For the FTSE 100, the results indicate that for the first 15 
seconds following a not-expected announcement the level of continuations are 
significantly lower than the non-announcement period, this indicates that the high 
degree of surprise corresponding to these unexpected announcements meant that market 
participants took time to digest the announcements’ implications upon the futures price 
before reacting to the new information. However for much o f the remainder of the 
twelve-minute window continuations remain significantly greater than both the non­
announcement period and the respective expected announcement period. In terms of 
transaction time, following a not-expected announcement the level of continuations 
became significantly elevated after 3 transactions and remained significant for much of 
the thirty transactions. However following an expected announcement, although the
level of continuations remained greater than the non-announcement period, these were 
rarely significant over transactions. Again, we confirm our earlier finding that following 
an expected/not-expected announcement our results are indicative of a shorter/longer 
price adjustment period than that found in Ap Gwilym et al. (1998).
Short Sterling FTSE100
Non-Announcement 0.00 5.38
Time Interval E NE E NE
T - 105 0.61 0.00 6.35 7.50
T -  90 0.61 0.00 2.14b 12.22
T -  75 0.00 0.00 7.26 14.29
T -  60 0.00 0.00 5.45 o.oo8
T - 4 5 0.00 0.00 7.28 14.76
T -  30 0.00 0.00 5.99 11.00
T -  15 1.22 0.00 9.54 2.00b
T 0.00 0.00 7.16 o.oo8
T +  15 12.19a 10.83a 14.478 5.17b
T + 30 3.57b 12.00^8 19.338 29.41b
T + 45 5.63b 8.22a,b 15.788 37.22818
T + 60 2.48 4.008’8 17.698 30.13“
T + 75 5.18b 0.71 11.758 23.0281 b
T + 90 0.75 0.00 12.418 17.27“
T +  105 2.54 0.00 12.208 24.49 b>b
T +  120 0.00 5.838’8 15.018 26.83“
T +  135 0.00 3.018’8 15.488 26.54“
T +  150 0.00 1.67 14.128 17.80
T + 165 0.00 2.50b 14.708 19.82
T +  180 0.00 0.00 12.20b 23.49“’b
T +  195 0.00 0.00 18.328 29.33“
T + 210 0.00 0.00 12.52“ 11.22
T + 225 0.81 0.00 9.92 19.50“’b
T + 240 0.00 0.00 17.25“ 17.44
T + 255 0.00 0.00 11.97“ 25.75 b’b
T + 270 0.00 0.00 10.41b 16.61
T + 285 0.00 3.338,a 9.34 14.22
T + 300 0.00 0.00 20.738 6.04
T + 315 0.00 0.00 12.28b 10.33
T + 330 0.00 0.00 9.71b 22.04 b
T + 345 0.00 0.00 9.80 b 15.78
T + 360 0.00 0.00 5.95 24.43 b’b
T + 375 0.00 0.00 12.07 b 24.66b
T + 390 0.00 5.00b 10.27 9.27
T+405 0.00 0.00 10.84 b 17.26b
T + 420 0.00 0.00 9.76 6.00
T + 435 0.00 0.00 10.75 b 5.00
T + 450 0.00 0.00 13.72“ 12.50
T + 465 0.00 0.00 7.03 7.26
T + 480 0.00 0.00 8.71 14.88
T + 495 0.00 0.00 5.59 16.89b
T + 510 0.00 0.00 10.76 13.91
T + 525 0.00 0.00 14.50“ 23.61b
T + 540 0.00 0.00 8.26 10.00
T + 555 0.00 0.00 11.28 8.22
T + 570 0.00 0.56 7.88 18.93“*b
T + 585 0.00 0.00 9.79 11.91
T + 600 0.00 0.00 3.48 10.83
Table 3.6: Mean Percentage Continuations Around Repo Rate Announcement
a/b = the difference between the announcement and the non-announcement is significant at the l%/5% level, 
a/b = the difference between the not-expected announcement and the expected announcement is significant at the 
l%/5% level.
E/NE represents expected/not-expected announcements
Short Sterling FTSE100 1
Non-Announcement 4.84 24.09 |
Transaction Number E | NE E NE 1
1 46.341a 40.00a 34.15 30.00
2 31.71a 40.00a’b 41.46b 30.00
3 34.15a 70.0081 b 31.71 70.00 s’a
4 26.83a 30.003 29.27 30.00
5 26.83a 60.00a>b 31.71 50.00s’a
6 31.71a 30.00s 43.90 b 30.00
7 26.83a 40.00s’b 48.78 s 70.0081 b
8 21.95a 0.00“ 19.51 80.00 s’a
9 7.31 40.00a’b 14.63 40.00 s’*
10 8.04 30.00s’b 34.15 50.00 a’a
11 7.32 0.00 21.95 30.00
12 12.20 30.00s’* 29.27 10.00
13 4.88 30.00s’a 39.02 50.00 s’
14 4.88 10.00 29.27 40.00 s’
15 4.88 20.00s’b 26.83 50.00 s’*
16 7.32 10.00 39.02 40.00
17 7.32 20.00s’b 17.07 40.00 s’a
18 12.20 20.00s’b 24.39 40.00 a’a
19 2.44 0.00 41.46b 40.00 s
20 2.44 20.00s’“ 43.90 b 20.00
21 7.32 30.00s’a 29.27 30.00
22 14.63 10.00 39.02 50.00 s’
23 4.88 20.00s,a 26.83 60.00b
24 4.88 10.00 46.34 s 20.00
25 12.20 30.00s’b 29.27 30.00
26 4.88 40.00s’a 31.71 20.00
27 2.44 20.00s,a 36.59 50.00 s’
28 2.44 0.00 34.15 40.00
29 7.32 30.00s’b 21.95 50.00 s’a
30 2.44 20.00s’a 31.71 30.00
Table 3.7: Mean Percentage Continuations Across Transactions Following a Repo Rate 
Announcement
a/b = the difference between the announcement and the non-announcement is significant at the l%/5% level, 
a/b = the difference between the not-expected announcement and the expected announcement is significant at the 
l%/5% level.
E/NE represents expected/not-expected announcements.
3.4.1.3 The Speed of the Adjustment Process
To determine how much of the adjustment from the old equilibrium price to the new 
equilibrium price occurs during each interval, we calculate cumulative average adjusted 
returns as proposed by Ederington and Lee (1995) and followed by others. Since there is 
no independent measure o f whether an announcement is bullish or bearish we interpret 
this from the sign of the return over the first thirty seconds following a repo rate 
announcement.
The adjusted return for each interval is calculated as;
ARt = Rt *Dt (3.1)
where Dt is determined as follows. Let R(ojo) represent the return over the first thirty- 
second interval following an announcement at time T. For intervals before T or after T + 
30 seconds, Dt = 1 if R(o,30) > 0;D t = - 1  if R<o,30) < and Dt = 0  if  R(ojo) = 0. This forces 
returns that are in the same direction as the initial price change to be positive, and 
returns that are in the opposite direction to be negative. To avoid spurious correlation 
between Rt and Dt , for the two intervals within the period from T to T + 30 seconds,
we define Dt = 1 if  (R(o,30) -R t) > 0 ,D t = -\ if  (R(o,30) - Rt) < 0 and Dt = 0  if  (R(o,30) - Rt) = 
0. The average adjusted returns are calculated for each 15-second interval, and the null 
hypothesis that AARt = 0 is tested for each interval. If there is no information leakage 
prior to any announcement then AARt should be insignificantly different from zero for 
intervals prior to the release. Intervals after the announcement should be significantly 
greater than zero during the adjustment period and insignificantly different from zero 
once the adjustment is complete.
The AARt are summed from interval 1 (T -  120 seconds to T -  105 seconds) to interval t 
to form the cumulative average adjusted returns, CARt. The ratio of CARt to the CAR at 
the end of the twelve-minute announcement window determines how much of the 
overall adjustment occurs by time t.
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Table 3.8 presents the average adjusted returns, cumulative adjusted returns and the 
ratio of CARt to the CAR at the end of the twelve-minute window. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 
show plots of the ratio values of the Short Sterling and the FTSE 100 for the twelve- 
minute window respectively. Our results indicate that prior to an announcement the 
AARt are small and insignificant for the Short Sterling, however for the FTSE 100, the 
AARt are relatively large prior to an announcement although generally insignificant. 
Following an announcement both contracts begin reacting within 15 seconds, reporting 
large significant AARt. Both contracts show larger AARt following a not-expected 
announcement compared with those found following an expected announcement.
For the Short Sterling following a not-expected announcement returns are significantly 
greater than zero for the first 30 seconds, then over the next 15 seconds a significant 
negative AARt occurs indicating the start of some correction from an initial over-reaction 
to the announcement. The following three intervals show negative AARh with a 
significant negative AARt occurring at T+120, then at T+135 a significant positive AARt 
is found indicating a second correction. Later AARt are generally insignificant with one 
exception, this being a significant negative AARt found at T+210. Following an expected 
announcement returns are generally significantly less than zero for the first 75 seconds, 
with a significant positive AARt occurring at T+90, indicating a small price re­
adjustment. Later AARt remain small and insignificant.
For the FTSE 100 following a not-expected announcement, returns are significantly 
greater than zero for the first 15 seconds. Although these returns remain insignificant for 
much of the remainder o f the first minute, during the second minute these returns are 
generally significantly greater than zero. This indicates a delayed reaction while market 
participants attempted to assess the announcements implications upon the futures price 
before entering the market. Later AARt were frequently found to be significantly 
different from zero. Following an expected announcement returns are significantly 
greater than zero for the first 15 seconds, in the following intervals AARt are generally 
significantly negative for the first 225 seconds after the announcement, although a 
significant positive AARt occurs at T+135. For the remainder o f the twelve-minute 
window AARt are generally insignificant with one exception, a negative AARt occurs at 
T+315.
0 4
The ratio of CARt to T+600 value for the Short Sterling following a not-expected 
announcement indicates that the ratio rises to over 2 after only 30 seconds and then 
gradually decreases for a further 75 seconds with evidence of a large under-reaction 
occurring at T+120, which is then corrected in the following 30 seconds. There is 
evidence of a further under-reaction for around two minutes occurring after T+275, 
which eventually begins to stablilise at around T+330. Following an expected 
announcement the ratio gradually rises to around 1.2 after 75 seconds and remains 
relatively stable for the remainder of the twelve-minute window.
For the FTSE 100 the ratio following a not-expected announcement takes 105 seconds 
to approach 1 and then remains above 1 for a further 195 seconds. Following this the 
ratio oscillates around 1 for the remainder o f the twelve-minute window, with some 
exceptions where the ratio jumps to around 1.5 at around T+495. Following an expected 
announcement the ratio takes 120 seconds to approach 1. Following this the ratio 
oscillates around 1 for a further 180 seconds and then remains above 1 before remaining 
stable at T+375.
Finally, we find that generally following an expected/not-expected announcement prices 
adjust more quickly/slowly than those found following an announcement in Ap Gwilym 
et al. (1998).
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Figure 3.4: Speed of Price Adjustm ent for the Short Sterling
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Figure 3.5: Speed of Price Adjustm ent for the FTSE100
Before presenting the second analysis of this chapter, we summarise our findings so far. 
We examined both the price and volume adjustment process following repo rate 
announcements for the Short Sterling and FTSE 100 futures contracts. We decomposed 
our announcement events into expected and not-expected announcements.
We found that price changes were significantly greater prior to an announcement and in 
particular for the FTSE 100, where price changes prior to a not-expected announcement 
were significantly greater than both the respective expected announcement period and 
the non-announcement period. Following an announcement, both contracts show a 
larger price reaction following a not-expected announcement. Although these price 
changes remain significantly greater than both the respective expected announcement 
period and the non-announcement period for much of the first 30 transactions and the 
remainder of the twelve-minute window, they decline rapidly after 1 2 0  seconds for the 
Short Sterling, after an initial over-reaction and 75 seconds for the FTSE 100. In contrast 
the reaction following an expected announcement reveals a faster adjustment process, 
and although these price changes remain significantly greater than the non­
announcement period for much of the first 10 minutes they decline rapidly after 75 
seconds for the Short Sterling and 60 seconds for the FTSE 100, in transaction time they 
remain significant for around 14 transactions for the Short Sterling and around 7 
transactions for the FTSE 100.
Prior to an announcement, the Short Sterling exhibited an increased frequency of 
smaller trades. Following a not-expected announcement both trade frequency and trade 
size remained significantly greater than the respective expected announcement period 
and the non-announcement period for much of the remainder o f the twelve-minute 
window. There is also evidence of an increased number of larger trades following an 
expected announcement.
For the FTSE 100, we found evidence of smaller trades prior to an announcement 
although no change in the mean number of trades. Following an announcement we 
found that the number of trades following a not-expected announcement remains 
significantly greater than both the respective expected announcement period and the 
non-announcement period. Trade size, following a not-expected announcement were
significantly greater than the non-announcement period for much of the following 1 0  
minutes. They remained only significantly greater than the expected announcement 
period for the first 75 seconds. Following an expected announcement, although trades 
sizes remained larger than the non-announcement period for much of the following 1 0  
minutes, these were rarely significant.
We conclude that following an unexpected announcement both contracts react 
immediately to the new information and the adjustment process is characterised by large 
price changes, raised volatility and an increased number of larger trades. However we 
also found evidence of a market reaction albeit smaller, following an expected 
announcement. We explain that these findings are due to an element of uncertainty that 
still exists within all our expected announcements. This is because we determine an 
announcement as expected if more that 50 percent forecast the decision, therefore unless 
1 0 0  percent forecast the decision there will always exist a certain element of surprise in 
the announcement, albeit a smaller surprise than that encountered by an unexpected 
announcement.
Finally, our results indicate a shorter/longer adjustment period following an 
expected/not-expected announcement than that found following an announcement in Ap 
Gwilym et al. (1998). We suggest that the majority o f the price adjustment is explained 
by the degree of surprise associated with an announcement. Therefore in studies such as 
Ap Gwilym et al. (1998) where announcement data used contains both expected and 
unexpected components and not just the surprise element associated with an 
announcement, that the observed price adjustment is diluted by the expected 
components o f that announcement.
The next section wishes to address this issue by providing an alternative analysis of the 
surprise element. This directly measures the unexpected component associated with 
each announcement.
3.4.2 The Effects of the Degree of Repo Rate Announcement Surprises 
upon Trading Volume
In the analyses above we have indicated that both trade frequency and trade size become 
elevated following a repo rate announcement, and that it is the degree of the unexpected 
component of each announcement that determines the amount of abnormal trade 
frequency and trade size observed following an announcement.
Following this observation, in our second analysis we utilise the repo rate survey data as 
shown in Table 3.1, to focus on simply the unexpected components of each 
announcement, which we separate into four surprise component states, 
F50~,F25~,F25+,F 5 0 +;
F 50“ : The proportion of the market that forecast a decision 50 basis points below the 
actual decision.
F25~ : The proportion of the market that forecast a decision 25 basis points below the 
actual decision.
F 25+ : The proportion of the market that forecast a decision 25 basis points above the 
actual decision.
F 5 0 + : The proportion of the market that forecast a decision 50 basis points above the 
actual decision.
This permits the capture of all the unexpected components associated with each 
announcement, and provides measures of both the magnitude3 and the direction4 o f the 
surprise element.
*3
When we refer to the magnitude o f the surprise element, we refer to both the 
proportion o f the market that are surprised and the number of basis points the forecast is 
away from the decision.
4 When we refer to the direction of the surprise element, we refer to whether the forecast 
is above or below the decision.
In our analysis we examine the impact o f the degree of repo rate surprise upon trade 
volume, trade frequency and trade size. By examining the relationship between the state 
o f surprise and trade volume, we illuminate the role of volume in the adjustment process 
to new information. For a further detailed analysis of the behaviour o f trade volume, we 
examine the relationships between the state of surprise and both trade frequency and 
trade size. These analyses provide additional insights into the behaviour of market 
participants in response to new information.
3.4.2.1 Hypothesis
We predict that the greater the degree o f surprise, to a repo rate announcement, the 
greater the market activity following the announcement (See Section 2.2.2).
3.4.2.2 The Model
The impact of a surprise component upon trade volume, trade frequency and trade size 
is examined by estimating the following linear regression equation:
MAt = a Q + AF50," + 0 2F25~ + fcF 25+t + fi4F501 + SDt , (3.2)
Where MAt = trading volume, trade frequency or natural log of trade size5 from the time 
of the announcement to the first five minutes of trading after the announcement. The 
independent variable F50i is the mean proportion of market participants that forecast a 
decision of 50 basis points below the actual decision. The independent variable F25t’ is 
the mean proportion of market participants that forecast a decision o f 25 basis points 
below the actual decision. The independent variable F25t+ is the mean proportion of 
market participants that forecast a decision o f 25 basis points above the actual decision.
5 When estimating Equation (3.2), with MAt = trade size, we found for both the 
FTSE 100 and the Short Sterling, the null hypothesis of normally distributed errors to be 
rejected (Jacque-Bera test statistics t= l55.854, t=228.159 respectively). As a 
consequence of such extreme non-normality we took the natural log transformation of 
the dependent variable.
The independent variable F50t+ is the mean proportion of market participants that 
forecast a decision of 50 basis points above the actual decision. We include a dummy 
variable Dt where Dt = 1 if announcement occurred after electronic trading was 
introduced and zero elsewhere.
3.4.2.3 Empirical Results
3.4.2.3.1 Trade Volume
Short Sterling FTSE100 1
Coefficient T-Statistic Probability Coefficient T-Statistic Probability I
Oo -1914.759 -1.372 0.177 -202.611 -1.017 0.315
01 -1041.739 -1.352 0.183 87.197 1.497 ° ’141
02 38.801 0.935 0.355 13.696 3.192* 0.003
03 70.460 2.661* 0.011 13.034 4.096* 0.000
04 28.295 0.578 0.566 7.741 0.849 0.400
8
1
4764.804 5.258* 0.000 145.229 1.031 0.308
Table 3.9: The Effects of both Direction and Magnitude of Repo Rate Announcement 
Surprises upon Trading Volume.
Coefficient estimates, t-statistics and associated probabilities o f Equation (3.2),
MAf =  (Xq + y0jF5O< + /?2-^251 +  y03F 25*  +  f34F S 0 +t +  S D t +  ,
The dependent variable, MAt, is the trading volume for the first 5 minutes o f post-announcement trading. 
The independent variables are; F50,~ is the mean proportion o f market participants that forecast a decision 
of 50 basis points below the actual decision. F25't is the mean proportion o f market participants that 
forecast a decision o f 25 basis points below the actual decision. F25,+ is the mean proportion of market 
participants that forecast a decision o f 25 basis points above the actual decision. F50,+ is the mean 
proportion of market participants that forecast a decision o f 50 basis points above the actual decision. Dt, is 
a dummy variable representing the switch to electronic trading. *=significant at thel% level. Number of 
observations = 51.
Short Sterling: White Heteroskedasticity Test Statistics: 7.252 (probability=0.611).
LM Test for Serial Correlation Test Statistics: 0.141 (probability=0.932).
Jacque-Bera Test Statistics: 10.716 (probability=0.005).
Adjusted R2 values=0.378.
FTSE100: White Heteroskedasticity Test Statistics: - (probability = -).
LM Test for Serial Correlation Test Statistics: 1.571 (probability=0.456).
Jacque-Bera Test Statistics: 4.779 (probability=0.092).
Adjusted R2 values=0.442.
The results in Table 3.9 indicate that out of all the market participants who incorrectly 
forecast the repo rate decision, the forecast o f a decision of 25 basis points above the 
decision is positively related to volume for both contracts, and a forecast of a decision of 
25 basis points below the decision is positively related to volume for the FTSE 100 only. 
In other words for the FTSE 100, any observed abnormal volume following a repo rate 
announcement is the consequence of a similar level of elevated trading by those who 
forecast a decision 25 basis points either side of the actual decision. However for the 
Short Sterling, any observed abnormal volume following an announcement appears to 
only be explained by those who forecast a decision 25 basis points above the actual 
announcement. In addition the switch to electronic trading appears to be positively 
related to trading volume for both contracts.
3A2.3.2 Trade Frequency
Short Sterling FTSE100
Coefficient T-Statistic Probability Coefficient T-Statistic Probability I
do -27.019 -2.640* 0.011 -104.665 -2.447** 0.019 ]
01 -14.547 -2.576* 0.013 18.089 1.140 0.261
02 0.829 2.725* 0.009 3.335 3.821* 0.000
03 0.889 4.576* 0.000 2.804 5.167* 0.000
04 -0.129 -0.359 0.722 1.242 1.330 0.190
8 47.941 7.213* 0.000 123.411 3.337* 0.002
AR(1) - - - 0.470 3.440* 0.001
Table 3.10: The Effects of both Direction and Magnitude of Repo Rate Announcement 
Surprises upon Trading Frequency.
Coefficient estimates, t-statistics and associated probabilities o f Equation (3.2).
MA, = a 0 + ^ F 5 0 ;  + J32F25 '  + /?3F25,+ + /?4F50,+ + 8Dt + XARQ) +et,
The dependent variable is the trading frequency for the first 5 minutes o f post-announcement trading. The 
independent variables are; F50,' is the mean proportion o f market participants that forecast a decision o f 50 
basis points below the actual decision. F25i is the mean proportion o f market participants that forecast a 
decision o f 25 basis points below the actual decision. F25t+ is the mean proportion o f market participants 
that forecast a decision of 25 basis points above the actual decision. F50t+ is the mean proportion of market 
participants that forecast a decision o f 50 basis points above the actual decision. Dt, is a dummy variable 
representing the switch to electronic trading and AR(1) represents an autoregressive process o f order one. 
*=significant at thel% level. **=significant at the 5% level. Number o f observations = 51.
Short Sterling: White Heteroskedasticity Test Statistics: 7.904 (probability=0.544).
LM Test for Serial Correlation Test Statistics: 2.594 (probability=0.273).
Jacque-Bera Test Statistics: 0.594 (probability=0.743).
Adjusted R2 values=0.537.
FTSE100: White Heteroskedasticity Test Statistics: 15.456 (probability = 0.079).
LM Test for Serial Correlation Test Statistics: 3.610 (probability=0.164).
Jacque-Bera Test Statistics: 0.380 (probability=0.827).
Adjusted R2 values=0.585.
The results in Table 3.10 indicate that out of all the market participants who incorrectly 
forecast the repo rate decision, it appears for both contracts that those participants who 
forecast both 25 basis points below and 25 basis points above the repo rate decision are 
positively related to trade frequency. In addition, participants who forecast a repo rate of
50 basis points below the decision appear to be negatively related to the trade frequency 
of the Short Sterling only. In addition it appears that for the Short Sterling following an 
announcement those market participants that forecast a decision 25 basis points either 
side of the actual decision, trade equally more frequently. In contrast for the FTSE 100, 
although those who forecast a decision 25 basis points either side of the actual decision 
trade more frequently, those market participants that forecast a decision 25 basis points 
below the actual decision appear to explain more of the observed higher frequency of 
trading following an announcement. For both contracts the switch to electronic trading 
appears to be positively related to trade frequency (significant at the 1 % level).
3.4.2.3.3 Trade Size
1 s
Coefficient
hort Sterlin
T-Statistic
____________ 1_____________ ,
Probability I Coefficient
FTSE100
T-Statistic Probability
Constant 4.573 13.827* 0.000 2.071 12.371* 0.000
F 5 0 " 0.259 1.417 0.163 0.007 0.076 0.940
F25~ -0.025 -2.493** 0.016 0.005 1.068 0.291 |
F 25+t -0.009 -1.407 0.166 0.008 2.533** 0.015
F 50+t 0.021 1.822*** 0.075 0.003 0.497 0.621
Dt 0.359 1.672*** 0.102 -1.262 -11.244* 0.000
Table 3.11: The Effects of both Direction and Magnitude of Repo Rate 
Announcement Surprise upon Trading Size
Coefficient estimates, t-statistics and associated probabilities o f Equation (3.2),
= (Xq + JS^ F 50 ( + P ^ 2 5 t + P^F25+t + f3^F 50+( + 8D t + 8j ,
The dependent variable is the natural log o f trade size for the first 5 minutes o f post-announcement trading. 
The independent variables are; F50,' is the mean proportion o f market participants that forecast a decision of 
50 basis points below the actual decision. F25,' is the mean proportion o f market participants that forecast a 
decision of 25 basis points below the actual decision. F25,+ is the mean proportion o f market participants that 
forecast a decision o f 25 basis points above the actual decision. F50,+ is the mean proportion o f market 
participants that forecast a decision o f 50 basis points above the actual decision. D,, is a dummy variable 
representing the switch to electronic trading. *=significant at thel% level. **=significant at the 5% level. 
***=significant at the 10% level. Number o f observations=51.
Short Sterling: White Heteroskedasticity Test Statistics: 14.894 (probability=0.094).
LM Test for Serial Correlation Test Statistics: 2.491 (probability=0.288).
Jacque-Bera Test Statistics: 8.448 (probability=0.015).
Adjusted R2 values=0.163.
FTSE100: White Heteroskedasticity Test Statistics: 6.195 (probability = 0.720).
LM Test for Serial Correlation Test Statistics: 1.611 (probability=0.447).
Jacque-Bera Test Statistics: 0.336 (probability=0.845).
Adjusted R2 values=0.804.
The results in Table 3.11 indicate that out o f all the market participants who incorrectly 
forecast the repo rate decision, it appears to be only those participants that forecast a 
decision of 25 basis points above the actual decision are positively related to the trade 
size for the FTSE 100. However for the Short Sterling, those who forecast a decision of 
25 basis points below the decision appear to be negatively related to trade size (at the 
5% level). In addition the switch to electronic trading appears to be negatively related 
to trade size for the FTSE 100.
3.4.2.3.4 Diagnostic and Sensitivity Tests
Formal diagnostic tests on the estimated models were also carried out. First, 
homoskedasticity of the residuals was tested for using White’s test. The computed test 
statistic of trading volume for the FTSE 100 (t = 22.296, p=  0.008) means that the 
hypothesis of homoskedastic errors could not be supported. As a consequence the 
reported standard errors in Table 3.9 for the FTSE 100 are White heteroskedastic- 
consistent. Serial correlation of the residuals was tested using the Lagrange Multiplier 
statistic, we found trade frequency of the FTSE 100 to be serially correlated (/ = 11.128, 
p  = 0.004). We accounted for the serial correlation by the addition of an AR (1) process 
and this was found to have no adverse effect upon the significance of other explanatory 
variables. Normality of the residuals was tested using the Jacque-Bera statistic and the 
null hypothesis of normally distributed errors was rejected for both volume and lnsize of 
the Short Sterling (/ = 10.716,/? = 0.005; t = 8.448,/? = 0.015 respectively). However, as 
previously discussed econometric sources such as Kmenta (1971), suggested that non­
normal disturbances are common in small data sets and so this limitation is an 
unavoidable constraint o f the research design.
3.5 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we examine the impact of repo rate announcements upon both price and 
trading volume of the Short Sterling and the FTSE 100 futures contracts. In the first 
section of this chapter we focus on both the price and volume adjustment process to repo 
rate announcements. Using survey data supplied by Reuters, we separated our 
announcements into expected announcements and not-expected announcements and 
focused on an announcement window that extends from two minutes prior to an 
announcement to the first ten minutes following an announcement. Our results indicate 
that following a not-expected announcement both contracts initially exhibit large price 
changes, and raised volatility. For the Short Sterling there is evidence o f an initial over­
reaction and although mean absolute price changes remain significantly greater than 
both the respective expected announcement period and the non-announcement period 
for much of both the first 30 transactions and the first 10 minutes, they rapidly decline at 
around 120 seconds or 15 transactions. There is evidence of an increased number of 
larger trades for much of the remainder of the twelve-minute window. For the 
FTSE 100, we found evidence o f a delay in reaction following a not-expected 
announcement. We interpreted this delay as a period where market participants 
reassessed the announcements’ implications upon the futures price. The mean absolute 
price changes following a not-expected announcement remain significantly greater than 
both the respective expected announcement period and the non-announcement period 
for much of both the first 30 transactions and the remainder of the twelve-minute 
window, although they rapidly decline at around 75 seconds. While both trade 
frequency and trade size remain elevated for much of the first 1 0  minutes following a 
not-expected announcement, trade size remains significantly greater than the respective 
expected announcement period for only 75 seconds. We interpreted any reaction 
following an expected announcement as being the result o f a minority o f market 
participants that did not expect the announcement decision, and therefore had to trade, 
as their prior beliefs were not confirmed.
Further, our results indicate a shorter/longer adjustment period following an 
expected/not-expected announcement than that found following an announcement in Ap
Gwilym et al. (1998). We suggest that the majority of the price adjustment is explained 
by the degree of surprise associated with an announcement. Therefore in studies such as 
Ap Gwilym et al. (1998) where announcement data is not split into expected and 
unexpected components, the observed price adjustment is diluted by the expected 
components of that announcement. These results further underline the importance of 
extracting the unexpected components of any announcement if accurate conclusions are 
to be drawn regarding the adjustment process of futures prices to announcement 
releases.
While using the difference between the forecast value and the actual announced value as 
an indicator of whether an announcement is expected or not expected provides a good 
measure of the consensus of an announcement, it still remains unable to distinguish 
between what is entirely expected and entirely unexpected information.
In the second section of this chapter we addressed this issue and introduced a new 
method that captures all elements of surprise associated with each repo rate 
announcement. We utilised the survey data provided by Reuters to focus on the four 
possible elements of surprise, these comprised those that forecast a repo rate 
announcement; 50 basis points below the actual decision, 25 basis points below the 
decision, 25 basis points above the decision and 50 basis points above the decision. By 
focusing on the degree of surprise associated with each announcement, we provide a 
direct test of the impact of entirely unexpected information upon market activity.
We estimated three linear regression equations with our surprise elements as our 
explanatory variables and trade volume, trade frequency and trade size over the first 5- 
minutes following an announcement as our dependent variables. Again we focused on 
trade frequency and trade size for a fuller description of the reaction o f volume to new 
information. Our results indicate that for the Short Sterling, following a repo rate 
announcement much of the observed first 5-minute volume is a consequence of more 
frequent trading by those who forecast a repo rate announcement 25 basis points above 
the actual decision. Those participants who forecast a decision 25 basis points below the 
actual decision also traded more frequently, but their trades were smaller and so had no 
impact upon volume. Finally those who forecast a decision 50 basis points below the
actual decision were found to trade less often. For the FTSE 100, much of the observed 
first 5-minute volume is a consequence of those who forecast a decision either 25 basis 
points above or below the actual decision. Those who forecast a decision 25 basis points 
above the decision were found to trade larger amounts more often compared with those 
who forecast a decision 25 basis points below the decision who were only found to trade 
more frequently.
Although much of the volume in the first 5-minutes following an announcement is a 
consequence of elevated trading activity, by those who forecast a decision 25 basis 
points either side o f the actual decision, one might have expected that following our 
hypothesis (see section 3.4.2.1), those who forecast a decision 50 basis points either side 
o f the actual decision would have proved to be more significant in explaining the 
observed elevated market activity following an announcement. However the lack of 
support for this is a consequence of the small sample sizes within the 50 basis point 
categories with most of those who forecast incorrectly, being 25 basis points around the 
actual decision.
Chapter Four
The Price Formation Process in an Order-Driven Market
4.1 Introduction
Central to the market microstructure literature is the notion that in a market with 
asymmetrically informed agents, trades convey information and through observing the 
sequence of trades, market participants can update their beliefs. This causes prices to 
move. Accordingly prices are considered to be a stochastic process conditioned on a 
function of the trading process. Since the stochastic process o f prices forms the 
foundation of most financial models, it is essential to understand this learning process.
Both theoretical and empirical models have addressed this issue and many features of 
the trading process have been suggested as informative variables in the price formation 
process. However an important feature prevalent in most o f these models is the 
existence of a designated market maker who provides bid and ask quotes to the trading 
public. In the theoretical contribution of Easley and O’Hara (1987), trade size provides
information while others such as Garman (1976), Garbade and Lieber (1977), Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1987) and Easley and O’Hara (1992) indicate that the timing of trades 
is considered informative. In the empirical literature there has been no clear consensus 
about the relationship between trading activity and the price formation process. Jones et 
al. (1994) conclude that the occurrence of transactions per se, and not their size contains 
all the relevant information required for the pricing of securities. However Huang and 
Masulis (1999) and Chan and Fong (2000) conclude that trade size provides relevant 
information. Hasbrouck (1991) found that the change in prices depends on 
characteristics such as the sign and size o f a trade, the market environment as measured 
by the bid-ask spread and the current and past levels of prices. He suggested the study of 
time-of-day patterns for a better understanding of the price impact o f a trade. Dufour 
and Engle (2000) extended Hasbrouck’s (1991) model to include trade durations (the 
time between two consecutive transactions) and time-of-day patterns as additional 
measures of market activity. They found that while trades performed around the open 
showed some evidence of being significant, in general time-of-day effects were found to 
be insignificant and concluded that short time durations, hence high trading activity are 
related to both larger quote revisions and stronger positive autocorrelations of trades. 
When combined with the earlier results of Hasbrouck (1991), they concluded that higher 
trading activity is associated with larger spreads, higher volume and higher price 
impacts of trades. They suggest that when trade size is large or the market is highly 
active, the liquidity providers revise their beliefs in an upward fashion that an 
information event has already occurred. This causes them to postpone their trading 
inferring such markets as having reduced liquidity. Hausman, et al. (1992) estimate 
ordered probit models for transaction prices. They consider the time between the current 
trade and the last trade as an explanatory variable, and although time seems to matter, its 
role appeared inconclusive. Engle and Russell (1994) provide evidence of co­
movements among duration, volatility, volume and spread. Engle (1996) observes that 
longer (shorter) durations lead to lower (higher) volatility.
Other empirical analyses have shown that the dynamics o f market variables may be 
partly attributed to intra-day periodicities. It is well established that quoted bid-ask
spreads, volatility and volume exhibit U-shaped patterns over the trading day1. However 
Ederington and Lee (1993) find an L-shape pattern in intra-day volatility for US 
Treasury Bond, Eurodollar and Deutschmark futures markets, with a peak in volatility 
early in the day followed by reasonably flat volatility for the rest o f the day. They 
conclude that this peak does not coincide with the market open but rather the release of 
macroeconomic announcements. Chan et al. (1995) found that the spread of NASDAQ 
stocks was highest at the beginning of the day, declining thereafter and then narrowing 
abruptly during the last hour of trading. Reiss and Werner (1993) identified a similar 
pattern of declining spreads on the London Stock Exchange, which has a multiple dealer 
structure similar to NASDAQ. Previous studies of intraday behaviour of LIFFE futures 
markets have reported elevated volume and volatility around the release of 
macroeconomic announcements as well as around the market open and close. Becker et 
al. (1995a) find that the volatility of 30-minute returns for the FTSE 100 index futures 
market responds to the release o f UK and US economic data. Becker et al. (1993) find 
elevated volatility in the Long Gilt futures market following UK and US 
announcements. Becker et al. (1995b) report that volatility for the Long Gilt, Short 
Sterling and other contracts traded on LIFFE is elevated around times of UK and US 
announcements. Abhyanker et al. (1999) examine the intraday behaviour o f returns, 
returns volatility, traded volume and bid-ask spreads for the FTSE 100 futures contracts 
and found U-shaped patterns in both volume and volatility, however in contrast to the 
behaviour reported in many studies of US futures markets, they found high spreads at 
the open with a steady rise to mid-day then falling thereafter with a particularly sharp 
drop just before the market close. Buckle et al. (1998) examine the intraday behaviour 
of returns, returns volatility, trading volume, reversals, and returns autocorrelation for 
the FTSE 100 and the Short Sterling futures contracts. For both contracts they report U- 
shaped patterns in volatility and volume but where the variables are higher at the open 
than the close. For the FTSE 100 they reported elevated volatility following UK and US 
announcements, in contrast for the Short Sterling they only reported elevated volatility 
following UK announcements. Engle and Russell (1998) indicated that trade durations 
exhibit an inverted U-shaped pattern over the trading day.
1 See Wood et al (1985), Harris (1986), Jain and Joh (1988), Mclnish and Wood (1992), 
Brock and Kleidon (1992), Eckman (1992), Laux (1993), Wang et al. (1994).
In this chapter, we examine the price learning process o f the FTSE100 futures contract; 
that is we examine the information content of its trades and evaluate how these are 
reflected in the market quotes. An important distinction between this study and others is 
that in our work we consider an order-driven market, where there is no market maker. In 
an order driven market traders can enter either limit orders or market orders. A limit 
order is an order to buy/sell a given quantity at a maximum/minimum price within a 
given time horizon. A market order is an order to buy/sell a given quantity at the best 
available price. In an order driven market transactions occur when orders are matched, 
and the spread amounts to the difference between the smallest limit sell price and the 
largest limit buy price. Indeed the traders who enter limit orders provide liquidity to 
those who enter market orders, in a similar way to market makers providing liquidity in 
a quote driven market.
Using Hasbrouck’s (1991) Vector Autoregression (VAR) model, we extend this model 
in a similar manner to that of Dufour and Engle (2000) to incorporate time as an 
additional feature of the price formation process. We argue that such models can be 
extended to markets where limit orders rather than a specialist provide liquidity. In the 
literature a few studies have documented that there is no fundamental difference 
between a specialist market and an order driven market, in the sense that the same set of 
equilibrium prices will be obtained in either market (see Tonks (1998) and Dufour and 
Engle (2000)). By applying their methodology to an order driven market we gain further 
insight into the dynamic process of price formation in an order-driven market. Moreover 
this provides for a comparative analysis o f the price formation process in these two 
types of markets. Finally by incorporating time into the price formation process we 
provide additional evidence o f the role played by time, which has only recently been 
considered an important feature in market microstructure.
This study is organised as follows, in Section 4.2 we introduce the data used in this 
chapter. In Section 4.3 we introduce our model. In Section 4.4 we discuss the results, 
while focusing on price formation in order-driven markets and in particular the 
information content of time in models for price and trade dynamics. In Section 4.5 we 
summarise our findings and conclusions.
4.2 Data and Methodology
4.2.1 LIFFEData
Again we use transaction data provided by LIFFE for the FTSE100 futures contract. The 
data includes details of all trades, bids and asks to the nearest second, delivery month, 
price and volume. We use the nearest-to-maturity contract until the trading volume on 
the next contract becomes greater. This generally occurs at maturity. The sample period 
is January 4, 2000 to June 30, 2000.
4.2.2 Preparation of the Data for the Analysis
We prepare the data for our analysis as follows. First, we only consider trades, asks and 
bids that occur between 08:35:00GMT and 16:30:00GMT. Secondly, we filter out any 
anomalous data2. Thirdly, we add up the volume of consecutively recorded trades that 
occur at the same timestamp and the same price, and we consider these as one trade. 
Fourthly, we omit the opening trade and the overnight price change to avoid 
contamination of prices by the arrival of overnight news. Hence we drop transactions 
occurring before the first quote and treat the overnight price change as a missing value 
for all lagged variables. Despite these adjustments the data set still remains very large, 
with 804,555 observations.
2 We deleted three unusual transactions reported on the 02/03/00 and the 31/03/00. 
Reasons for these included the collapsing of the electronic trading system.
4.3 The Model
Under the hypothesis that the public information set is exclusively given by the past 
evolution of trades and quotes, Hasbrouck (1991) introduced an econometric 
methodology to model the dynamic relationship between the trading process and the 
subsequent adjustment of market quotes. This methodology is based on a general VAR 
model for the changes o f the quote midpoint and the trade indicator. Following Dufour 
and Engle (2000) we use a generalisation o f the Hasbrouck (1991) model to include 
time as a predetermined variable that influences both the price impact o f a trade and the 
correlation between trades. This presents the following system for quote revisions and 
trades in an order-driven market,
15
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Using the familiar rule of using t to index trades. We define the revision in quotes, rt as 
the change in the natural logarithm of the mid-quote price that follows the current trade 
at time t, so that rt -  In (qt -  qt-i). To examine the role o f time we consider time 
durations, Tt, the difference in seconds between the time stamp for the trade xt and the 
previous trade xt.j, and a set of time-of-day dummy variables Without loss of 
generality we add one second to each trade duration observation, so that the lowest log- 
duration is zero. We consider 15 diurnal dummy variables. We present these dummy 
variables and their respective time intervals in Table 4.1 below. In particular we focus 
on the UK open and close, as well as the US open3 and the UK and US announcement 
effect.
3 The US open is generally 13:20GMT, however due to British DST (daylight saving 
time), for trading days that occur between 26/03/00 and 01/04/00, the US open is 14:20 
GMT.
We use a dummy variable xt°, which indicates the direction o f the trade4. This variable 
assumes a value of one if the trade is initiated by a buyer, a value of minus one if the 
trade is initiated by a seller and zero if the trade is just a match of two opposite orders at 
the mid-quote. Since we do not have any information on the actual identity o f the trade 
initiator, we determine the direction of a trade based on the prevailing quote. We 
classify a trade as a purchase if the transaction price equals the price o f the last ask, as a 
sale if  the transaction price equals the price of the last bid and unclassified if the 
transaction price is equal to the mid-quote price. This procedure results in classifying 
48.35 % as buyer initiated, 50.55 % as seller initiated and leaves a residual of 1.10 % as 
unclassified. We delete these unclassified trades.
Although it is unusual to include a limited dependent variable in a vector autoregression, 
this presents no econometric difficulties when it is as an explanatory variable, which is 
the case for the relationship of primary interest, the price equation. However when 
estimating the trade equation, the linear specification is potentially inappropriate. 
Nonetheless, OLS estimation still yields consistent parameter estimates, if the 
conditional mean of the trade indicator is correctly specified. However with the 
probability of a buy or sell being so close to 0.5, the linear specification is acceptable.
Additionally the informational component o f price variation can be related to two 
different sources of information, public and private. These informational shocks are 
commonly represented by two white noise processes Vi, t and V2, /. Where vi,, represents 
the update to public information and V2, t captures the unanticipated component of the 
trade (relative to an expectation formed from linear projection on the trade and quote 
revision history). As such if  there is any new information contained in xt it must reside 
in the innovation V2, t, since the remaining component is entirely known. This does not 
imply that the innovation is a deterministic function o f the new information. The 
presence of uninformed liquidity traders, for example will introduce a noise component 
o f V2, t that is uncorrelated with private information. Assuming that public information 
prior to the tth trade does not aid the forecast of future innovations, model (4.1) may be
4 Hasbrouck (1991) also suggests generalisations with xt as a vector of other trade 
related variables such as the interaction between trade sign and volume and the 
interaction between trade sign and spread.
estimated with the current trade in the first equation and the further assumption that the 
disturbances have zero means and are jointly and serially uncorrelated.
Hasbrouck (1991) suggests that as many microstructure imperfections can cause lagged 
effects to new information, a more robust model would be achieved by including lagged 
values5. Although in principle this may be o f an infinite order, for practical purposes it is 
truncated at some finite lag. We assume that summations in model (4.1) can be 
truncated at 5 lags and the model can be estimated consistently by ordinary least squares 
(OLS)6.
Dummy Variable Time Interval
1 08:35:00-08:44:59
2 08:45:00 - 08:59:59
3 09:00:00 - 09:59:59
4 10:00:00- 10:59:59
5 11:00:00- 11:59:59
6 12:00:00 - 12:59:59
7 12:00:00 - 12:04:59
8 13:00:00- 13:19:59
9 13:20:00- 13:29:59
10 13:30:00- 13:34:59
11 13:35:00- 13:59:59
12 14:00:00 - 14:59:59
13 15:00:00- 15:59:59
14 16:00:00- 16:14:59
15 16:15:00 - 16:29:59
Table 4.1: The Diurnal Dummy Variables and their Respective Time Intervals
In particular D3 represents trades performed around the U.K. announcements. D6 represents the lunch hour. 
D7 represents the repo announcement effect. D9 represents the first ten minutes o f trading after the U.S. open. 
Dio represents the first five minutes o f trading after the U.S. announcements are released.
5 The estimation error in the VAR approach is due to the truncation of the 
autoregressions, and with longer lags a better accuracy is achieved. Hasbrouck (1991) 
indicate that quotes adjust rapidly and after 5 transactions the majority of the adjustment 
is complete. Subsequently Dufour and Engle (2000) followed Hasbrouck (1991) and 
truncate to 5 lags.
6 Covariance stationarity o f the price trade process is typically assumed (see Hasbrouck 
(1991), de Jong et al. (1995) and Dufour and Engle (2000)).
4.4 Empirical Results
4.4.1 Time-of-Day Effects
In this section we follow the suggestion raised in Hasbrouck (1991) and study whether 
the time of day plays an important role in the price formation process. Although Dufour 
and Engle (2000) only found evidence of trades performed in the first 30 minutes of the 
trading day to be significant, we indicated in Section 4.1 that other previous empirical 
analyses have shown that dynamics of market variables may be attributed partly to intra­
day periodicities. It follows that time-of-day effects may be informative considerations 
to the dynamic process of price formation for the futures markets.
We estimate the VAR defined by model (4.1), with current and lagged values of all but 
one of the diurnal dummy variables7. Firstly we perform a Wald test o f the null that all 
lagged diurnal dummies are jointly zero. Since heteroskedasticity is present in the 
residuals for the quote equation8 we use White’s heteroskedasiticity consistent 
covariance estimator to compute both Wald and ^-statistics. Since both 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are present in the residuals of the trade equation9, 
we use the Newey-West estimator that is consistent in the presence of both 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form, to compute both Wald and t- 
statistics. We reject the null that all lagged diurnal dummies are jointly zero, for both the 
quote revision equation and the trade equation, with respective /?-values of 0 . 0 0 0  and 
0.000.
7 When all dummy variables are included in the estimation, we encounter 
multicollinearity. For this purpose we drop D n, which considers trades that occur 
between 15:00 and 16:00 GMT.
8 White Heteroskedasticity Test Statistic: 71.714 (probability = 0.000)
9 White Heteroskedasticity Test Statistic: 12.129 (probability = 0.000),
LM Test for Serial Correlation Test Statistic: 370.785 (probability = 0.000)
We then exclude from the model all insignificant lagged diumal dummies and when re- 
estimating the VAR we see little effect of this exclusion on both the coefficients and t- 
statistics of the remaining market variables. Therefore we re-estimate the VAR with 
only the significant current and lagged diumal dummies.
4.4.2 The Trade Equation
Table 4.2 presents the estimated coefficients for the trade equation. We format in bold 
the values of the coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent 
level o f confidence. Since both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are present in the 
residuals10, we use the Newey-West estimator to compute both Wald and ^-statistics.
The coefficients on lagged price changes are positive for the first leading lag but 
negative at the next two leading lags. This indicates that when quotes are revised in an 
upward fashion more buyers enter the market and similarly when quotes are revised in a 
downward fashion more sellers enter the market. In contrast Hasbrouck (1991) and 
Dufour and Engle (2000) found negative lagged quote revisions at all leading lags in the 
trade equation. They indicated that these findings might be the consequence of inventory 
control effects since a monopolistic market maker with an inventory surplus would 
reduce quotes to encourage more purchases. In addition we found signed trades exhibit 
strong positive autocorrelation. This is consistent with the findings of Hasbrouck and 
Ho (1987), Hasbrouck (1988), Hasbrouck (1991) and more recently Dufour and Engle 
(2 0 0 0 ), the explanation is simply that purchases tend to follow purchases and sales tend 
to follow sales. Hasbrouck (2000) further describes the short-run predominance of 
positive auto-correlation to be consistent with a lagged adjustment to new information.
The coefficients of the dummy variables for trades performed around the U.K. 
announcement time and trades performed around the end of day are positive and 
significant and negative and significant respectively at the first lag. Although the
10 White Heteroskedasticity Test Statistic: 38.927 (probability = 0.000),
LM Test for Serial Correlation Test Statistic: 369.046 (probability = 0.000)
coefficients for other announcement dummies are significant, including trades 
performed around both the U.K. and the U.S. opening time, we shall not focus on these, 
as these do not occur at the leading lags. However in brief, trades performed during the 
first ten minutes after the open and trades performed during the next fifteen minutes 
were found to be positive and significant at the second lag. Trades performed around 
the U.S. open and the end of day was found to be negative and significant at the third 
lag. Trades performed following both the U.S. open and the U.S. announcements were 
found to be negative and significant at lag 5.
The 8i coefficients that represent the interaction between the trade indicator and trade 
duration, are typically positive and significant for the first four lags. These findings are 
in contrast to Dufour and Engle (2000), while they found time durations to be significant 
for 13 out of 18 stocks at the first leading lag. For 8  o f these 13 coefficients the sign was 
negative.
Thus we conclude that although time effects in the trade equation appear partly 
attributable to daily periodicities they are primarily due to the stochastic component of 
time durations Tt. This interpretation is confirmed by the results of tests on time 
coefficients presented in Table 4.3. The first column of Table 4.3 presents Wald 
statistics for the null hypothesis that time coefficients are jointly zero. We reject the null 
hypothesis. In the last two columns of Table 4.3 we show respectively Wald statistics 
for the null hypothesis that all 5, coefficients are jointly zero and that the sums of these 
coefficients are jointly zero. We reject the null hypothesis that all are jointly zero and 
that the sum of the 6 , coefficients is zero.
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Table 4.3: The Significance of Time in the T rade Equation.
Wald and /-tests on the significant diumal dummies and 5, coefficients in the trade equation
= t  * , r w  + Z  [ r  ?  +  | >  w  - l“ ( r M ) ] ^  + V j _ ,
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Tt is the time interval between two consecutive transactions; x,° the trade indicator (1 for a buyer; -1 for a 
seller). rt is the quote revision following transaction /. Wald and /-statistics are computed using Newey- 
West adjustment. The sample covers the period from 4 January 2000 to 30 June 2000. For simplicity we 
present the general model above, however for the model that we used to obtain the above results we 
considered only the significant diumal dummy variables. Bold format denotes significance at the 5 
percent level
4.4.3 The Quote Revision Equation
Table 4.4 presents the estimated coefficients for the quote revision equation. We format 
in bold the values of the coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 5 
percent level o f confidence. Since both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are both 
presents in the residuals11, we use the Newey-West estimator to compute both Wald and 
/-statistics.
The coefficients on lagged price changes are positive for all lags indicating positive 
correlation in returns. This indicates a high level o f continuations, and is consistent with 
the observed declining futures price over our time period. More specifically the futures
11 White Heteroskedasticity Test Statistic: 162.414 (probability = 0.000), 
LM Test for Serial Correlation Test Statistic: 5.120 (probability = 0.000)
price was around 6930 in early January 2000 and 6359 at the end of June 2000. The 
central coefficients to this study are the Ys and the 5’s which represent the coefficients 
of the trade indicator and the interaction of the trade indicator and trade duration 
respectively. These coefficients reveal the price impact o f a signed trade. By examining 
these coefficients we observe that the price impact of a signed trade is positive at the 
current value but negative and generally decreasing at all lags, and negatively related to 
durations. More specifically the coefficient of xt° implies that on average the quote 
midpoint is raised roughly 1.004 immediately subsequent to a purchase order.
The coefficients on the interaction between the trade indicator and trade durations are 
negative and significantly different from zero for the current and the first two leading 
lags. We interpret this in a similar fashion to Dufour and Engle (2000), “A buy 
transaction arriving after a long time interval has a lower price impact than a buy 
transaction arriving right after a previous trade”. We conclude that with trade 
frequency being higher, hence trade duration being lower then the market infers a higher 
likelihood of informed traders. This presence of informed traders may further deter the 
uninformed from trading. Therefore it becomes increasingly difficult for liquidity 
traders to enter the market and match the opposite side of a trade hence trades have a 
larger price impact.
The coefficient estimates of the diumal dummy variables indicate that eleven out of the 
fourteen dummies are both positive and significant at the current lag, and ten out of the 
fourteen dummies are significant at the first lag. These first lag diumal dummies 
however are generally negative with the exception of trades performed during the last 
fifteen minutes of the trading day, which shows a positive sign. Trades performed 
during both lunchtime and the last fifteen minutes o f the trading day were negative and 
significant and positive and significant respectively at the second lag. Trades performed 
during the last fifteen minutes of the day were positive and significant at lag 3. Finally 
trades performed between both 11:00 and 12:00 and prior to the U.S. announcements 
were found to be both negative and significant at lag 5. These findings differ from those 
reported in Dufour and Engle (2000) where time-of-day effects were found to be 
generally insignificant in the quote revision equation, with some evidence of trades 
performed around the open to be significant.
However in consensus with many earlier findings of the importance o f including time-of- 
day effects in models of market microstructure, we show in particular that the opening of 
the UK and US market, the release of UK and US macroeconomic announcements, the 
lunch-time effect and the market close to be highly significant variables in the quote- 
revision equation of the market considered in this study.
Thus time effects in the quote equation appear attributable to both daily periodicities and 
the stochastic component of trade durations Tt. This interpretation is again confirmed by 
the results of tests on time coefficients presented in Table 4.5. The first column of Table 
4.5 presents Wald statistics for the null hypothesis that all time coefficients are jointly 
zero. We reject the null hypothesis. In the last two columns of Table 4.5 we show 
respectively Wald statistics for the null hypothesis that all 5, coefficients are jointly zero 
and that the sums of these coefficients are jointly zero. We reject the null hypothesis that 
all are jointly zero and that the sum of the 5,- coefficients is zero.
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Table 4.5: The Significance of Time in The Quote Revision Equation
Wald and /-tests on the significant diumal dummies and <5, coefficients in the quote revision equation
r, = £  a,r,-,+ £  \Yr, + ^ X Di.--<+d < ln(2!-i)]*°-i+vi,«
1=1 i=0 j=1
T, is the time interval between two consecutive transactions; x,° is the trade indicator (1 for a buyer; -1 for a 
seller), r, is the quote revision following transaction /. Wald and /-statistics are computed using Newey-West 
adjustment. The sample covers the period from 4 January 2000 to 30 June 2000. For simplicity we present 
the general model above, however for the model that we used to obtain the above results we only considered 
the significant diumal dummy variables. Bold format denotes significance at the 5 percent level.
4.4.4 Robustness of Results for Time
At present, our results indicate that trade durations plays a significant role in the 
dynamic relationship o f both quote revision and trades. However, as we discussed in 
Section 4.1 many other features of the trading process have been indicated as 
informative variables in the dynamics of price formation. It follows that the time 
between transactions may not offer any new information other than that conveyed by 
such features as volume and spread. Dufour and Engle (2000) examined this proposition 
and while they found both volume and spread predominantly characterised the price 
impact of trades and the effect of trade durations was only marginal, time was more 
robust in the trade equation with 1 0  out of the 18 stocks indicating trade durations as 
significant.
In a similar manner we examine whether trade durations are important determinants of 
both price and trade dynamics or whether, other features such as volume and spread are
more informative variables. By adding these variables to both the trade impact and 
autocorrelation of trades we have
■, = Y , a i r <-i+ H ' Z x h Dj.‘-ix' - i+ 2 > A + vi,<’
i=l i=0 y=l /=0
(4.2)
/=1
+ ' k t * b Dj,,-,xi + i d
i=1 y=l /=!
where the trade impact on quote revisions ( b , )  and trades ( d t ) is parameterised as
(b„ d,) = y ,  + S l i \n(T,_l) + 8 2,,ln(Ko/,_,.) + <?3 S p r e a d , (4.3)
Where vo/ is defined as the trade volume, and spread is defined as the difference 
between the last ask and the last bid prices.
Table 4.6 presents the estimated coefficients for the trade equation and Table 4.8 
presents the estimated coefficients for the quote revision equation. We format in bold 
the values of the coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent 
level of confidence. Since both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are present in the 
residuals o f both the trade equation12 and the quote revision13 equation we use the 
Newey-West estimator to compute the standard errors. Our results indicate that when we 
add both volume and spread to trade duration as determinants of both price and trade 
dynamics we found that for the trade equation trade durations still enters as positive and 
significant for the first four leading lags, while trade durations in the quote revision 
equation still enters as negative and significant at the current and first leading lag.
12 White Heteroskedasticity Test Statistic: 315.341 (probability = 0.000),
LM Test for Serial Correlation Test Statistic: 372.326 (probability = 0.000).
13 White Heteroskedasticity Test Statistic: 269351.5 (probability = 0.000),
LM Test for Serial Correlation Test Statistic: 11.031 (probability = 0.000).
We also found that while trade durations for both equations were robust to the presence 
of volume and spread, both of these additional variables are important determinants of 
both price and trade dynamics in the order-driven market considered here. For the trade 
equation we found both volume and spread to be generally positive and significant. For 
the quote revision equation we found spread to be positive and significant at the current 
lag and generally negative and significant at the remaining leading lags, whereas volume 
was also positive and significant at the current lag and negative and significant at the 
first leading lag however for the remaining leading lags volume was generally 
insignificant. These interpretations are confirmed by the results of tests on the 
coefficients, of these three market variables.
We perform two tests on each group of coefficients related to trade durations, volume 
and spread. First we test the null that all coefficients in each group are jointly zero and 
after computing their sum we also test that the sum is zero. The sum of the coefficients 
for each group provides a first raw approximation of the long-run impact on both price 
and trade dynamics of the specific explanatory variable. We present the results o f the 
trade equation in Table 4.7 and the results of the quote revision equation in Table 4.9. 
Our results indicate that for the trade equation, all three variables exhibit a positive and 
significant long-run impact of signed trades, for the quote revision equation trade 
durations exhibit a negative long-run impact on prices while both trade volume and 
spread exhibit a positive impact on prices.
Further, daily variation appeared generally robust to the addition o f both volume and 
spread for both equations. Although we do not report the diumal dummy coefficients 
and their respective ^-statistics, we note there was generally very little change in both the 
coefficients and their respective ^-statistics compared to those shown in Table 4.2 and 
Table 4.4 14.
14 With exception to the quote revision equation where both Aio.o and Ais,i are now 
insignificant.
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4.5 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we examined the price formation process of the FTSE 100 futures 
contract traded on LIFFE between 4 January 2000 and 30 June 2000. In contrast with 
most previous studies, we considered a market where there is no market maker, and 
limit order traders provide liquidity. In an attempt to draw some useful conclusions on 
price formation in an order-driven market, we generalised the model suggested by 
Hasbrouck (1991) for the dynamics of trades and quote revisions. In a similar manner to 
Dufour and Engle (2000) we included time-of-day patterns and trade durations among 
the determinants of both the price impact and the autocorrelation of trades. By 
examining the dynamics of price formation and in particular the role o f time upon price 
formation in an order driven market we have uncovered some similarities and 
differences in the dynamics of price formation in quote and order driven markets.
Our results indicate that in contrast to Dufour and Engle (2000) time-of-day effects 
seem to matter. Although these appear more important in the quote revision equation, 
with 11 out of the 14 diumal dummies showing as significant at the current lag, and in 
particular among the significant diumal dummies were the UK open and close, the US 
open as well as UK and US announcement effects. For the trade equation both UK 
announcements and the market close are significant at the first leading lag. This concurs 
with previous studies of UK futures markets
In consensus with Dufour and Engle (2000) we found that short trade durations, hence 
high trading activity are related to larger quote revisions. Further we found signed trades 
to exhibit strong positive autocorrelation and a buy order leads to an upward quote 
revision. These findings are consistent with Hasbrouck (1991) and Dufour and Engle 
(2000). Although we reported positive autocorrelation in returns, which is indicative of 
a high level of continuations, we explained such continuations are the consequence of 
the declining trend in prices observed over our sample period. Finally we indicated that 
when quotes are revised in an upward fashion, more buyers enter the market and 
similarly when quotes are revised in a downward fashion, more sellers enter the market. 
Although this is in contrast with Hasbrouck (1991) and Dufour and Engle (2000), they
IUS
indicated that the negative coefficients found in the quote revisions of the sign equation 
were the consequence of inventory measure effects. However such market 
characteristics are not present in an order-driven market, where there is no market maker 
but only limit order traders.
In a similar manner to Dufour and Engle (2000) we performed robustness checks on 
trade durations and found that trade durations appeared robust for both equations in the 
presence of both volume and spread. However we also found these additional variables 
appeared to exhibit a positive and significant long-run effect on the price impact and the 
autocorrelations of trades. This result contrasts with Dufour and Engle (2000), who 
found durations to be mainly insignificant when volume and spread are included.
We conclude that price formation depends upon both trade durations and time-of-day 
patterns, the sign and size of a trade, the market environment as measured by the bid-ask 
spread and current and past levels of prices. Thus in contrast with Dufour and Engle 
(2 0 0 0 ) our results indicate that time-of-day patterns and trade durations are extremely 
informative variables in price formation in the order driven market examined in this 
study.
Chapter Five
Autoregressive Conditional Duration Processes: Introducing 
Trade Sign Information to an Asymmetric Log-ACD Model
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we provided strong empirical evidence o f the relevance of time 
in the process of price adjustment to information in an order driven market. It follows 
that the time between two consecutive transactions conveys meaningful information, 
and has recently become the object of modelling. However to measure and forecast the 
intensity of the arrival of trades requires a model that can account for the irregular 
spacing characteristic of transaction arrivals. Traditional econometric techniques, being 
based on a fixed time interval analysis, does not account for this irregular spacing 
characteristic.
However recently Engle and Russell (1998) proposed a new econometric model for the 
analysis of data that does not arrive in equal time intervals, such as financial
transactions. This proposed model, known as the Autoregressive Conditional Duration 
(ACD) model, models the time intervals directly and is therefore in the spirit o f the 
models of time deformation initially proposed by Tauchen and Pitts (1983), Clark 
(1973), Stock (1988), Muller et al. (1990) and Ghysels and Jasiak (1994) but does not 
require auxiliary data or assumptions on the causes of time flow.
Engle and Russell (1998) proposed to let the interval between transactions be a random 
variable. Thus the data set comprises a list o f durations and characteristics of each 
transaction. That is, there is a probability of a transaction arriving in each instant of time 
and this probability varies according to the type of transaction, the length of time since 
the previous transaction and any other outside influences.
One motivation behind the ACD model is the frequently observed clustering 
characteristic of inter-trade arrival times, typically found in high frequency financial 
data, (for example exchange rate trades (Engle and Russell (1997), stock market trades 
(Engle and Russell (1998)). This clustering characteristic is clearly indicated if the 
standard deviation of the series is greater than the mean.
Following the contribution of Engle and Russell (1998), several high frequency duration 
models have been put forward, with a motivation towards increased flexibility and 
generality. Bauwens and Giot (2000) introduced a logarithmic version of the ACD 
model, called the Log-ACD model, which is more convenient than the ACD model 
when conditioning variables are included in the model to test for market microstructure 
effects. The reason is that the ACD model practically requires the imposing of non­
negativity constraints on its parameters, whereas the Log-ACD model does not. As an 
alternative to the Weibull distribution used in the original ACD model, Grammig and 
Maurer (2000) use the Burr distribution, and Lunde (1999) uses the generalised gamma 
distribution (both of these distributions include the Weibull as a particular case). 
Ghysels, Gourieroux and Jasiak (1997) proposed the stochastic volatility duration 
model, which accounts for stochastic volatility in the durations. Bauwens and Veredas 
(2003) introduced the stochastic conditional duration (SCD) model, which uses a 
stochastic volatility type model instead of a GARCH-type model, to model the
durations. Jasiak (1999) introduced the Fractional Integrated ACD (FIACD) process to 
allow for the characteristic of long-term memory effects.
However an important feature prevalent in all these models above is that although they 
account for the duration between market events and they include additional variables 
drawn from the market microstructure literature such as volume and spread, they do not 
include information about the trade sign process. This may be an important drawback, as 
both the earlier results of Dufour and Engle (2000) and the previous chapter indicate 
that the trade sign is closely related to the time between transactions. Thus combining 
information given by the trade sign process and the duration between transactions seems 
a natural extension. Further, in contrast to Dufour and Engle (2000) we found trade 
durations to be robust in the presence of both volume and spread. Although not 
conclusive, we suggested that time maybe a more informative variable in an order 
driven market compared with a quote driven market. Hence by modelling the trade 
intensity process and in particular the impact of the sign of the previous transaction 
upon trading intensity, we illuminate this process in an order driven market. This 
provides a comparative analysis of the trade intensity process in an order driven market 
to a quote driven market.
This chapter uses an Autoregressive Conditional Duration (ACD) framework, as 
proposed by Engle and Russell (1998) to model the transaction process o f the FTSE 100 
futures contract between 4 January 2000 and 30 June 2000. First, we follow a similar 
methodology to Engle and Russell (1998) to provide a comparative analysis of both the 
exponential and the Weibull versions of the ACD model. Second, by incorporating trade 
sign, we extend the asymmetric Log-ACD model first proposed by Bauwens and Giot 
(2003). The asymmetry in the model proposed in this study comes from the dependency 
of the duration process on trade sign. If a buyer initiates a trade the duration process 
may differ compared to when a seller initiates a trade. Additionally, in order to better 
specify the expected conditional duration, we include trading volume and spread into 
our version of the asymmetric Log-ACD model.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 5.2 we review the ACD 
model o f Engle and Russell (1998). In Section 5.3 we describe the nature of the
iuy
durations for the FTSE 100 futures contract. In Section 5.4 we present the estimation 
results o f both the EACD and the WACD models. In Section 5.5 we review the Log- 
ACD model of Bauwens and Giot (2000). In Section 5.6 we extend the asymmetric Log- 
ACD model o f Bauwens and Giot (2003) to examine the existence of an asymmetric 
trade sign effect upon the trade intensity process. We also include volume and spread as 
additional explanatory variables.
5.2 Review of the ACD Model
5.2.1 The ACD Model
The ACD model first introduced by Engle and Russell (1998) shares some features of 
the GARCH model. Instead of modelling an autoregressive process on the variance of 
the returns as in the GARCH model, the ACD model bears on the autoregressive 
structure displayed by durations. This model is particularly well suited to the analysis of 
irregularly spaced data, where the time elapsed between two trades conveys meaningful 
information.
Let xi be the duration between two consecutive transactions occurring at times ti and U-i 
i.e. x,. = ti - 1j_\, which is measured in seconds. The assumption introduced by Engle 
and Russell (1998) is that the time dependence in the durations can be subsumed in their 
conditional expectations x¥ i = E (x(. | F._,) in such a way that x(. / 'F. is independent and
identically distributed. Ft_{ denotes the information set available at time , (i.e. at the 
beginning of duration xf), and contains at least x M and its past values and M and its 
past values.
The ACD model specifies the observed duration as a mixing process:
(5.1)
where the e t are independent and identically distributed and follow a Weibull ( 1 ,7 ) 
probability distribution, while the are proportional to the conditional expectation of 
as explained below.
A second equation specifies an autoregressive model for the (expected) conditional
durations1:
%  = a + a lx l_l + a 2x,_2+ . . . + a mx l_m + 0 2¥ ,_2+...+ 0  ¥ ,  , (5.2)
with the following constraints on the coefficients: 6 ? > 0 ,a  ,.> 0  and
m ax{ tti,t/}
5 > , + A )  < 1. The last constraint ensures the existence of the unconditional mean of
/•= ]
the duration, while the others simply ensure the positivity of the conditional durations.
The condition 'F. = E(xi |Fm ) provides us with a third equation, linking equations (5.1) 
and (5.2):
= r O,., (5.3)
where T(.) is the gamma function. The exponential distribution is obtained as a special 
case of the Weibull distribution when y - 1. In which case, 0 ( = .
The autoregressive structure of the conditional expectations o f the durations implies that 
small durations are more likely to be followed by small durations (and likewise for long 
durations). Thus the model accounts for the clustering effect o f durations. The Weibull 
distribution is preferred over the exponential. While the exponential is a very tractable 
model specification, it is also very inflexible. The single parameter in the distribution
1 This model is the ACD (m,q) model.
yields the well-known property of a constant proportional hazard. However the 
probability of a trade at time t conditioned on no trade up to time t may not be constant. 
However for the Weibull distribution, the conditional intensity is a two-parameter 
family, which can exhibit either increasing or decreasing hazard functions. This makes 
especially long durations more or less likely than for the exponential depending on 
whether 7  is less or greater than unity respectively.
5.2.2 Statistical Properties of the ACD Model
By definition, the conditional expectation of x,- is equal to %. Similarly the conditional 
variance of x,- is 'k,2. Thus equation (5.2) provides a way to forecast expected durations, 
based on the information available at the previous durations. The constant unconditional 
expectation (/x) and variance (a ) of x,. are given by
The result shows that the unconditional standard deviation exceeds the mean whenever 
a  > 0 , and is therefore consistent with the excess dispersion that is typically observed in 
duration data. For the exponential model k = 1 so there is no excess dispersion in the 
standard deviations even though there is in the unconditional durations.
u. = h \x i ) = -------- ;— -”  '  1 /  maxfm.q'} (5.4)
and
_ 2 _ 2 t 1 2 a/? p 2cj -  u k  ;-------—----- —
\ - ( a  + p )  - a  k
(5.5)
For the Weibull with parameter y , it can be shown that
k = v Yj
'.+P*
v Yj
- 1 (5.6)
Similar but increasingly complicated results can be obtained for the higher moments and 
for the higher order models. For a proof of these results see, Engle and Russell (1998).
5.2.3 The Likelihood Function of an ACD Model 
By definition the exponential density function o f x f can be written as
f v  ^ -\^ L
VF.
(5.7)
Using equation (5.7), we can write the log-likelihood function of the observation 
x n i = 1,..., A  as
- E/=!
ln O F ,)+ ^ -
with Y , defined by equation (5.2).
(5.8)
By definition the Weibull density function of xt can be written as
(
x . r i + -  
V r  
VF.
x, r| 1+-
(5.9)
Using equation (5.9) we can write the log-likelihood function of the observation xn 
i = 1 as
ln0 /) - E ln(;r, ) + r ln
t=i
x,.r
v Y j
Y In^F,-)-
x.r
f  A Y  
1+ -  
. Yj (5.10)
with ¥ .  defined by equation (5.2).
5.3 The Durations
5 . 3 . 1  D e s c r i p t i v e  S t a t i s t i c s
After all the adjustments to the data (see section 4.2.2), there are 804,555 observations 
on FTSE 100 transactions to be analysed. The data sample covers the period from 4 
January 2000 to 30 June 2000. The average time interval between transactions is 5.37 
seconds, the minimum interval is 0 seconds and the maximum interval is 479 seconds. 
The standard deviation is 8.75 seconds and the skewness is 6.59. A histogram of these 
durations is shown in Figure 5.1. For a Poisson process the means should be equal to the 
standard deviation, our data set clearly exhibits excess variance in durations.
Duration (secs)
Figure 5.1: Duration Histogram
5.3.2 Time-of-Day Effects
Figure 5.2 presents mean durations for different periods over the trading day. The data 
exhibits the well-known property of high activity (small durations) in the morning and 
just prior to close. Durations are longest in the middle o f the day. The mean duration is 
1.5 times higher during lunchtime than that at the opening, with the average trade 
duration around 13:00 being 8.72 seconds and the average duration around the opening 
being 4.66 seconds. The durations are twice as high during lunchtime compared with 
just prior to the market close, where the average duration is 3.24 seconds. An additional 
time o f high activity hence lower trade durations was observed around the US open, 
with an average duration o f 4.34 seconds. In Table 5.1 we present the descriptive 
statistics for our durations conditioned on the time o f day.
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Figure 5.2: Mean Duration Conditioned on the Time of Day
Time-of-day Frequency Mean StandardDeviation
08:35:00 - 08:44:59 18815 4.662 6.220
08:45:00-08:59:59 27519 5.045 6.765
09:00:00-09:59:59 96411 5.568 8.123
10:00:00-10:59:59 85750 6.169 9.501
11:00:00- 11:59:59 73729 7.039 11.537
12:00:00-12:59:59 58696 8.591 14.348
13:00:00- 13:19:59 20871 8.716 14.633
13:20:00- 13:29:59 10730 8.232 12.816
13:30:00- 13:34:59 11743 4.341 7.596
13:35:00- 13:59:59 39401 5.561 8.956
14:00:00- 14:59:59 116899 4.736 7.534
15:00:00- 15:59:59 156964 3.842 4.689
16:00:00- 16:14:59 37459 3.976 4.889
16:15:00- 16:29:59 49568 3.241 3.684
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics for the durations
5.3.3 Autocorrelations and Partial Autocorrelations
The ACD model is proposed as a model for intertemporally correlated event arrival 
times. To examine the dependence, we calculate the autocorrelations and the partial 
autocorrelations of the durations, or the waiting times between consecutive transactions. 
Table 5.2 shows these autocorrelations with the overnight waiting times removed. The 
autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations are far from zero and all the signs are 
positive. The Ljung-Box statistic is examined to formally test the null hypothesis that 
the first 15 autocorrelations are zero. The test statistic is distributed as a X\s with a 5%
critical value of 24.99. The null is very easily rejected with a chi-squared statistic of 
207697 and a corresponding p-value of 0.000. These long autocorrelations are exactly 
what is found for autocorrelations of squared returns. Engle and Russell (1998) show 
that volatility clustering and trade duration clustering exhibit many similarities.
We remove the deterministic diurnal component Ay where Ay represents the mean 
duration of the time-of-day interval containing *,■ and consider the diumally adjusted 
series o f time durations
The new diumally adjusted series xt has a mean of 1, a standard deviation of 1.46 and
should be free o f any daily periodicity. The autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations 
of the diumally adjusted durations are also shown in Table 5.2. The new Ljung-Box 
statistic for the first 15 lags associated with the diumally adjusted series is 125078. This 
indicates that dependency between durations still exists after the removal of the diurnal 
effects.
Lag Raw Durations Diurnalbv Adjusted £durations
ACF PACF Q-stat ACF PACF Q-stat
1 0.188 0.188 28528 0.160 0.160 20488
2 0.156 0.125 48113 0.125 0.102 33041
3 0.144 0.100 64771 0.113 0.082 43376
4 0.136 0.083 79660 0.106 0.069 52439
5 0.131 0.072 93399 0.101 0.061 60713
6 0.126 0.063 106139 0.096 0.053 68172
7 0.128 0.062 119241 0.097 0.052 75811
8 0.125 0.056 131788 0.094 0.046 82967
9 0.120 0.048 143341 0.090 0.041 89508
1 0 0.120 0.047 154978 0.091 0.040 96123
1 1 0.118 0.043 166211 0.087 0.035 102255
1 2 0.113 0.036 176437 0.084 0.031 107923
13 0.114 0.037 186900 0.084 0.032 113648
14 0.113 0.035 197159 0.084 0.030 119270
15 0.114 0.036 207697 0.085 0.031 125078
Table 5.2: Autocorrelations and Partial Autocorrelations of Trading Interval.
5.4 Estimation of the ACD Models
The ACD model consists first of a distributional assumption for the conditional density 
of the adjusted durations xj . In the ACD model first proposed by Engle and Russell
(1998), the Weibull distribution is preferred to the exponential distribution. They found 
the restrictive constant proportional hazard to be inappropriate. It follows, that in a 
similar manner to Engle and Russell (1998) we empirically test whether the Weibull 
version of the ACD model is preferred to the exponential version of the ACD model for 
the FTSE 100 durations considered in this chapter.
We proceed by maximising the log-likelihood functions for the exponential and Weibull 
versions of the ACD models as described in section 5.2.1. To perform maximum 
likelihood estimation, we used the Marquadt algorithm in Eviews 4.1. The algorithm has 
no trouble in converging for these samples and the results are robust to the choice of 
starting values. To allow for inter-day effects a dummy variable was included taking a 
value o f 1 if it is the first observation of the day and zero elsewhere.
5.4.1 The Exponential ACD (EACD) Models
The parameter estimates for both the EACD (2,1) model and the EACD (2,2) model are 
presented in Table 5.3. Our results indicate that all the included variables are significant 
at the 1% level. In contrast to Engle and Russell (1998), we did not find reduced t- 
statistics for the EACD (2,2) model, which they attribute to multicollinearity. The 
results shown in table 5.3 indicate that this is not a problem in our model. For a constant 
unconditional mean to exist, the sum of c^’s and f t’s must be less than one. Both models 
are close to being integrated with the sum of Qi’s and jft’s equal to 0.993 and 0.997 for 
the EACD (2,1) model and the EACD (2,2) model respectively. This indicates that the 
process has strong persistence as measured in transaction time. The implied 
unconditional means are 1.051 and 1.071 for the EACD (2,1) and the EACD (2,2) 
models respectively.
The ACD process assumes that a particular stochastic transformation of the data is 
independent and identically distributed. Testing this assumption provides a diagnostic test 
of the model.
The ‘standardised’ durations series
I I
'F ,
(5.12)
are tested for autocorrelation using the Ljung Box statistic with 15 lags. The Ljung-Box 
statistics are 455.94 and 160.15 for the EACD (2,1) model and the EACD (2,2) model 
respectively. Both of these values are much less than those computed for the raw and 
diumally adjusted durations, however these values are still greater than the critical value 
(24.99 at the 5% level), and the null hypothesis o f white noise is rejected for both models. 
The independence assumption in equation (5.1) implies that higher order moments should 
also be independent. The Ljung-Box statistic for the square o f the standardised series is 
110.16 and 143.30 for the EACD (2,1) model and the EACD (2,2) model respectively. 
Higher order moments are also greater than the critical value. These statistics suggest that 
the model does not do a good job of accounting for the intertemporal dependence in 
transaction rates, and that the large Ljung-Box statistic observed for the raw durations in 
Table 5.2 is not a result of the daily factor alone. This observation is supported by the 
large ^-statistics observed for the parameters 04 and ft which are designed to capture this 
inter-temporal autocorrelation.
One goodness of fit test is a simple moment condition implied by the exponential 
distribution. In particular the exponential distribution implies that the mean should equal 
the standard deviation. The mean of the standardised durations is unity by first order 
conditions while the standard deviations are 1.222 and 1.218 for the EACD (2,1) model 
and the EACD (2,2) model respectively.
A simple test of the null of no excess dispersion is then based on the statistic 
” l)/CTv)W^ ere & I is the sample variance o f e , which should be 1 under the
null hypothesis. crv is the standard deviation of (s,. -  l ) 2 which is equal to V8  under the
exponential null hypothesis. A straightforward application o f a central limit theorem 
implies this statistic should have a limiting normal distribution under the null with a 5% 
critical value of 1.96. The null of the standard deviation equal to unity is easily accepted 
with ^-statistics of 0.936 and 0.941 for the EACD (2,1) and the EACD (2,2) model 
respectively.
EACD (2,1) EACD (2,2)
Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic
CO 0.007 0 .0 0 0 52.065 0.003 0 .0 0 0 47.644
a . 0.130 0.001 115.323 0.125 0.001 134.684
a  2 -0.086 0.001 -75.775 -0.106 0.001 -112.316
f i i 0.950 0 .0 0 0 2622.195 1.423 0 .0 0 0 4727.944
P  2 - - - -0.444 0 .0 0 0 -1076.575
X 0.279 0.024 11.754 0.133 0.011 11.542
Table 5.3: M aximum Likelihood Estimates of EACD Models after Removing Time of 
Day Effects
We estimate the Exponential Autoregressive Conditional Duration (EACD) models on FTSE 
100 intertrade durations (+1 second) after removing the time-of-day effect. We use duration 
data for the period from 4 January 2000 to 30 June 2000. We remove the deterministic 
diurnal component Ay where Ay represents the mean duration of the time-of-day interval 
containing xt and consider the diumally adjusted series of time durations 5c. = xi/ Aj .
Assuming that xt has an exponential distribution, the estimated EACD models are
VE / =  +  +  # 2-*7-2 +  P l ^ i - ]  ^  P l ^ i - 2  + y^ / - l  >
and
\ ~ \  -1^  
/ ( * / ) = —
X : VF ;
e , for > 0 .
IA * iJ
D, is a dummy variable for the first observation of the trading day.
5.4.2 The Weibull ACD (WACD) Models
The parameter estimates for the WACD (2,1) model and the WACD (2,2) model are 
presented in Table 5.4. Our results indicate that all the included variables are significant 
at the 1% level. The parameter estimates of 7  are 1.06 for both the WACD (2,1) and the 
WACD (2,2) models respectively. The exponential model is easily rejected in favour of 
the Weibull with a t statistic associated with a null hypothesis o f 7 = 1  o f 57 and 64 for 
the WACD (2,1) model and the WACD (2,2) model respectively. For a constant 
unconditional mean to exist, requires the sum of Qi’s and f t’s to be less than one. Both 
models are close to being integrated with the sum of o f s and f t ’s equal to 0.994 and 
0.997 for the WACD (2,1) model and the WACD (2,2) model respectively. The implied 
unconditional means are 1.112 and 1.205 for the WACD (2,1) model and the WACD
(2,2) model respectively. Given the similarities in the parameters, it is not surprising to 
find that the standardised series exhibit similar autocovariances and Ljung-Box 
statistics. If  the Weibull specification is correct then raising the residuals to the power 7  
should produce a series that remains independent and identically distributed, and is also 
distributed as a unit exponential. By applying the same set of diagnostic tests as before 
to the transformed Weibull ‘standardised’ series,
± L
T .
(5.13)
yields associated Ljung-Box statistics are 428.13 and 145.85 for the WACD (2,1) model 
and the WACD (2,2) model respectively. Again these are a great improvement over the 
Ljung-Box statistics associated with the raw and diumally adjusted durations, and 
although slightly less, these values remain very similar to those computed for the EACD 
models. The Ljung-Box statistic for the square of the standardised series is 77.57 and 
105.83 for the WACD (2,1) model and the WACD (2,2) model respectively. These 
statistics suggest that the model does not account for all o f the intertemporal dependence 
in transaction rates.
The standard deviations of e are 1.325 and 1.327 for the WACD (2,1) model and the
WACD (2,2) model respectively. The test for excess dispersion of the transformed 
series yields ^-statistic of 1.377 and 1.383 for the WACD (2,1) and the WACD (2,2) 
model respectively. Therefore, we accept the null o f no excess dispersion.
WACD (2,1) WACD (2,2)
Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic
0) 0.006 0 .0 0 0 56.229 0.003 0 .0 0 0 62.190
a  i 0.130 0.001 130.720 0.128 0.001 147.948
a 2 -0.086 0.001 -85.466 -0.104 0.001 -120.663
/?, 0.950 0 .0 0 0 3057.098 1.326 0 .0 0 0 731331.100
P  2 - - - -0.353 0 .0 0 0 -3767.868
r 1.057 0.001 1273.710 1.064 0.001 1288.113
X 0.284 0.020 13.621 0.170 0.012 13.784
Table 5.4: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of WACD Models after Removing Time 
of Day Effects
We estimate the Weibull Autoregressive Conditional Duration (WACD) models on FTSE 
100 intertrade durations (+1 second) after removing the time-of-day effect. We use duration 
data for the period from 4 January 2000 to 30 June 2000. We remove the deterministic 
diumal component Ay where Ay represents the mean duration of the time-of-day interval 
containing Xi and consider the diumally adjusted series o f time durations xt = x, /Ay.
Assuming that x{ has a Weibull distribution, the estimated WACD models are
'E y  — (U  +  Q fjX ;_ j +  £ ^ 2 ^ 7 -2  ^  P 2 ^ i-2 + A D i - \  »
and
/(*,■) x ..
x T 1 + 1  
v Yj
VE,
*.r i + v
D, is a dummy variable for the first observation of the trading day.
The results of the EACD and the WACD models above suggest that although both the 
exponential and the Weibull versions of the ACD models account for much of the 
intertemporal correlation in durations, both models remained incapable o f accounting 
for all o f the dependency. For both the exponential and the Weibull versions of the ACD 
models we were able to accept the null of no excess dispersion. However the finding of 
7=1.06 for both of the WACD models, indicates that especially long durations are less 
likely in our FTSE 100 durations data. Further, the null o f 7 = 1  is strongly rejected; this 
indicates that we prefer the Weibull to the exponential. Thus in a similar manner to 
Engle and Russsell (1998), we suggest that the constant proportional hazard feature of 
the exponential function is inappropriate for our durations data.
The duration models above are self-contained, in that the durations are modelled 
conditionally on the past durations. Microstructure effects relating to durations were not 
considered in the models above. Such effects may include trading volume, transaction 
price, bid-ask spread and volatility. The importance o f including such variables within 
the ACD framework was first proposed by Engle and Russell (1998) and has more 
recently become the motivation for the development of new models. The necessity for 
this development is due to the restrictive positivity constraints imposed upon the 
coefficients of the ACD model, which becomes a problem if we wish to include 
additional explanatory variables to test for market microstructure effects.
Following this argument Bauwens and Giot (2000) proposed the Log-ACD model; a 
variant to the ACD model that does not require positivity of the coefficients. In the next 
section we briefly review the Log-ACD model o f Bauwens and Giot (2000). Although 
we do not consider market microstructure effects in the basic Log-ACD model outlined 
below, it provides us with a framework for building a new model, which we introduce in 
Section 5.6. This new model combines information on the duration and direction of the 
trade sign. For these reasons we believe that a brief discussion of the underlying Log- 
ACD model is needed before we introduce our new model.
5.5 The Log-ACD Model
As in the ACD model, let Xj be the duration between two consecutive trades. The
where the s{ are independent and identically distributed and follow a Weibull ( 1 ,7 ) 
distribution, while <j) . is proportional to the logarithm of the conditional expectation of 
Xj as explained below.
Let y/ . be the logarithm of the conditional expectation of x t so that y/ = lni?(jc, |.F M).
A second equation specifies an autoregressive model for the logarithm of the conditional 
durations:
For positivity of eVt and thus of x n there are no restrictions on the signs of the 
parameters co,a and p .
The condition y/{ = lni^jcJF,.,,) or e Vi = E (x i\Fi_l ) provides an equation, linking 
equations (5.14) and (5.15):
logarithmic version of the ACD model changes the mixing process of equation (5.1) of 
the ACD model into the following equation:
(5.14)
y/, = a + a g ( (5.15)
e*T  1 + -  = e r<
I r )
(5.16)
Although Bauwens and Giot (2000) proposed several choices for g (* M,eM), we 
consider,
In this specification the logarithm of the conditional expectation depends on its past 
lagged value and on the lagged ‘excess duration’. This model is close to the exponential 
GARCH model of Nelson (1991). For covariance stationarity o f ip t, \ P \  must be smaller 
than one.
By definition of the Weibull density, the density function of x . can be written as
Using (5.18) we can write the log-likelihood equation of the observationsx , i = 1 
as
Using the Log-ACD model of Bauwens and Giot (2000) outlined above, we wish to 
extend this model to incorporate asymmetric effects similar to the one proposed by 
Bauwens and Giot (2003). In Bauwens and Giot (2003) they considered letting the bid- 
ask quote duration process depend on the state o f the price process. However in the 
model developed here, we let the transaction duration process depend on the state of the 
trade sign process.
As a further extension we follow suggestions made by many authors of including 
additional explanatory variables drawn from the market microstructure literature in order 
to better specify the expected conditional duration. In this model we consider both trade 
volume and spread. It is proposed here that a moving average o f the past realisations of
(5.18)
(5.19)
1Z, u
volume and spread provides more information about the current state of the market than a 
single past realisation. We therefore construct a moving average of volume and spread 
using 10 equally weighted lags. Ten transactions correspond on average, to around 55 
seconds o f trading. Just as the durations exhibit a deterministic component, it is a stylised 
fact that both volume and spread exhibit a similar deterministic component (see section 
4.1). We therefore removed the time-of-day effects in a similar manner as we did for the 
durations.
5.6 An Asymmetric Log-ACD Model
In our framework we consider a marked point process consisting of the pairs (x 
where x { is as before the duration between two trades, and y  t is a variable indicating the 
sign of trade x f such that:
y  i = 1 if a buyer initiated trade x t ; 
y = - 1  if  a seller initiated trade x t ;
such that
' =i if y M =i
I * j  (5.20)
. = 0  if  = - 1
and
i'i = i - f ; (5.21)
At the end of duration x , there are only two possible end states either where y . = 1 or 
y t = - 1 .  We assume a hazard function of the Weibull ACD type, i.e. we let the hazard 
depend not only on the previous state but also on the previous durations.
Combining a two-state competing risk model with a Log-ACD model yields an 
asymmetric Log-ACD model, which is defined by the following equations:
If the end state o f duration x t is y .  =1, the hazard for assuming a Weibull 
distribution, is given by
1 v y
(5.22)
with e¥> =xFf+, and the autoregressive process \f/T is defined as
f
y/+i = co] + a  
V
r ( i + l / r +)
+
(5.23)
J3 + y/+i_} + NewDayM + 5 \ VolM + 8 3 SpreadM
with
(5.24)
The condition y/* =\nE(xi\ F or eWi = E (x i\Fi_l) provides an equation, linking 
equations (5.23) and (5.24):
1 + —  =e«
< r +)
(5.25)
If the end state of duration x . is y = - 1 ,  the hazard of x assuming a Weibull 
distribution, is given by
*(*,!?, = - i ,f h ) = £ - x,r(i+i/y-)T,Vi (5.26)
with ew' =x¥i , and the autoregressive process y/i is defined as
co3+ a 3
x ,, ,r ( l+ l / y - )-X\ (
£> + co4+ a 4 A-l +
(5.27)
P y/ + 5 1 N e w D a y + S 2 Voli_l + 5 3 SpreadM
with
(5.28)
The condition y / . = ln ^ ^ JF ,.. ,)  or e ¥l = 2?(jc/ |F i._1) provides an equation, linking 
equations (5.27) and (5.28):
1+
V r
= er‘ (5.29)
At the end state of x { either state y  i, = 1 or y  i -  -1  is realised. In the framework of a
competing risk model, the duration corresponding to the state that is not realised is 
truncated, since the observed duration is the minimum of two possible durations: the one 
which would realise if y = 1 and the one which would realise if y . -  - 1. The realised
state contributes to the likelihood function via its density function, while the truncated 
state contributes to the likelihood function via its survivor function.
The joint density of duration x . and state y given the past state and the past duration is 
given by:
r
i V .V'l
f  fs,r(i + i/r + ) 
e ^ Si
C/r(i+i/r -)x
i V
(5.30)
Using (5.30) we can write the log likelihood of the observation x p i = 1,..., N  as
in(y+) * / ;  - S i n k ) * / ;  + y+in -
(5.31)
Inly-)*1;  - X ln(^)*7/" +r~ ln ,^.r^ l + y _
' ( 1 ' w  jc.rl 1+ l/
* / f  -
5.6.1 Empirical Results
The parameter estimates for the asymmetric Log ACD model are presented in Table 5.5. 
Our results indicate that all included variables are significant at the 1% level of 
significance. The estimation is performed by maximising the likelihood function defined 
in equation (5.31), using the Marquadt algorithm implemented in Eviews 4.1. The first 
three columns of Table 5.5 are for the part o f the model, when the end state is a buyer-
initiated trade (see equations (5.23) and (5.24)) and the last three columns are for the part 
of the model, when the end state is a seller-initiated trade (see equations (5.27) and 
(5.28)).
Our results indicate that as in the EACD and the WACD models, we find strong 
autoregressive effects (/3 coefficients), indicating a strong persistence in the dynamics of 
the duration process. In addition we note that the inclusion of volume and spread hardly 
changes the estimates of the /3 coefficients. As indicated in the WACD models, the 
estimates for the 7  parameters exceed yet remain close to one. Furthermore, we indicate 
that y  = y  and y  = y  = 1 are rejected at the 5% level of significance. These results 
confirm our earlier findings that the exponential distribution is inappropriate for our data. 
The estimates of 5i+ and 5 f  are negative and significant which indicates, negative inter­
day effects. The estimates of 6 2 * and 8 2  are negative and significant. This indicates, that 
when average volume per trade increases, the next expected duration becomes smaller. 
The estimates of 8 3 * and 6 3 ' are also negative and significant. This indicates, that when 
average spread per trade increases this decreases the next expected duration between 
FTSE 100 transactions.
Furthermore, the results given in Table 5.5 indicate that, for each additional variable 
included in the model, the corresponding coefficients for the two states (a buyer-initiated 
trade and a seller-initiated trade) are quite close. However we find that a test of the 
hypothesis that 6 2 * = &2 is rejected at the 5% level of significance. However a test of the 
hypothesis that 6 3 * = 6 3 " cannot be rejected at the 5% level of significance. This indicates 
that both volume are spread play an important informational role in the trade intensity 
process. Furthermore when trade volume decreases the next expected duration becomes 
smaller. This relationship appears to be o f particular importance when the end state is a 
buyer-initiated trade. However when spread decreases the next expected duration 
becomes smaller, and this relationship is similar for both end states.
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5.7 Summary and Conclusions
In recent years, we have witnessed the development of a new wave of high frequency 
duration models, known collectively as the autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) 
models. These models account for the irregular spacing characteristic o f transactions 
data. In the original model, Engle and Russell (1998) let the next expected duration 
depend upon past durations and past expected durations. In this model they assumed the 
conditional density of the diumally adjusted durations to be Weibull, which in a special 
case collapses to the exponential. In a similar manner to Engle and Russell (1998), we 
apply the exponential and Weibull versions o f the ACD model to FTSE 100 transaction 
durations. Our results indicated that both the exponential and the Weibull versions of the 
ACD model only partially accounted for the intertemporal correlations occurring in our 
transactions data. Both versions of the model accept the null hypothesis of no excess 
dispersion. However we found our estimates of 7  to be 1.06 for both the WACD (2,1) 
and the WACD (2,2) model. This indicates that especially long durations are less likely 
and we reject the null hypothesis that 7 = 1  for both the WACD (2,1) and the WACD 
(2,2) model indicating that we prefer the Weibull to the exponential. Thus, in a similar 
manner to Engle and Russell (1998), we find that the constant proportional hazard of the 
exponential to be inappropriate for our durations data.
We also proposed a two-state transition model for the trade sign process, where the two 
states correspond to either to a buyer-initiated trade or a seller-initiated trade, and where 
the durations are modelled by a Log-ACD process. Additional market microstructure 
effects were included in the model; these were the past average volume and the past 
average spread. Our results indicate that 7  exceeds one for both states, and again we 
reject the exponential in favour of the Webull. We also found that as in the EACD and 
the WACD models, we show strong autoregressive effects, indicating a strong 
persistence in the dynamics o f the duration process, and that the inclusion of volume and 
spread hardly changes the estimates of the fi coefficients. The coefficients o f both 
volume and spread were negative and significant. These results indicated that when 
average volume per trade increases, the next expected duration becomes smaller and 
similarly when average spread per trade increases, the next expected duration becomes
smaller. Further we found volume for a buyer-initiated trade to be significantly different 
to volume for a seller-initiated trade in the trade intensity process.
Chapter Six
Conclusions
The literature dedicated to the impact of new information upon financial futures markets 
is burgeoning. However, most of these studies consider US data, so relatively little 
empirical work exists on the very high frequency adjustment dynamics of UK futures 
markets to new information. This thesis addresses this deficiency in the literature by 
empirically examining the impact o f new information upon UK futures contracts traded 
on LIFFE. In particular we examine the reactions of market microstructure variables in 
response to two different types of information, namely a macroeconomic news event 
and the historic pattern of transactions.
One important contribution of this study is the insights provided into the differences 
between the adjustment process in quote-driven and order-driven markets. The major 
US markets are specialist markets, where a market maker provides liquidity by posting 
bid and ask quotes to the trading public. However the UK futures markets are order 
driven, where traders enter either limit orders or market orders. Given that most studies 
in this area have looked at US markets, it is clear that relatively little empirical work
considers the dynamics of price formation and the trading intensity process in an order 
driven market. This thesis sets out to address these issues by highlighting the similarities 
and differences of the dynamics of price formation and trading intensity exhibited in an 
order driven and a quote driven market.
In chapter two, we examined the impact o f repo rate surprises upon prices and trading 
activity o f both the Short Sterling and the FTSE 100 futures contracts. In particular we 
utilised survey data provided by Reuters of market participants expectations of the 
forthcoming repo rate announcement as a proxy of the degree of surprise in the market 
following a repo rate announcement. First, assuming that market participants’ forecasts 
may change during the week of the forecasts being published and the actual 
announcement release, we performed bias and efficiency tests of the survey data. Our 
results indicate that while the forecasts appear to be unbiased and efficient, there does 
appear to be some evidence of a market reaction for the Short Sterling between the time 
of the survey release and the actual announcement. In our models, we accounted for any 
market revision by an additional explanatory variable that measures the change in 
futures price between the time of the survey release and the time of the announcement. 
As expected this variable was significant in our model of price change for the Short 
Sterling only. We also indicated that during our sample period, two major 
environmental changes occurred, namely the tick change for the FTSE 100 and the 
switch to the electronic trading system from the traditional open outcry, we found these 
changes to have an impact upon trade volume and its components. We accounted for 
these changes by including additional dummy variables into our model estimations. We 
utilised the survey data to extract two measure of the surprise element in the market 
following a repo rate announcement. In particular for our first measure of the surprise 
element, we followed Sun and Sutcliffe (2003) and separated our unexpected 
announcements into unexpected increases and unexpected decreases in repo rate. The 
second measure of the surprise element utilised information on the proportion of the 
market that correctly forecast the repo rate announcement as a measure of the market 
consensus following the release of an announcement. We found that any unexpected 
change in repo rate leads to a change in price for both contracts and that the response in 
these two markets to be asymmetric with unexpected increases exhibiting the larger 
price reaction. In general trading volume was not found to be associated with any
surprise in repo rate for the Short Sterling. We suggested, in a similar manner to Kandel 
and Pearson (1995), that market participants agreed with the announcements 
implications and therefore did not engage in any additional trading even though a price 
change occurred. However for the FTSE 100, we found volume to be significantly 
elevated following a surprise announcement. Additionally, for the FTSE 100 the 
response in volume was found to be asymmetric with unexpected increases exhibiting 
the larger volume reaction. Consistent with the uncertain information hypothesis (Brown 
et al. (1988)), we found volatility became elevated immediately following a surprise 
announcement, and although volatility returned to normal levels after 5 minutes for the 
FTSE 100, for the Short Sterling volatility remained persistently higher for at least 60 
minutes following an announcement.
In chapter three we provided further evidence on the price and volume adjustment of the 
Short Sterling and the FTSE 100 futures contracts in response to surprises in repo rate 
announcements. A major innovation of this chapter is to provide further evidence of the 
importance o f extracting the unexpected components associated with an announcement. 
Utilising survey data provided by Reuters we determined our measures o f the surprise 
element in the market following a repo rate announcement. We proposed additional 
measures that better capture the surprise element associated with an announcement. In 
our first analysis we use the popular method of capturing the difference between the 
forecast value and the actual announced value as a proxy of whether an announcement is 
generally expected or not expected. We focused on an announcement window extending 
from two minutes prior to an announcement to the first ten minutes following an 
announcement. Our results indicated that following a not-expected announcement both 
contracts react immediately, exhibiting large price changes, raised volatility and a higher 
frequency of larger trades. Although for the Short Sterling we found evidence o f an 
initial over-reaction, for the FTSE 100, we found evidence of a delay in reaction and 
interpreted this as being time where market participants reviewed the implications of the 
unexpected announcement. Although, we found evidence of a market reaction following 
an expected announcement, we interpreted this as a consequence of elevated trading 
activity by a minority of those that did not forecast the expected announcement. Further 
we found that when an announcement is separated in to its expected and not-expected
components, the adjustment process reveals a somewhat different pattern to that found 
in Ap Gwilym et al. (1998). More specifically we found that following an expected/not- 
expected announcement prices react more quickly/slowly than that found following an 
announcement in Ap Gwilym et al. (1998). This indicates that with the majority of the 
price adjustment being explained by the degree of surprise in the announcement, then 
the price adjustment processes found in studies such as Ap Gwilym et al. (1998), where 
announcements are not separated into expected and unexpected components, will have 
been diluted by the expected component associated with each announcement. This 
further confirms the importance of capturing the unexpected components associated 
with an announcement before conclusions are drawn regarding the adjustment process 
of financial prices to new information.
In our second analysis, we attempt to capture more precisely the surprise elements 
associated with each announcement. More specifically, utilising Reuters survey data we 
focus on the proportions of the market that forecasts a repo rate announcement decision 
either 25 or 50 basis points either side of the actual decision. We estimated three linear 
regression equations with our surprise elements as our explanatory variables and trade 
volume, trade frequency and trade size over the first 5-minutes following an 
announcement as our dependent variables. Our results indicate that for the Short 
Sterling, following a repo rate announcement much of the observed first 5-minute 
volume is a consequence of more frequent trading by those who forecast a repo rate 
announcement 25 basis points above the actual decision. Those participants who 
forecast a decision 25 basis points below the actual decision also traded more 
frequently, but their trades were smaller and so had no impact upon volume. Finally 
those who forecast a decision 50 basis points below the actual decision were found to 
trade less often. For the FTSE 100, much of the observed first 5-minute volume is a 
consequence of those who forecast a decision either 25 basis points above or below the 
actual decision. Those who forecast a decision 25 basis points above the decision were 
found to trade larger amounts more often compared with those who forecast a decision 
25 basis points below the decision who were only found to trade more frequently. 
Although we found those that forecast a decision o f 50 basis points from the actual 
decision explained very little of the observed elevated trading activity in the market
following an announcement, we explained this result to be a consequence of the small 
sample sizes in these 50 basis points from the actual announcement decision.
In chapter four, we generalised Hasbrouck’s (1991) VAR model to examine the price 
formation process o f the FTSE 100 futures contract. In a similar manner to Dufour and 
Engle (2000) we included time-of-day effects and the time between consecutive 
transactions as additional variables among the determinants of the price impact of a 
trade and the autocorrelation of trades. A major contribution of this chapter is to 
examine the role of time in the price formation process of an order driven market. Our 
results indicate that in contrast to Dufour and Engle (2000) time seems to matter more in 
the price formation process of an order driven market. In particular we found the time of 
the UK market open and close, the US open, as well as UK and US announcements to 
be highly significant. More specifically, we found that a buy transaction arriving after a 
long time interval has a lower price impact than a buy transaction arriving right after a 
previous trade. In addition, we found signed trades to exhibit strong positive 
autocorrelation and a buy order leads to an upward quote revision. In contrast with 
Hasbrouck (1991) and Dufour and Engle (2000), we found that when quotes are revised 
in an upward fashion, more buyers enter the market and similarly when quotes are 
revised in a downward fashion, more sellers enter the market.
In chapter five we model transaction durations using a similar autoregressive conditional 
duration framework to that first proposed in Engle and Russell (1998). Using FTSE 100 
futures contract transactions durations data a comparative analysis of both the 
exponential and the Weibull versions o f the ACD model was undertaken. We found that 
both the exponential and the Weibull only partially accounted for the intertemporal 
correlations present in our durations’ data. We accepted the null o f no excess dispersion 
in both the EACD and the WACD models. In addition we found 7 to be 1.06 and that we 
rejected the null hypothesis that 7 =1 , and therefore rejected the exponential in favour of 
the Weibull.
In chapter four we indicated that a relationship exists between the trade sign process and 
the trade intensity process. Following this, we proposed a two-state transition model for 
the trade sign process, where the two states correspond to either to a buyer-initiated
trade or a seller-initiated trade, and where the durations are modelled by a Log-ACD 
process. In addition, we included two additional market microstructure effects; these 
were the past average volume and the past average spread. Our results indicate that 7  
exceeds one for both states, and again we reject the exponential in favour of the Webull. 
We also found that as in the EACD and the WACD models, we find strong 
autoregressive effects, indicating a strong persistence in the dynamics o f the duration 
process, and that the inclusion of volume and spread hardly effects the estimates of the (3 
coefficients. The coefficients of both volume and spread were negative and significant. 
These results indicated that when average volume per trade increases, the next expected 
duration becomes smaller and similarly when average spread per trade increases, the 
next expected duration becomes smaller. Further we found volume for a buyer-initiated 
trade to be significantly different to volume for a seller-initiated trade in the trade 
intensity process.
I HU
Bibliography
Abhyankar, A., Copeland L.S. and Wong, W. (1999), LIFFE Cycles: Intraday Evidence 
from the FTSE 100 Stock Index Futures Market. European Journal o f Finance, 5: 123-39.
Admati, A.R. (1985), A Noisy Expectations Equilibrium for Multi-Asset Securities 
Markets. Econometrica, 53: 629-57.
Admati, A.R. and Pfleiderer, P. (1988), A theory of Intraday Patterns: Volume and Price. 
Review of Financial Studies, 1 (spring): 3-40.
Ajinkya, B.B. and Jain, P. (1989), The Behavior of Daily Stock Market Trading Volume. 
Journal o f Accounting and Economics, 11: 331-59.
Anderson, T., Bollerslev, T., Diebold, F. and Vega, C. (2003), Micro Effects of Macro 
Announcements: Real Time Price Discovery in Foreign Exchange. American Economic 
Review, 93 (March): 38-62.
Ap Gwilym, O., Buckle, M., Clare, A. and Thomas, S. (1998), The Transaction-by- 
Transaction Adjustment o f Interest Rate and Equity Index Futures Markets to 
Macroeconomic Announcements. The Journal of Derivatives, 6  (No.2): 7-17.
Ap Gwilym, O., and Evamena, A. (2003), Decreased Price Clustering in FTSE 100 
Futures Contracts Following a Transfer from Floor to Electronic Trading. Journal of 
Futures Markets, 23 (No.7): 647-59.
Bachelier, L. (1900), Theory of Speculation (Translation of the 1900 French Edition). In 
the Random Character of Stock Prices, P.H. Cootner, ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
(1964), 17-78.
Balduzzi, P., Elton, E.J. and Green, T.C. (2001), Economic News and Bond Prices: 
Evidence from the U.S. Treasury Market. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
36 (No.4): 523-44.
Bamber, L. and Cheon, Y. (1995), Differential Price and Volume Reactions to 
Accounting Earnings Announcements. Accounting Review, 62 (July): 510-32.
Bamber, L.S., Barron, O.E. and Stober, T.L. (1999). Differential interpretations and 
trading volume. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 34 (3): 369-386.
Barclay, M.J. and Litzenberger, R.H. (1988), Announcement Effects of New Equity 
Issues and the Use of Intraday Price Data. Journal of Financial Economics, 21: 71-99.
Bauwens, L. and Giot, P. (2000), The Logarithmic ACD Model: An Application to the 
Bid-Ask Quote Process of Three NYSE Stocks. Annales d’Economie et de Statistique, 
60: 117-49.
Bauwens, L. and Giot, P. (2003), Asymmetric ACD Models: Introducing Price 
Information in ACD Models with a Two State Transition Model. Empirical Economics, 
28 (4): 709-31.
Bauwens, L. and Veredas, D. (2002), The Stochastic Conditional Duration Model: A 
Latent Variable Model for the Analysis of Financial Durations. Journal of Econometrics, 
(forthcoming).
Beaver, W.H. (1968), The Information Content of Annual Earnings Annouuncements. 
Empirical Research in Accounting: Selected Studies. Supplement to Journal of 
Accounting Research, 6 : 67-92.
Becker, K.G., Finnerty, J.E. and Kopecky, K.J. (1993), Economic News and Intraday 
Volatility in International Bond Markets. Financial Analysts Journal, 49: 81-6.
I HZ
Becker, K.G., Finnerty, J.E. and Friedman, J. (1995a), Economic News and Equity 
Market Linkages between the US and the UK. Journal o f Banking and Finance, 19: 1191- 
210.
Becker, K.G., Finnerty, J.E. and Kopecky, K.J. (1995b), Domestic Macroeconomic News 
and Foreign Interest Rates. Journal of International Money and Finance, 14: 763-83.
Becker, K.G., Finnerty, J.E. and Kopecky, K.J. (1996), Macroeconomic News and the 
Efficiency of the International Bond Futures Markets. The Journal o f Futures Markets, 16 
(no.2): 131-45.
Blume, L.E., Easley, D. and O ’Hara, M. (1994), Market Statistics and Technical 
Analysis: The Role of Volume. Journal of Finance, 49: 153-82.
Brown, K.C., Harlow, W.V. and Tinic, S.M. (1988), Risk Aversion, Uncertain 
Information and Market Efficiency. Journal o f Financial Economics, 22: 355-89.
Brown, D.P. and Jennings, R.H. (1989), On Technical Analysis. Review of Financial 
Studies, 2: 527-55.
Brown, P., Clinch, G. and Foster, G. (1992), Market Microstructure and Capital Market 
Information Content Research. American Accounting Association, 32.
Buckle, M., Ap Gwilym, O., Thomas, S.H. and Woodhams, M.S. (1998), Intraday 
Empirical Regularities in Interest Rate and Equity Index Futures Markets, and the Effect 
o f Macroeconomic Announcements. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 25: 
921-44.
Campbell, J.Y., Grossman, S.J. and Wang, J. (1993), Trading Volume and Serial 
Correlation in Stock Returns. Quarterly Journal of Economics-Cambridge Massachusetts, 
108: 905-39.
Chan, K.C., Christie, W.G. and Schultz, P.H. (1994), Market Structure and the Intraday 
Pattern ofBid-Ask Spreads for NASDAQ Securities. Journal of Business, 6 8 : 35-60.
Chan, K.C. and Fong, W.M. (2000), Trade size, order imbalance, and the volatility- 
volume relation. Journal of Financial Economics, 57: 247-73.
Clark, P. (1973), A subordinated Stochastic Process Model with Finite Variance for 
Speculative Prices. Econometrica, 41: 135-56.
Copeland, T.E. (1976), A Model of Asset Trading under the Assumption of Sequential 
Information Arrival. Journal o f Finance, 31 (September): 1149-68.
Cornell, B. (1983), The Money Supply Announcement Puzzle: Review and 
Interpretation. American Economic Review, 73 (September): 644 -  57.
Crain, S.J. and Lee, J.H. (1995), Intradaily Volatility in Interest Rate and Foreign 
Exchange Spot and Futures Markets. Journal o f Futures Markets, 15 (no.4): 395-421.
De Jong, F., Nijman, T. and Roell, A. (1996), Price Effects of Trading and Components 
o f the Bid-Ask Spread on the Paris Bourse. Journal of Empirical Finance, 3: 193-214.
Diamond, D.W. and Verrechia, R.E. (1987), Constraints on Short-Selling and Asset Price 
Adjustment to Private Information. Journal of Financial Economics, 18: 277-311.
Diamond, W.D. and Verrechia, R.E. (1981), Information Aggregation in Noisy Rational 
Expectations Economy. Journal of Financial Economics, 9 (September): 221-35.
Dufour, A. and Engle, R.F. (2000), Time and the Price Impact of a Trade. Journal of 
Finance, LV (No.6 ): 2467-98.
Easley, D. and O ’Hara, M. (1987), Price, Trade Size and Information in Securities 
Markets. Journal of Financial Economics, 19: 69-90.
Easley, D. and O ’Hara, M. (1992), Time and the Process of Security Price Adjustment. 
Journal of Finance, 19: 69-90.
Eckman, P.D. (1992), Intraday Patterns in the S & P 500 Index Futures Market. Journal 
o f Futures Market, 12: 365-81.
Ederington, L.H. and Lee, J.H. (1993), How Markets Process Information: News 
Releases and Volatility. Journal of Finance, XLVIII (No.4): 1161-91.
Ederington, L.H. and Lee, J.H. (1994), The Response of the Dollar/Yen Exchange Rate to 
Macroeconomic Announcements. Financial Engineering and the Japanese Markets, 1: 
111-28.
Ederington, L.H. and Lee, J.H. (1995), The Short-Run Dynamics of the Price Adjustment 
to New Information. Journal o f Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 30 (March): 117-34.
Engle, R and Russell, J. (1997), Forecasting the Frequency of Changes in Quoted Foreign 
Exchange Prices with the Autoregressive Conditional Duration Model. Journal of 
Empirical Finance, 4: 187-212.
Engle, R.F. (2000), The Econometrics o f Ultra-High Frequency Data, Econometrica, 6 8 : 
1- 22 .
Engle, R.F. and Russell, J.R. (1994), Forecasting Transaction Rates: The Autoregressive 
Conditional Duration Model, NBER Working Paper, (ISSN 0898-2937), Issue. 4966.
Engle, R.F. and Russell, J.R. (1998), Autoregressive Conditional Duration: A New Model 
for Irregularly Spaced Transaction Data. Econometrica, 6 6  (No.5), 1127-62.
Epps, T.W. (1975), Security Price Changes and Transaction Volumes: Theory and 
Evidence. American Economic Review, 65: 586-97.
Fama, E. (1970), Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work. 
Journal of Finance, 25: 383-417.
Fama, E.F. and Schwert, G.W. (1977), Asset Returns and Inflation. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 5 (November): 115-46.
Foster, F. and Viswanathan, S. (1993), Variations in Trading Volume, Return Volatility 
and Trading Costs: Evidence on Recent Price Formation Models. Journal of Finance, 48: 
187-211.
Garbade, K.D. and Lieber, Z.L. (1977), On the Independence o f Transactions on the New 
York Stock Exchange. Journal of Banking and Finance, 1: 151-72.
Garman, M.B. (1976), Market Microstructure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 257- 
75.
Geweke, J., Meese, R. and Dent, W. (1983), Comparing Alternative Tests of Causality in 
Temporal Systems: Analytic Results and Experimental Evidence. Journal of 
Econometrics, 21: 161 -94.
Ghysels, E. and Jasiak, J. (1994), Stochastic Volatility and Time Deformation: An 
Application to Trading Volume and Leverage Effects. C.R.D.E., Universite de Montreal, 
unpublished manuscript. Journal of Econometrics (forthcoming)
Ghysels, E., Gourieroux, C. and Jasiak, J. (1998), Stochastic Volatility Duration Models. 
Journal of Econometrics, (forthcoming).
Glosten, L.R. and Milgrom, P. (1985), Bid Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist 
Market with Heterogeneously Informed Agents. Journal o f Financial Economics, 14: 71- 
100.
Grammig, J. and Maurer, K.-O. (2000), Non-Monotonic Hazard Functions and the 
Autoregressive Conditional Duration Model. The Econometrics Journal, 3: 16-38.
Grossman, J. (1981), The "Rationality" o f Money Supply Expectations and the Short-Run 
Response of Interest Rates to Monetary Surprises. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 
13 (November): 409-24.
Grundy, B.D. and McNichols, M. (1989), Trade and Revelation of Information Through 
Prices and Direct Disclosure. Review of Financial Studies, 2: 495-526.
Hardouvelis, G.A. (1988), Economic News, Exchange Rates and Interest Rates. Journal 
of International Money and Finance, 7: 23-5.
Hasbrouck, J. (1988), Trades, Quotes, Inventories and Information. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 22: 229-52.
Hasbrouck, J. (1991), Measuring the Information Content of Stock Trades. The Journal of 
Finance, XLVI (Nol): 179-207.
Hasbrouck, J. (1996), Modeling Market Microstructure Time Series, in G.S. Maddala and 
Calyampudi R.Rao, eds: Handbook of Statistics, 14: Statistical Methods in Finance 
(Elsevier, North Holland, Amsterdam)
Hasbrouck, J. and Ho, T.S.Y. (1987), Order Arrival, Quote Behavior and the Return 
Generating Process. Journal of Finance, 42: 1035-48.
Hasbrouck, J. (2000), The Dynamics of Discrete Bid and Ask Quotes. Journal of Finance, 
54: 2109-42.
Hausman, J.A., Lo, A.W. and MacKinlay, A.C. (1992), An Ordered Probit Analysis of 
Transaction Stock Prices. Journal of Financial Economics, 31: 319-79.
Hellwig, M.F. (1980), On the Aggregation o f Information in Competitive Markets. 
Journal of Economic Theory, 22 (July): 477-98.
Holthausen, R.W. and Verrecchia, R.E. (1990), The Effect of Informedness and 
Consensus on Price and Volume Behavior. The Accounting Review (January), 65: 191- 
208.
Huang, R.D. and Masulis, R.W. (1999), FX Spreads and Dealer Competition across the 
24-Hour Trading Day. Review of Financial Studies, 12: 61-94.
Jain, P.C. and Joh G.-H. (1988), The Dependence between Hourly Prices and Trading 
Volume. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 23: 269-83.
Jain, P.C. (1988), Response of Hourly Stock Prices and Trading Volume to Economic 
News. Journal of Business, 61 (no.2): 219-31.
Jasiak, J. (1999), Persistence in Intertrade durations, Discussion Paper, York University 
Montreal.
Jennings, R. and Starks, L. (1985), Information Content and the Speed of Stock Price 
Adjustment. Journal of Accounting Research, 23: 336- 50.
Jones, C.M., Kaul, G. and Lipson, M.L. (1994), Transactions, Volume and Volatility. 
Review of Financial Studies, 7: 631-51.
Kandel, E. and Pearson, N. (1995), Differential Interpretation o f Public Signals and Trade 
in Speculative Markets. Journal of Political Economy, 103 (Aug): 831-72.
Karpoff, J.M. (1986), A Theory of Trading Volume. Journal of Finance, XLI 
(December): 1069-87.
Kim, O. and Verrecchia, R.E. (1991a), Market Reaction to Anticipated Announcements. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 30: 273-309.
Kim, O. and Verrecchia, R.E. (1991b), Trading Volume and Price Reactions to Public 
Announcements. Journal of Accounting Research, 29: 302-321.
Kmenta, J. (1971), Elements o f Econometrics, Macmillan, New York.
Kyle, A. (1985), Continuous Time Auctions and Insider Trading. Econometrica, 53: 
1315-36.
Laux, P. (1993), Intraday Price Formation in the Stock Index Futures Market. Working 
Paper. Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University.
Leng, H. (1996), Announcement versus Nonannouncement: A Study of Intraday 
Transaction Price Paths of Deutsche Mark and Japanese Yen Futures. Journal of Futures 
Markets, 16: 829-57.
Li, L. and Engle, R.F. (1995), Macroeconomic Announcements and Volatility in 
Treasury Futures, Discussion Paper no.98-27, Economics Department, University of 
California, San Diego.
Lunde, A. (1999), A Generalised Gamma Autoregressive Conditional Duration Model. 
Working Paper. Department of Economics, University of Aarhus.
McQueen, G. and Roley, V. (1993), Stock Prices, News and Business Conditions. 
Review of Financial Studies, 6 : 683-707.
Muller, U.A., Dacorogna, M.M., Olsen, R.B., Picket, O.V., Schwarz, M. and Morgenegg, 
C. (1990), Statistical Study of Foreign Exchange Rates, Empirical Evidence of a Price 
ChangeScaling Law, and Intraday Analysis. Journal of Banking and Finance, 14:1189- 
1208.
Nelson, D.B. (1991), Conditional Heteroskedasticity in Asset Returns: A New Approach. 
Econometrica, 59: 349-70.
Patell, J. and Wolfson, M. (1984), The Intraday Speed of Adjustment of Stock Prices to 
Earnings and Dividend Announcements. Journal of Financial Economics, 13: 223-52.
Pearce, D.K. and Roley, V.V. (1985), Stock Prices and Economic News. Journal of 
Business, 58 (Jan): 49-67.
Regulez, M. and Zarraga, A. (2002), Common Features between Stock Returns and 
Trading Volume. Applied Financial Economics, 12: 885-93.
Werner, I.M. and Kleidon, A.W. (1996), UK an US trading of British Cross-Listed 
Stocks: An Intraday Analysis of Market Integration. Review of Financial studies, 9: 615- 
59.
Roley, V.V. (1982), The Effect of Federal Debt-Management Policy on Corporate Bond 
and Equity Yields. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97: 645-68.
Roley, V.V. and Troll, R. (1983), The impact of New Economic Information on the 
Volatility of Short-Term Interest Rates. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Economic 
Review: 3-15.
Schirm, D.C., Sheehan, R.G. and Ferri, M.G. (1989), Financial Market Responses to 
Treasury Debt Announcements. Journal o f Money, Credit and Banking, 21 (August): 
394-400.
Schwert, G.W. (1981), The Adjustment of Stock Prices to Information and Inflation. 
Journal of Finance, 36 (March): 15-29.
Sheehan, R.G. (1985), Weekly Money Supply Announcements: New Information and its 
Effects. Review Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis, 67 (Aug/Sep): 25-34.
Smirlock, M. (1986), Inflation Announcements and Financial Markets Reaction: 
Evidence from the Long-Term Bond Market. Review of Economics and Statistics, 6 8  
(May): 329-33.
Stock, J. (1988), Estimating Continuous Time Processes Subject to Time Deformation. 
Journal o f the American Statistical Association, 83: 77-85.
Sun, P. and Sutcliffe, C. (2003), Scheduled Announcements and Volatility Patterns: The 
Effects of Monetary Policy Committee Announcements on LIBOR and Short Sterling 
Futures and Options. Journal o f Futures Markets, 23: 773-98.
Tauchen, G. and Pitts, M. (1983), The Price Variability-Volume Relationship on 
Speculative Markets. Econometrica, 51: 485-505.
Tonks, I. (1996), The Equivalence of Screen Based continuous-Auction and Dealer 
Markets, Special Paper- LSE Financial Markets Group, 92: (ISSN 1359-9151).
Tse, Y. and Zabotina, T. (2001), Transaction Costs and Market Quality: Open Outcry 
Versus Electronic Trading. Journal of Futures Markets, 21: 713-35.
Urich, T. and Wachtel, P. (1981), Market Response to the Weekly Money Supply 
Announcements in the 1970s. The Journal of Finance, 36 (December): 1063-72.
Urich, T. and Wachtel, P. (1984), The Effect o f Inflation and Money Supply 
Announcements on Interest Rates. Journal of Finance, 39 (September): 1177-88.
Verrechia, R.E. (1981), On the Relationship between Volume Reaction and Consensus of 
Investors: Implications for Interpreting Tests of Information Content. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 19 (Spring): 271-83.
Wang, G.H.K., Michalski, R.H., Jordan, J.V. and Moriarty, E.J. (1994), An Intra-Day 
Analysis of Bid-Ask Spreads and Price Volatility in the S&P 500 Index Futures Market. 
Journal of Futures Markets, 14: 837-59.
Wood, R.A., Mclnish, T.H. and Ord, J.K. (1985), An Investigation o f Transaction Data 
for NYSE Stocks. Journal of Finance, 4: 723-41
Woodruff, C.S. and Senchack, Jr.A.J. (1988), Intradaily Price-Volume Adjustment of 
NYSE Stocks to Unexpected Earnings. Journal of Finance, 43 (June): 467-91.
